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I. Introduction 
A. Prologue 
The jury trial underwent a remarkable rebirth in Russia between 1993 
and 1994.1 That rebirth and the move from inquisitorial to adversarial pro-
cedure were central to the "Concept of]udicial Reform," which was passed 
nearly unanimously by the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Soviet Federated 
Socialist Republic (RSFSR) on October 21, 1991, as the Soviet Union was 
crumbling? The reforms were seen to be prime catalysts for the democra-
tization and humanization of the Soviet-Russian criminal justice system as 
the country moved from a totalitarian system with a command economy to 
democracy and capitalism.3 
In the latter years of perestroyka, the "restructuring" of the Soviet sys-
tem undertaken by Mikhail S. Gorbachev, a broadening of the freedom of 
the press (so-called glasnost or transparency) led to widespread criticism of 
the Soviet-era court system for its inability to provide a quality of justice 
worthy of a civilized country. 4 All Soviet trial courts were composed of one 
professional judge and two lay judges called "people's assessors." The lat-
ter were derisively called "nodders" because they were completely depen-
dent on, and failed meaningfully to check, the power of the professional 
judge.5 The professional judge, in turn, was completely dependent on 
instructions from party or other local officials (so-called ''telephone law")6 
1. See generally Stephen C. Thaman, The Resurrection of Trial by jury in Russia, 31 
STAN.]. h;r'L L. 61 (1995) (chronicling Russia's transition toward jury trials in the early 
1990's). 
2. 0 Kontseptsii Sudebnoy Reformy, VEDOMosn RSFSR, lssue No. 44, Item No. 1435 
(1991), reprinted in KoNTSEPTSIIA SlJDEBKOY REFORMY v RosSlYSKOY FEDER>\Tsn (1992) 
[hereinafter Concept of]udicial Reform]. 
3. Id. at 40-41, 80, 85. 
4. A study in 1986 reported that each year approximately 2,500 citizens were ille-
gally arrested and more than 3,000 wrongfully prosecuted. Todd Foglesong, Habeas 
Corpus or \Vho Has the Body? judicial Review of Arrest and Pretrial Detention in Russia, 14 
Wts. 1NT'L LJ. 541, 547 (1996). Central to these revelations was the fact that many 
innocent people had been convicted. Emblematic of this situation was the conviction 
and sentencing to death of twelve innocent persons in Vitebsk for the crimes of 
Mikhasevich, a maniac who killed thirty-three women. At least one of the innocent was 
executed. V.V. MEL'NlK, 1sKussTVo ZASHCHlTY v SuDE PRlSlAZHNYKH 25-26 (2003). 
5. See Thaman, supra note 1, at 67. These "people's assessors" have also been 
called "pawns in the hands of the judge" and "wordless judges." V.V. MEL'NJK, lsKUSSTVO 
DoKAZAZYVANJIA W SosnAZATEL'NoM UGoLOVNOM PROTSESSE 19 (2000). 
6. ln a 1988 survey of 120 judges, sixty reported that within the past year they had 
been approached by a party or government official with a suggestion as to how to decide 
a particular case. GoRDON B. SMITH, REFORMING THE RussiAN LEGAL SYSTEM 68 (1996). 
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and the powerful public prosecutor's office (prokuratura). This resulted in 
routine rubber-stamping of the results of preliminary investigations and 
the virtual absence of acquittal judgments, despite universal recognition of 
the poor quality of police investigative work. 7 
Unable or unwilling properly to investigate crimes, investigative 
organs resorted to coercing confessions.8 There was virtually no adver-
sarial challenge to the credibility of the evidence gathered in secrecy by law 
enforcement officials, as adversary procedure and the presumption of inno-
cence had long been impugned as institutions of bourgeois legal culture. 9 
The trial judge would effectively prejudge the case in the pre-trial stage by 
deciding the sufficiency of the evidence, and then transform himself into a 
trier of fact at trial, armed with what was tantamount to a presumption of 
guilt. 10 If the evidence turned out to be insufficient to establish guilt, the 
judge would send the case back to the investigating officials with the 
understanding that "new" evidence would need to be found. When such 
evidence was not found, the case would simply disappear without an 
acquittal to clear the name of the accused. 11 
A new adversary system of jury trial was preliminarily introduced in 
1993-1994 in nine political constituents of the Russian Federation. 12 The 
new Constitution of the Russian Federation of 1993 contained rights to 
jury trial, adversary procedure, the presumption of innocence, and the 
mandatory exclusion of illegally gathered evidence.13 Finally, the new 
Criminal Procedure Code of the Russian Federation, passed in December 
2001, led to the extension of the jury trial to the entire Republic ""ith the 
exception of Chechnya in 2003-2004. The same code also completely elim-
Another study estimated that party officials intervened in 10 to 12 percent of all cases. 
I d. 
7. See Thaman, supra note 1, at 66-68. 
8. RoBERT CoNQUEST, THE GREAT TERROR: A REASSESSMENT 121-24 (1990). 
9. l.L PE'TRUKHlN, TEORETICHESKlE OSNOVY REFORMY UGOLOVNOGO PROTSESSA V Rossu 
PART Il 122 (2005). 
10. For more on how this "file prejudice" poisoned the Soviet-Russian trial, see L M. 
KARNozovA, VozROZHDENNYY Suo PRtSV\ZHNYKH 155 (2000). For more on how it is the 
most important reason for the judge's prosecutorial bias, see MEL'NIK, supra note 5, at 
35. 
11. Peter H. Solomon, Jr., The Case of the Vanishing Acquittal: Informal Norms and the 
Practice of Soviet Criminal justice, 39 SoviET STuD. 531, 547 (1987). 
12. The 1993 jury Law amended the 1960 Soviet era Code of Criminal Procedure. 
UGOLOVNO-PROTSESSUAL'Kn KoDEKS RSFSR S PRILOZHENIA:Vn (N.P. Kipnis ed., 2d. ed. 
200 l) [hereinafter UPK-RSFSR]. 
13. Atticle 47 of the Constitution of the Russian Federation (adopted on December 
12, 1993), guarantees right to trial by jury and Art. 20 the right to a jury trial in cases 
where capital punishment is threatened. Konstitutsiia Rossiyskoy Federatsii, KoMTITUTSn 
STRN"' SNG (1999), at 262-296 [hereinafter Canst. RF] (translated by the author). In 
1996 Russia declared a moratorium on the imposition of capital punishment, but the 
penalty is still included in the Russian Penal Code. See Stephen C. Thaman, Comparative 
Criminal Law and Enforcement: Russia, in E~cYCLOPEDIA Of CruME &: JusTicE 207, 215 
Qoshua Dressler ed., 2d. ed. 2001). Art. 123(4) provides for adversary procedure; art. 
49(1) guarantees the presumption of innocence; and finally, art. 50(2) requires exclu-
sion of illegally gathered evidence. Canst. RF, supra note 13. The aforementioned rights 
had actually already been included by amendment in the Soviet-era Constitution by 
1992. See Thaman, supra note 1, at 77. 
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inated the Soviet-era mixed court with people's assessors. 14 This article 
will explore the extent to which the Russian jury system has achieved cer-
tain goals crucial to the reformation of inquisitorial Soviet practices. 
In Section II, I discuss how transferring the power to determine guilt 
from judges to lay jurors in criminal cases can promote the independence 
of Russian judges. After briefly describing the political influences on 
judges, I discuss legal and practical factors that effectively limit the number 
of cases that are actually tried in the jury court. These include limitations 
on the jurisdiction of the jury court, manipulation of charges to circumvent 
juries, and plea bargaining or waiver of the right to jury trial by the 
defendant. 
Section Ill explores the extent to which the presumption of innocence, 
new rules of adversary procedure, and the exclusionary rule have curbed 
the prosecutor's dominance of the trial judge and promoted acquittals in 
cases involving insufficient evidence. Here, I emphasize the extent to 
which coerced confessions still find their way into Russian jury trials, the 
peculiar role of the victim as the prosecutor's 'Trojan horse" in the new 
adversary procedure, the abusive remand of cases to investigators before 
the jury can reach a verdict, and the persistence of secret trials and secret 
evidence. 
Section IV focuses on the extent to which the introduction of the jury 
system has humanized the administration of criminal justice. To this end, 
the jury alone should be responsible for deciding guilt and should acquit if 
the evidence is insufficient to establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. 
The reformers indeed felt that jurors should be able to avoid the strict 
application of the law and return verdicts of not guilty for humanitarian 
reasons, even if the evidence conclusively established guilt. They also gave 
the jury the power to prescribe lenient sentences consistent with their 
consciences. 
Unfortunately, even in cases submitted to the jury for decision, the 
Supreme Court of the Russian Federation (SCRF) has effectively co-opted 
jurors' competence to decide guilt, reducing them to mere fact-finders 
while reposing the ultimate power to determine guilt in the judge. This 
division of labor strips the jury of a critical responsibility and undermines 
its function as a check on the power of the trial judge. 
Section V details the factors contributing to the high reversal rate of 
acquittals in Russian jury cases. Acquittals may be appealed by the prose-
cutor or the aggrieved party, and Russian law does not require the appeal-
ing party to make a timely objection. Thus, the SCRF, which hears all 
appeals in cassation from jury court judgments, has virtually unfettered 
discretion to overturn the judgment of the trial court and, indeed, reverses 
the great majority of acquittals which are appealed. These liberal appeal 
rules enable the judge and prosecutor collusively to introduce trial errors, 
14. UGOLOVNO-PROTSESSUAL'NYY KODEKS RosSJYSKOY FEDERATSJJ (2005) (hereinafter 
UPK-RF] (adopted by the State Duma on November 22, 2001, approved by the Federa-
tion Council on December 5, 2001, and signed by the President of the Russian Federa-
tion on December 18, 2001). 
360 Cornell International Law journal Vol. 40 
in order to assure a grounds for reversal in the event of acquittal. Even 
without such collusion, the rules of adversary procedure and the exclusion-
ary rule, along with the highly confusing Russian special jury verdict, allow 
the SCRF to turn against the defendants rules originally meant to protect 
them. This renders human rights guarantees ineffectual and essentially 
maintains the inquisitorial appellate practices that were the mainstay of the 
old Soviet "error-free" justice. 
The introduction of the jury trial was aimed at expanding the partici-
pation of the citizenry in the administration of justice and democratizing 
the judicial branch of government. It was intended to school citizens in the 
rule of law and develop public confidence in the judiciary and the legal 
system. Section VI discusses the pros and cons of the complete elimination 
of the court with lay assessors, and whether that court could have been 
democratically transformed and maintained as the trial court for crimes of 
moderate seriousness. Section VI also discusses the attitude of the Russian 
citizenry toward jury duty, both prospectively and retrospectively. 
My regrettable conclusion in Section VII is that these ambitious 
reforms increasingly appear to be democratic window-dressing for a system 
that functions in the same manner as its forerunner. Instead of allowing 
the jury to counteract the old acquittal-free criminal jurisprudence, the 
courts and the legislature have collaborated to nullify the Russian jury as 
an independent judicial organ. I will recommend reforms to rehabilitate 
the Russian jury system, which may also prove instructive for the former 
Soviet republics of Eurasia 15 and for countries in the Asian Far East, 16 
where totalitarian or authoritarian or judge-dominated systems continue to 
produce significant numbers of erroneous convictions. 17 
Before beginning the analysis of the questions posed above, it is impor-
tant briefly to trace Russia's earlier experiences with jury trial and the 
mixed court from 1864 through the collapse of the Soviet Union. Russia's 
15. The right to jury trial is guaranteed in the following post-Soviet constitutions: 
The Constitution of the Republic of Armenia, art. 91(2), KoNST!Tursn STRAN SNG (1999), 
at 66; The Constitution of Kazakhstan, art. 75(2), KoNsnruTsu STRAN SNG (1999), at 
184; The Constitution of Ukraine, arts. 124( 4), 127(1), 129(2), KoNSTITUTSn STRAN SNG 
(1999), at 399-400; The Constitution of Georgia, art. 82(5), available at http://www. 
constcourt.gov.ge/?item_id= 17 &language_id=2. Legislation is already on the books to 
implement the jury trial in Azerbaijan, see Ugolovno-protsessuai'nyy hodehs Azerbaydzhan-
shoy Respublihi, Law No. 907-ll, §§ 24(1), 78(3), 79, 82,362-80 Quly 14, 2000) [herein-
after UPK-Azerbaijan]) and Kazakhstan, see Ugolovno-protsessual'nyy hodehs Respublihi 
Kazakhstan,§§ 543-77 Qan. 16, 2006) [hereinafter UPK-Kazakhstan]; Zahon Respublihi 
Kazahhstan, 0 prisiazhnyhh zasedateley, No. 121 Qan. 16, 2006) [hereinafter jury Law-
Kazakhstan]. 
16. See Hiroshi Fukurai, The Rebirth of japan's Petit Quasi-jury and Grand jury Sys-
tems: A Cross-National Analysis of Legal Consciousness and the Lay Participatory Experi-
ence in japan and the U.S., 40 CoRNELL 1NT'L LJ 315 (2007). 
17. In relation to democratic Japan, see David T. johnson, Plea Bargaining in japan, 
in THE jAPANESE ADvERSARY SYSTEM IN CoNTEXT 140, 161 (Malcolm M. Feeley & Setsuo 
Miyazawa eds., 2002). The low acquittal rate, accounting for .11 percent in 1992, has 
been attributed to Japan's "precision justice" (seimitsu shih6). Karl-Friedrich Lenz, 
Liinderbericht: japan, in DIE BEWEISAUFNAHME !M SrRAFVERFAHRENSRECHT DES AusLANDS 
195, 204 (Walter Perron ed., 1995). 
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experience in these years paralleled the rise and fall of the jury in continen-
tal Europe and the development of its inquisitorial relative, the mixed court 
with lay assessors. Its experiences are also important in analyzing the 
questions discussed in the body of the article. This brief history will be 
followed by an equally brief summary of Russian jury trial procedure. 
B. Lay Participation in Continental European and Russian History 
The issue of lay participation invariably touches separation of powers 
principles. 18 The most repressive regimes throughout human history have 
always been supported by a professional career judiciary without lay par-
ticipation, and an inquisitorial system in which the ideology of the search 
for truth had strict priority over human rights concerns. Democratic, egali-
tarian countries can exist without lay participation, but it is difficult for 
repressive dictatorships to exist with it, unless it is deformed into a kanga-
roo court of yes-sayers. 19 
Lay participation in the administration of justice has traditionally 
been seen as a "right-duty" of a democratic citizenry.20 It serves to legiti-
mize the imposition of criminal penalties, build public confidence in the 
criminal justice system, and educate individuals to be law-abiding 
citizens. 21 
In the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries, the right to trial 
by jury became a rallying cry of English religious dissidents and republi-
cans in their struggles against repression. 22 The transformation of the jury 
from an institution of customary law to a check on despotism accounts for 
the constitutionalization of the right to trial by jury in the United States,23 
and to its becoming a battle cry in the French Revolution and the anti-
monarchist movements on the European Continent that followed. 24 
The jury trial was introduced in France in 1789 and in most German 
states after the abortive revolutions of 1848 (though the Rhine States had 
maintained the institution since the time of Napoleonic occupation). It 
was extended to all of Germany through the unification of 1871. Russia 
introduced trial by jury in the great judicial reforms instituted by Tsar 
Alexander II in 1864, and nearly all European countries followed suit with 
18. De Tocqueville saw it primarily as a political institution. ALEXIS DE TocQUEVILLE, 
DE LA DEMOCRATIE El" AMERIQUE, vol. I, 371-73 (1981). 
19. I d. at 3 7 4 ("All the sovereigns who have wanted to base in themselves the source 
of their power and direct society rather than let themselves be directed by it, have 
destroyed the institution of the jury or weakened it."). 
20. Stephen C. Thaman, Spain Returns to Trial by jury, 21 HASTII"GS ll"T'L & CoMP. L 
REv. 241, 265 (1998). 
21. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 187-188 ( 1968) (Harlan, J, dissenting). 
22. THOMAS ANDREW GREEN, VERDICT ACCORDII"G TO CoNSCIENCE: PERSPECTIVES ON 
THE ENGLISH CRIMINAL TRIAL jURY, 1200-1800 153-355 ( 1985). 
23. U.S. CoNST. amend. VI. 
24. fRANCOISE LOMBARD, LESjURES: jUSTICE REPRESENTATIVE ET REPRESENTATIONS DE LA 
JUSTICE 146-50 (1989). 
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the exception of the Netherlands. 25 But these reforms were not only politi-
cal. Trial by jury was seen as preservative of the presumption of inno-
cence, the principles of immediacy and the oral trial, and the evidentiary 
standard of intime conviction - all of which became recognized as indispen-
sable in any civilized criminal justice system. 26 
A competing form of lay participation in continental Europe was the 
court with lay assessors or "mixed court," first introduced as the Schof-
Jengericht in 1818 in Wurttemberg, and later included for the trial of lesser 
crimes in the 1871 German Code of Criminal Procedure. There, in its clas-
sic form, the mixed court comprised a panel of one professional judge and 
two lay assessors collegially deciding all questions oflaw, fact, and punish-
ment. 27 Throughout Europe, the enemies of trial by jury sought to abolish 
the jury court, which they blamed for "scandalous acquittals" and "nullifi-
cation of the law" based on popular emotion, ignorance, or outright rebel-
lion. They also criticized the division of legal labor between judges of fact 
(jurors) and judges of the law (judges) as premised on an artificial distinc-
tion between factual and legal questions. Another problem with the jury 
was that the appeals process required reasoned judgments. Some German 
supporters of the mixed court used blatantly chauvinistic arguments: the 
Schoffengerichte was an ancient German institution, whereas the jury was 
an English-French institution with no "folk" roots. 28 
The replacement of European monarchies by totalitarian dictatorships 
in the wake of World War I led to the abolition of the jury trial and its 
replacement with the German model of mixed court: in Russia in 1917 
following the Bolshevik Revolution and in 1924 in Germany following a 
decree of the minister of justice. The Fascists in Italy eliminated jury trials 
in 1931, the dictator Francisco Franco in Spain followed suit in 1939, and 
the Vichy government in France, which collaborated with Nazi Germany, 
did the same in 1941. Italy and France maintained a mixed court which 
was still called an assizes court, whereas Spain eliminated all lay 
participation. 29 
Prior to 1864, the Russian courts were subservient to notoriously cor-
rupt provincial governors and doled out justice to the highest bidder.30 
25. For a succinct list of the European and other countries which adopted trial by 
jury in wake of the French Revolution, see "''eil Vidmar, The Jury Elsewhere in the World, 
in WoRLD juRY SY<>TEMS 428-32 (Neil Vidmar ed., 2000). 
26. See K.]. t.1nTERMAIER, DAs Vot.KSGERICHT IN GESTALT DER ScHWUR- UND ScHOE-
EENGER!CHTE 21 (1866). 
27. CHRISTOPH RENNIG, DIE ENTSCHEmuNGSFINDt;NG DCRCH ScHOFFEN UND BERUF-
SR!CHTER IN RECHTLICHER UND PSYCHOLOG!SCHER S!CHT 33-34 (1993). 
28. Peter Landau, Schwurgerichte und SchOJJengerichte in Deutschland im 19. 
Jahrhundert bis 1870, in THE TRIAL juRY tN ENGLAND, fBANCE, GERMANY: 1700-1900 292-
302 (Antonio Padoa Schioppa ed., 1987). For a view linking the growing antipathy 
towards the jury and support for a mixed court to the triumph of positivism in Germany 
and the influence of Ferri and Garofalo, Italian theoreticians of social defense, see RICH-
ARD VoGLER, A WoRLD VlE\v oF CRtMINALjUSTICE 61-64, 236-38 (2006). 
29. Stephen C. Thaman, Europe's New Jury Systems, in WoRLD juRY SYSTEMS, supra 
note 25, at 324. 
30. MEL'NJK, supra note 5, at 20-21. 
2007 The Nullification of the Russian jury 363 
The 1864 reforms set up the framework for a genuinely independent judi-
ciary with life tenure and introduced trial by jury as a further guarantee of 
judicial liberation from control by the executive and local influences. The 
Bolshevik Decree on the Courts of December 7, 1917, however, put an end 
to the independent judiciary and replaced the jury with a mixed court com-
posed of one career judge, elected for a term of five years by the local party 
officials, and the two "people's assessors", selected by party-controlled 
worker, peasant, or housing collectives.31 Although the German Schof-
fengericht is the earliest modern model of a mixed court, the Bolshevik 
mixed court has been the most influential global model, serving as an 
example for mixed courts in the former Soviet republics, Eastern Europe, 
China and Vietnam. 32 
C. An Outline of Procedure in Russian jury Cases 
Procedure today in the Russian jury courts is based on the 2001 UPK-
RF and does not substantially differ from the procedure under the 1993 
jury Law.33 Many of its characteristics have been borrowed from the Code 
of Criminal Procedure34 and the judicial Code35 of 1864, which were effec-
tive until the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917. 
The defendant has the right to trial by jury in Russia in all criminal 
cases subject to the jurisdiction of the second-level courts of original juris-
diction, which includes formerly capital offenses such as aggravated mur-
der, other serious felonies, and some lesser crimes.36 The right belongs to 
the defendant and must be asserted.37 
Jurors are drawn from registered voters in the territorial jurisdiction in 
which the crime was committed. They must be at least 25 years of age and 
have no pending criminal cases or unexpunged criminal convictions.38 At 
31. SAMUEL KucHEROV, THE ORGANS OF SoviET i\.DMINISTRATJON OF JusTICE: THEIR Hrs. 
TORY AND OPERATION 34-44 (1970). 
32. See Stephen C. Thaman, Japan's New System of Mixed Courts: Some Suggestions 
Regarding Their Future Form and Procedures, 2001 ST. Louts-WARSAW TRANSATL. L.j. 89, 
91. 
33. For a detailed description of jury selection and trial under the 1993 law, see 
Thaman, supra note I, at 95-129. 
34. Ustav Ugolovnogo Sudoproizvodstva (signed by Tsar Alexander Il on Nov. 20, 
1864 ), reprinted in 8 ROSSIYSKOE ZAKONODATEL'STVO X-XX VEKOV 120-251 (B.V. Vilenskiy 
ed., 1991) [hereinafter UUS..1864]. 
35. Uchrezhdenie Sudebnykh Ustanovlenii (signed by Tsar Alexander ll on Nov. 20, 
1864), reprinted in 8 ROSSIYSKOE ZAKO"'ODATEL'STVO X-XX VEKOV, supra note 35, at 32-82 
[hereinafter USU-1864]. 
36. For a list of the crimes subject to trial by jury, see UPK-RF, supra note 14, 
§ 31(3). Capital cases were tried by military courts from 1864 through 1917. SAMUEL 
KucHEROV, CouRTS, LAWYERS AND TRIALS UNDER THE LAST THREE TsARs 204 (1953). 
37. At the dose of the preliminary investigation, the investigator, a legally-trained 
official in the Ministry of the Interior, advises the accused of the right to jury trial and, 
in the alternative, of the right to be tried by a panel of three professional judges. UPK-RF, 
supra note 14, § 217 (5). 
38. Federal'nyy zakon, 0 prisiazhnykh zasedateley Jederal'nykh sudov obshchey yuris-
dikzii Rossiyskoy Federatsii, No. ll3-F3, § 3(2)(1) (August 20, 2004), available at http:// 
ww>v.garant.ru/law/12036631-000.htm [hereinafter 2004 Law on Jurors]. Jurors in pre-
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least twenty prospective jurors must appear in court for jury selection to 
commence.39 During jury selection, the parties, including the aggrieved 
party, may conduct individual voir dire of the prospective jurors, which 
takes place in dosed session.4° Following any challenges "for cause," if 
more than fourteen of the original twenty jurors remain, then the prosecu-
tion, followed by the defense, may exercise a peremptory challenge. If the 
aggrieved party has expressed its desire to participate in the trial, then it 
constitutes one of the prosecuting parties and has a right to exercise per-
emptory challenges along with the public prosecutor.41 If more than one 
defendant is on trial, the defendants must either vote on each peremptory 
challenge or divide the peremptory challenges equally among them-
selves.42 The jury is ultimately composed of twelve jurors and two 
alternates.43 
Russian jury trials begin with the reading of the accusatory pleading, 
whereupon the judge asks the defendant whether she understands the 
pleading and admits guilt or maintains innocence. 44 Next, the prosecution 
and the defense give opening statements. 45 If the defendant decides to tes-
tify, she may do so at any time during the trial.46 If the defendant does not 
wish to testify at the beginning of trial, the prosecution parties first present 
their evidence, followed by the defenseY Unlike in the United States, the 
victim, or poterpevshiy, enjoys the rights of a full party. She may testify, 
present evidence, make motions, obtain professional legal representation, 
have full discovery of the contents of the preliminary investigation dossier, 
make a closing argument, and appeal a judgment of either acquittal or 
conviction. 48 
The closing arguments are followed by the formulation of the special 
verdict, or question list, that is submitted to the jury.49 The question list, 
explained in detail below, includes separ!lte questions dealing with the 
corpus delicti of the offense, the identity of the accused, and the guilt or 
innocence of the defendant. It may also include questions related to 
excuses, justification, or aggravating or mitigating circumstances. 5° After 
closing arguments, the presiding judge makes a summation in which she 
revolutionary Russia had to be between twenty-five and seventy years of age. USU-1864, 
supra note 36, § 81(2). 
39. UPK-RF, supra note 14, § 327(3). 
40. Id. §§ 328(8), (23). 
41. Thaman, supra note l, at n.225. See Thaman, supra note 29, at 243-44 for a 
discussion of the role of the victim in Russian jury trials. 
42. UPK-RF, supra note 14, § 328 (12)-(16). 
43. Id. §§ 30(2), 328(21). The pre-revolution jury court consisted of twelve jurors 
presided over by three professional judges, as was typical in Continental Europe at the 
time. See Thaman, supra note 29, at n.28. 
44. UPK-RF, supra note 14, § 273. 
45. Id. § 335(1). 
46. Id. § 274(3). 
47. Id. § 274(2). 
48. Id. § 42. 
49. Id. §§ 336-337. 
50. Id. § 339. The parallel sections of the UUS-1864 will also be discussed infra. 
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summarizes the evidence and the positions of the parties and explains the 
applicable law and the rules of deliberation, emphasizing the presumption 
of innocence, the resolution of doubt in favor of the defendant, and the 
principle that neither the defendant's silence nor inadmissible evidence 
may be used to prove guilt. 51 
The jury deliberations on the question of guilt must last for at least 
three hours unless the jury reaches a unanimous verdict sooner. 52 If the 
jury is not able to reach unanimity after three hours, it may return a verdict 
by majority vote. Where the vote is tied, the question is deemed to be 
decided in the defendant's favor. The jury may recommend lenience, 
which compels a sentence below the maximum and sometimes below the 
mandatory statutory minimum.53 
Following deliberations, the trial judge prepares the judgment and, 
based on the answers to the special jury verdict, either acquits or attaches a 
legal qualification to the wrongful acts proved.54 judgments of guilt and 
acquittal may be appealed in cassation based on errors of law, violations of 
the rules of criminal procedure, incorrect application of the criminal law, 
or the "injustice of the judgment. "55 Final judgments, either of guilt or 
acquittal, which have proceeded through the cassational instance may be 
appealed to a review instance (nadzor) or re-opened due to rediscovery of 
new evidence. 56 
II. The Dependence of the judiciary and the Extent to Which Juries 
Have Replaced Judges in Determining Guilt 
A. The Perceived Dependence and Corruption of the judiciary 
One of the main goals of judicial reform in Russia since perestroyka 
has been to create a judiciary truly independent of the executive branch. 
However, commentators have generally noted an increasing dependency of 
the judiciary on the office of the President of the Russian Federation, Vladi-
mir Putin.57 This has been achieved by substantial increases in salaries 
and the president's control of the chairpersons of the courts through his 
51. Id. § 340. 
52. Id. § 343. These rules were derived from the pre-revolution code. Thaman, supra 
note I, n.389. 
53. Id. § 349(2) (referring to the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation 
(Ugolovnyy Kodeks Rossiyskoy Federatsii, § 65(1) (Prospekt 2005) [hereinafter UK-RF])). 
54. UPK-RF, supra note 14, § 35 l. 
55. Id. § 379(1). 
56. Id. §§ 402-19. 
57. Sergey Pashin, a former Moscow City Court judge and one of the most promi-
nent reform voices in the Yel'tsin years, claims the new dominance of the presidency over 
the courts is a result of the influence of Dmitriy Kozak, the Administration's head of 
judicial reform, who was also influential in the passage of the UPK-RF and other laws. 
Yevgeniy Natarov, Sudy Bogdykhanov, GAZETA.Ru. (Nov. 26, 2003), available through 
DAYDZHFST TsENTRA SoDEYSTVUA PR.wosumrc PRJ foNDE INDEM [hereinafter INDEM] 
(Nov. 14-30, 2003), http://www.cja.ru/pages/index2.htm. 
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power of appointment.58 One could say that there is a vertical depen-
dency: lower district court judges are controlled by the chairpersons of 
their respective courts,59 who are controlled by the higher regional and 
territorial courts.60 They, in turn, are controlled by the SCRF. judges who 
contradict the will of the prosecutor or the judicial hierarchy are either 
reassigned to handle trivial cases or hounded out of the judiciary 
altogether.61 
Another concern is corruption of the judiciary. Bribery, though per-
haps more rampant in the civil and economic courts, also takes place in the 
criminal courts.62 Corruption is, even according to officials of the presi-
dential administration, the main reason why public trust in the courts is 
abysmally low.63 
58. According to Dmitriy Kozak, the administration intended to raise judicial salary 
fourfold in 2006 in order to reduce dependence of judges on the regional government. 
Grigoriy Vdovin, Razrabotka Reformy Zaniala Okolo Chetyrekh Mesiatsev, STRANA.RU 
(May 26, 2001), available at http:/ /strana.ru/state/kremlin/2001/05/26/990875332. 
html. 
59. The chairpersons of the courts, and now the new Judicial Administration, 
decides when judges can get money to remodel their apartments, etc. T.G. 
MORSHCHAKOVA, ROSS!YSKOE PRAVOSUDIE V KONTEKSTE 5UDEBNOY REFORMY 193 (2004). 
60. According to Solomon and Foglesong, "stability of sentences" or the absence of 
verdict reversals determines whether a district court judge is promoted. PETER H. SoLO-
MON, JR. & ToDD S. FoGLESONG, CouRTS AND TRANSITION IN RussiA 49-51 (2000); cf. S. 
Pomorski,Justice in Siberia: A Case Study of a Lower Criminal Court in the City of Krasno-
yarsk, 34 CoMMUNIST & PosT-COMMUNIST STUD. 447, 455 (2001) (arguing that there are 
two criteria which determine whether a district court judge is promoted: (1) stability of 
sentences and (2) "expeditious processing of cases"). Every judge and every district 
court has an appointed supervisor (kurator) in the higher level court who functions as 
both an informal mentor and official judge of their decisions in cassation. I d. at 50-51. 
61. Sergey Pashin says he refused to follow the orders of members of the procuracy 
and the president of Moscow City Court, Yelena Yegorova, to ignore obvious signs of 
torture in the trial of three suspects for kidnapping a Russian businessman, and as a 
result he received no important cases and there were two efforts to dismiss him from the 
judiciary. Andrew Jack, justice System, FIN. TIMES, Apr. 9, 2001, reprinted in PERICLES 
RussiAN LAw LETTER No. 9 (Pericles ABLE Project, Moscow, Russia). Moscow City Court 
Judge Ol'ga Kudeshkina revealed that the Procurator General was pressuring her col-
leagues to decide cases a certain way, and that Yegorova provided support by attempting 
to suspend any judges who resisted. Supreme Court Upholds Dismissal of Judge for Criti-
ciZing Prosecutors, RFE/RL NF.wsLlNE (RFE/RL, Prague, Czech Republic), Jan. 20, 2005, 
available at http:/ /www.rferl.org/newsline/2005/0l/l-RUS/rus-200105.asp. She also 
claimed that more than eighty judges had quit her court due to Yegorova's heavy-handed 
methods. Ol'ga Kudeshkina, Otkrytoe pis'mo prezidentu RF V.V. Putinu, NovAIA GAZETA, 
March 14, 2005, http://2005.novayagazeta.ru/nomer/2005/l8n/nl8n-s42.shtml. 
62. See Kudeshkina, supra note 61, for discussion of "price-lists." 
63. Ivan Sukhov, Nastorazhivaiushchiy Pokazatel', VREMIA NOVOSTEY, Jan. 28, 2004. 
An early 2004 poll found that 58% of the population believed courts to be ineffective 
and that 17% had no confidence in them. Id. Another poll, later that year, found that 
46% of respondents had a negative attitude toward judges and only 12% believed that 
most judges are honest and incorruptible. SLxty-two percent indicated that judges do 
not base their decisions solely on the law but on "other considerations" as well. Of 
those who said so, 40% said those considerations include judges' personal interests, and 
8% said they include political pressure from other branches of government. Public Confi-
dence in judges Weak, RFE/RL NEwSLINE, Oct. 18, 2004. 
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B. Undercharging the Case to Avoid Trial by jury 
There is a long history in Europe of avoiding trial by jury by intention-
ally undercharging the case so that it will not meet the requirements for 
trial by jury. This is done in England and Wales in relation to so-called 
"either-way" offenses that may be tried before a jury or the magistrate's 
court composed of three lay judges, and also in France through a non-
codified practice called correctionnalisation. 64 
In Russia, in the first year after reintroduction of the jury trial, nearly 
all of the cases tried were for murder, with only l2 of the first 109 trials 
involving non-capital crimes. This was common practice in Spain as 
well.65 Some have reported that Russian investigators also explicitly 
engage in this practice to avoid jury trials.66 
C. Will Russia's Introduction of Guilty Pleas Lead to Avoidance of jury 
Trials? 
Russian legal reformers knew that the only way America could afford 
a system of trial by jury was to have a developed system of plea-bargaining, 
which disposed of more than 90% of all criminal cases.67 The working 
group which drafted the UPK-RF actually enlisted aid from U.S. jurists, 
who were invited by the U.S. Department of justice to help in drafting a 
chapter dedicated to consensual and abbreviated procedures. 68 This draft, 
presented to the Russian State Duma, originally included a procedure 
closely modeled after the Italian "application for punishment on request of 
the parties" or patteggiamento. This procedure applied to crimes that car-
ried a maximum sentence of three years and gave the defendant a sentence 
reduction equal to one-third of what his or her sentence would have 
been.69 
Clearly, a system of abbreviated procedure that applied only to crimes 
carrying sentences of three years or fewer would not significantly reduce 
the number of cases tried in the Russian jury courts, which "vere primarily 
aggravated murders and serious felonies. In order to broaden its scope, the 
new Russian procedure was made applicable to all crimes authorizing 
64. STEPHEN C. THAMAN, CoMPARA1TVE CRIMINAL PRocEDURE: A CASEBOOK APPROACH 
141-43 (2002). 
65. Thaman, supra note 29, at 325-26. 
66. Georgiy Tselms, Gospoda Prisiaznhye, Zabud'te, RussKIY KUR'ER, Jan. 24, 2004. 
available through lNDEM, supra note 59 Oan. 25 Feb. 7, 2004). Pashin notes that the 
investigator will charge, instead of murder with aggravating circumstances, "infliction of 
serious injuries to health causing the death of the victim", which is not subject to jury 
triaL Leonid Nikitinskiy, "Prestuplenie i opravdanie," MosKOVSKIE NOVOSTI, Apr. 8, 
2003, available through lNDEM, supra note 59 (April 7-11, 2003). 
67. CHARLES H. WHITEBREAD & CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: A"i 
A:-~ALYSIS OF CAsEs AND CoNCEPTS 666 (4th ed. 2000). 
68. I drafted the chapter for the Working Group in january 2001, and presented it at 
a meeting of experts in March 2001 in Moscow. On the American influence on plea-
bargaining in Russia, see Matthew j. Spence, The Complexity of Success: The U.S. Role in 
Russian Rule of Law Reform, 60 CARNEGlE PAPERS 13 (2005), available at http:/ I 
www.carnegieendowment.org/files/CP60.spence.FINAL.pdf. 
69. On the patteggiamento, see THAMAN, supm note 64, at 153-58. 
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sentences up to five years. 70 On july 4, 2003, the scope ofthe new abbrevi-
ated procedure system was further broadened with the passage of a federal 
law that made it applicable to all cases punishable by sentences up to ten 
years.7 1 
The new Russian procedure also differs from its Italian ancestor in 
that parties may not appeal on any of the following grounds judgments 
rendered pursuant to agreements: inadequate evidentiary support (as the 
judge need not provide reasons for findings); a violation of the code of 
criminal procedure; improper application of the criminal law; or the unjust 
nature of the judgment.72 In light of the lack of independence of the Rus-
sian judiciary, the conversion of the original Italianate version, requiring 
judicial control and reasons, into a perfunctory American style plea-bar-
gaining with virtually no right to appeal is a matter of great concern. 73 It 
is no secret that the smooth functioning of the American plea bargaining 
system is attributable to the Draconian sentences threatened for felonies in 
the federal system and most states which virtually compel everyone 
(including some innocent persons) to plead guilty. 74 
The increased scope of the new procedure also means that it will now 
apply to a substantial number of the offenses subject to trial by jury. 
Although crimes carrying sentences in excess of ten years, including homi-
cide/5 attempted murder, murder of a public official/6 terrorism or seri-
ous crimes against the state, 77 and serious war crimes or other crimes 
against humanity/8 would not be subject to the consensual procedures, a 
large number of other crimes would be covered. These include obstruction 
of justice, bribery of a public official, negligent homicide, piracy, and 
70. Soglasie obvinaemogo s pred"iavlennym emu obvineniem. See KoMMENTARIY K 
UGOLOVNO-PROTSESSUAL'NoMu KoDEKSU RossrYSKOY FEDERATSII 540-44 (D.N. Kozak & Ye. 
B. Mizulina eds., 2002) [hereinafter KoMMENTARIY-2002]. The procedure did not require 
a "guilty plea" or a confession. Rather, the defendant simply stipulated that he did not 
contest the content of the accusatory pleading. rd. at 541. 
71. UPK-RF, supra note 14, § 314(1). With the 2003 amendments,§ 316(5) of the 
UPK-RF now reads: "The judge does not conduct an investigation and evaluation of the 
evidence collected in the criminal dossier." 
72. Id. §§ 317, 379. 
73. Sergey Pashin fears that "the conveyor belt to work over people into the condition 
of camp dust is especially effective in the summer when it is impossible to breathe in the 
pretrial detention centers and tuberculosis and consumption flourish. Then the 
detainee admits anything in order to be quickly punished and to go to the penal colony 
where it is easier to live." Sergey Pashin, Novorozhdennomu na zubok, NoVYE 1zvEsTnA, 
july 23, 2003, available through INDEM, supra note 59 Quly 8-17, 2003). 
74. Stephen C. Thaman, Gerechtigkeit und Verfahrensvielfalt. Logik der 
beschleunigten, konsuellen und vereinfachten Strajprozessmodelle, in REcm-GESELL-
scHAn-KoMMUNJKATION: FESTSCHRIFT FOR KLAUS F. RoHL 313 (2003); Mirjan Damaska, 
Negotiated justice in International Criminal Courts, 2]. lNT'L CRrM. JusT. 1018, 1028 
(2004). 
75. Among those which involve homicide are: §§ 105(2), 126(3), 131(3). UK-RF, 
supra note 54. However, if the prosecutor intentionally undercharges to fit the crime 
under the ten-year threshold, then plea-bargaining is possible. 
76. Id. §§ 277, 295, 317. 
77. Id. §§ 205, 206(2)-( 3), 209, 275, 276, 278, 279, 381. 
78. Td. §§ 353, 357, 358. 
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offenses relating to organized crime. 79 
Whether the new system of consensual stipulations and discounts will 
constitute another end run around the jury system remains uncertain. His-
torical evidence suggests that admitting guilt in the Soviet-Russian non-jury 
system did not traditionally lead to a lesser punishment. Because of the 
exceptionally poor quality of criminal investigations, defendants who did 
not admit guilt often received lesser sentences and had their cases returned 
for further investigation.80 Unlike the practices of other jurisdictions, the 
Russian Criminal Code does not regard an acceptance of guilt as a mitigat-
ing factor unless a person, by willfully appearing before officials, actively 
facilitates the arrest of co-defendants and the reparation of the damage 
caused by the crime.81 
D. Waiver of Trial by jury 
The right of the accused to a jury trial must be asserted at the end of 
the preliminary investigation when charges are proffered,82 or the right is 
waived. An accused who has asserted the right, however, is given an oppor-
tunity to waive it at the preliminary hearing.83 This was neither the case in 
pre-revolution Russia84 nor in Spain's new system, where trial by jury is 
mandatory for all cases within the court's jurisdiction.85 Despite the vir-
tual impossibility of acquittal by the non-jury courts, the majority of pre-
2003 Russian defendants entitled to jury court jurisdiction chose trial by 
the court with lay assessors-the "nodders" described above-rather than 
79. Id. §§ 208(1) (forming criminal groups); 211(1) (hijacking without serious 
results); 212(1) (riot); 227 (non-aggravated piracy); 263(3) (violating rail-traffic rules 
leading to death); 267(3) (sabotage of transport causing death); 269(3) (violating rules 
in constructing pipelines causing death); 290(3) (official bribery); 294-305, 321 (all 
relating to obstruction of justice); 304 (provoking bribery in commercial context); 
322(2) (unlawfully crossing state borders); 359 (non-aggravated activity as a merce-
nary); 360 (attack on person or institution with international protection). Petrukhin 
estimates that more than 200 criminal offenses are now subject to the consensual proce-
dures. PETRUKHIN, supra note 9, at 105. Plea bargaining was used 1.5 times more often in 
2005 than in 2004, with 2.4 percent of the "deals" taking place in the regional-level 
courts, which handle jury trials. Statisticheskaia Spravka o Rabote Sudov Obshchey Yuris-
dikzii za 2005 God, http://www.cdep.ru/material.asp?material_id=90 [hereinafter Court 
Statistics-2005]. 
80. V. Makhov & M. Peshkov, Sdelka o Priznanii Vinv, 7 RossJYSKAIA YUSTJTSJIA 17-18 
(1998). -
81. UK-RF, supra note 54, § 61(l)(i). Informal "bargaining," however, did occur in 
Soviet criminal procedure, especially in relation to defendants who became informants 
and helped police solve other crimes. This usually resulted in not charging collabora-
tors with certain crimes. S. Militsin, Sdelki o Priznanii Viny: Vozmozhen li Rossiyskiy 
Variant? l2 ROSSIYSKAIA YUSTLTSIIA 41-42 (1999). 
82. UPK-RSFSR, supra note 12, § 424; UPK-RF, supra note 14, § 217(5). 
83. UPK-RSFSR, supra note 12, § 432 ('I 4-5); UPK-RF, supra note 14, § 325. 
84. M.V. NEMYTINA, ROSSIYSKIY SUD PR!SIAZHNYKH 24 (1995). 
85. The Spanish constitution does not accord the defendant the right to trial by jury, 
but article 125 of the Spanish constitution conceives of the jury trial as a manifestation 
of citizens' right to "participate in the administration of justice." See Thaman, supra note 
20, at 256-58. The Russian legislature could have based its argument on Const. RF 
article 32(5), which reads that «citizens of the Russian Federation have the right to par-
ticipate in the administration of justice." 
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by the more lenient jury court. In the first eight months after reintroduc-
tion of the jury trial, between january 1 and September 1, 1994, defend-
ants requested jury trials in only 254 of the first 1,465 cases filed in the 
original nine jury trial jurisdictions. Interviews with many prosecutors, 
la\\'Yers and judges involved in the first cases led to my original conclusion 
that fear and concomitant reluctance to accept the new system's demands 
caused investigators, prosecutors, and defense la\\'Yers to convince the 
defendants to forego jury trials.86 
The percentage of defendants eligible for jury trial who exercised the 
right was a mere 20.4% in 1994, rising to 30.9% in 1995, 37.3% in 1996, 
and 37% in 1997.87 Occasionally, defendants would prevail in their claims 
that they were coerced or confused into waiving trial by jury and get a 
second chance.88 From 1997 to 2001, only 39% of those who could have 
opted for a jury trial did so, and only 23% actually proceeded to judgment 
in the jury coun.s9 
In 2003, following the passage of the UPK-RF in 2001, jury trials were 
held in 85 of the 98 subjects of the RF, with 62 of the new subjects coming 
on line on january 1, 2003 and 14 more on july 1, 2003. Only 18% of 
defendants chose jury trial in 2003,90 10.7% in 2004, and 12% in 2005,91 
substantially less than in the two years prior to expansion.92 
III. The Independence of the Judge in the Adversary Jury Trial 
A. Collusion of judge and Prosecutor in "Truth-Seeking" and Acquittal 
Prevention 
Under the old UPK-RSFSR, the duty of the judge to ascertain the truth 
was phrased in such a way that the judge could refuse to enter a judgment 
of acquittal based on reasonable doubt as to guilt if he or she could claim 
86. Thaman, supra note 1, at 87-88. Sergey Pashin has claimed that law enforcement 
officials pressure lawyers to get their clients to waive the right to a jury trial. Nikitinskiy, 
supra note 66. 
87. Thaman, supra note 29, at 326. 
88. Case of Zelikova, No. 170, 98 (Apr. 22, 1998). 
89. Obzor Sudebnoy Praktiki Rossmotreniia Ugolovnykh del s Uchastiem Prisiazhnykh 
Zasedateley, 7 BlULLETEN' VERKHOVNOGO ScDA RosslYSKOY FEDERATSU [hereinafter BVSRF] 
(2002), available at http:/ /www.supcourt.ru/bullettin/02/02-07 /bl20.htm [hereinafter 
SCRF-Jury Review (2001)]. 
90. Obzor po Delam Rassmotrennym Sudami s Uchastiem Prisiazhnykh Zasedateley v 
2003 Godu, http:/ /www.supcourt.ru/vscourt_detale.php?id= 165 [hereinafter SCRF-Jury 
Review (2003)]. ln 286 cases, representing 30% of all cases, defendants v.rithdrew their 
motion for a jury trial at the preliminary hearing. Seventy-eight cases as to 17 4 defend-
ants (7.3 percent of all cases) were returned to the prosecutor for further investigation. 
In the end, only 9 percent of all cases ended in a judgment in the jury courts, while 182 
cases, concerning 421 defendants, were still pending at the end of the year. Id. 
91. See Court Statistics-2005, supra note 79. 
92. There was a motion for jury trial at the conclusion of the preliminary investiga-
tion in 33.6% of all cases in 200 l, and 31% of cases in 2002, with 31.3% maintaining 
their choice of jury trial through the preliminary hearing in 2001 and 25.8% in 2002. 
Obzor Praktiki Kassatsionnoy Palaty Verkhovnogo suda RF za 2002 god po Delam, Rassmo-
trennym Kraevymi i Oblastnymi Sudami s Uchastiem Prisiazhnykh Zasedateley, http:/ I 
www.supcourt.ru/vscourt_detale.php?id= 170 [hereinafter SCRF-Jury Review (2002)]. 
2007 The Nullification of the Russian jury 371 
that there were further "measures provided by law" which could be pur-
sued toward an "all-sided, complete and objective investigation of the cir-
cumstances necessary and sufficient to decide the case."93 Thus, the judge 
could refuse to decide a case, claiming a lack of sufficient evidence, and 
return the case to the investigator to gather further evidence. 
In inquisitorial justice systems, there is typically no effective presump-
tion of innocence, and the trial inquisitor could send a case back to the 
pretrial inquisitor whenever he or she thought there were gaps in the inves-
tigation or issues which could be clarified.94 The Soviet Union was not 
alone in this respect. 95 
Although cases could be returned to the investigative stage from the 
trial court before the revolution and in early Soviet law, the grounds for 
doing so were limited. Only in 1961 did this practice become wide-
spread.96 The return for further investigation routinely served to give the 
investigators another chance to prepare the case, or to allow the case to 
disappear without the stigma of an acquittal.97 
Cases with insufficient evidence were often resolved with guilty judg-
ments for lesser-included offenses and a sentence for time-served, resulting 
in the immediate release of the defendant.98 Acquittals were treated as 
signs that the system did not work and that the investigative organs had 
violated the rights of the suspect by holding her for lengthy periods of 
pretrial detention on insufficient evidence (and nearly all of the accused 
93. UPK-RSFSR, supra note 12, § 20. 
94. Mikhaylovskaia sees the trial judge's power to return a case for further investiga-
tion as a "fetishization" of truth-finding, which converts the court into an arm of the 
criminal investigation obliging it to redo that which the organs of the preliminary inves-
tigation and the prosecutor were unable to do properly. LB. Mikhaylovskaia, Sotsial'noe 
Naznachenie Ugolovnoy Yustitsii i Tsel' ugolovnogo Protsessa, GosuDARSTVO 1 PRAvo No. 5, 
111. ll6 (2005). 
95. In the Netherlands, a case can still be bounced back and forth from the trial 
stage to the investigating magistrate, as in the old Soviet-Russian system. Stewart Field 
et al., Prosecutors, Examining judges, and Control of Police lnvestigations, in CRIMINAL jus.. 
TICE IN EuROPE, at 229-42. In France the trial judge may also order new acts of investiga-
tion to be performed by the investigating magistrate, the police, or a member of the 
court during the trial. C. PR PEN. §§ 283, 463; jEAN !'RADEL, PROCEDURE PENALE 30, 317, 
667 (9th ed. 1997). 
96. See SoLOMON & FoGLESONG, supra note 60, at 144. The percentage of acquittals 
fell from 9% in 1945 to around 1% in 1970. HENRIKE FRANZ, DIE HAUPTVERHANDLUNG lM 
RusSlSCHEN STRAFVERPAHREN 54 (2000). 
97. See Solomon, supra note 11, at 543-47, for the classic study of the practice in 
Soviet times. In the 1960's and 1970's the district courts returned around 80,000 to 
90,000 cases per year for "supplemental investigation," representing 3. 7% of all cases in 
1967, 2.7% in 1968, 3.7% in 1969, 3.9% in 1970, 4.2% in 1971, and 4.6% in 1972. 
PETRUKHIN, supra note 9, at 88. 8.7% of cases were returned in 1988 and 8.1% in 1987. 
FRANz, supra note 96, at 53. 
98. judges are widely perceived as lacking the courage to acquit and, in more than 
half of the cases returned for further investigation, they have found the defendant guilty 
on clearly insufficient evidence but sentenced them to credit for time served, resulting in 
their release. HuMAN RIGHTS \VATCH, CoNFESSIONS AT ANY CosT: PoucE ToRTURE IN Rus.. 
S!A, 120-22 (1999). Pomorski observed cases returned as well as guilty judgments with a 
sentence of time served where there was clearly insufficient evidence to convict in the 
Krasnoyarsk courts. Pomorski, supra note 60, at 463-64. 
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were held in pretrial detention). Since the procuracy supervised the inves-
tigations, this constituted an affront to the dignity of this most powerful 
agency in the administration of justice.99 
Under Soviet-Russian law, returning the case for supplementary inves-
tigation was allowed before the trial began, during trial, or even post-judg-
ment on appeal, if the appellate court believed the investigation was not 
"all-sided, complete and objective."100 With the reintroduction of jury tri-
als in 1993, the majority of cases returned for further investigation were 
returned before the jury was selected. 101 With increasing frequency, how-
ever, prosecutors began to move to return the case to the investigator after 
the jury had been selected and had heard the bulk of the evidence. This 
was done, for instance, in the second modern trial in Moscow Regional 
Court that 1 observed in 1994.102 I sharply criticized this practice, which 
undermined the jury system, the presumption of innocence, and the pro-
tection against double jeopardy.103 After retrial, that case resulted in a 
conviction, based on identical evidence but before a different judge. 104 
Furthermore, the majority of cases that were returned for supplementary 
investigation in jury and non-jury cases after the promulgation of the jury 
law in 1993 came back for trial, thereby affording the prosecutor a second 
"bite at the apple."105 With the increasing criticism of the institution, the 
number of jury and non-jury criminal cases returned to the investigator by 
the trial court for supplementary investigation fell from 9. 7% in 1997 to 
7.3% in 1998.1°6 
In April 1999, the CCRF finally took a step to limit the practice, 
declaring that judicial remand of a case for further investigation violated 
the presumption of innocence, in the absence of a motion by one of the 
99. In the "system of statistical evaluation of judicial activity" dominant in the USSR 
and Russia, an acquittal was seen as a "defect." MoRSHCHAKOVA, supra note 59, at 178. 
In the words of Petrukhin, "innocent persons tried for years to get acquitted" only to 
have their cases returned for further investigation. Id. at 99-100. The quality of the 
criminal investigation was measured by the rate of convictions achieved. FRANZ, supra 
note 96, at 54. The lack of acquittals was justified in Soviet times by the correct conduct 
and al1-sided nature of the preliminary investigation. l.B. MlKHAYLOVSKAIA, Tsa.J, FUNKT 
SH, I PRINTSIPY ROSSIYSKOGO UGOLOVNOGO SUDOPROIZVODSTVA 13 (2003). 
100. lJPK-RSFSR, supra note 12, § 343 (1). 
101. Supplementary investigation was performed in 18% of all cases tried from 
November 1, 1993 to January l, 1995. 36.1 o/o of jury cases were returned for further 
investigation in 1994 and 36 percent, in 1995. The percentage feU to 25.8% in 1996 
and 22.5% in 1997. Thaman, supra note 29, at 328. 
I02. See Thaman, supra note I, at 99-101. 
103. Stephen Thaman, Formirovanie Skam'i Prisiazhnykh v. Rossii i SShA, 7 RossrYs-
KAIA YusnTSIIA 5 (1994). For similar opinions, see Yu. Liakhov, Sudebnoe Sledstvie v Sw:le 
Prisiazhnykh, in SosTIAZATEL\KlE rRAvosumE 80-81 (SA Pashin & LM. Karnozova eds., 
1996), who sees the institution as being the result of "serious inadequacies of profes-
sional jurists" in properly investigating cases; see also FRANz, supra note 96, at 53. 
104. Thaman, supra note I, at 100. 
105. 88.5 percent were returned to court in 1997 and only 10 percent were dis-
missed. SoL0:-10N & FoGLESONG, supra note 60, at I60. The authors include elimination 
of this institution in their recommendations for reform of the Russian judicial system. 
106. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 98, at 120. 
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parties. 107 The language of the decision of the CCRF is clear: if there is 
insufficient evidence to convict, then the trial court must direct a verdict of 
acquittal, regardless of whether the motion is made by the judge or by one 
of the prosecuting parties. Nevertheless, the SCRF, even after the 1999 
CCRF decision, has on occasion used a trial judge's failure to grant the 
prosecutor's motion to return a case for further investigation as a justifica-
tion for reversing a jury acquittal. IOS 
The 2001 Code took a long-awaited step and eliminated the return of 
the case for supplementary investigation in its traditional form. § 237 UPK 
RF limited the motion to the preliminary hearing. It also restricted its 
availability to errors that prevented a valid judgment from being rendered 
and to cases in which the accusatory pleading was not delivered to the 
accused. The procurator was given five days to cure these defects. The 
practice of returning a case for supplementary investigation was eliminated 
to "stimulate the quality of the investigation and to guarantee the right of 
the accused to be tried without unjust delays" so as to comport with Art. 
5(3) ECHR. 109 
Despite the clarity of§ 237 UPK-RF, courts continued to send cases 
from the trial court back to the investigative stage and appeared to be 
reaching similar results as under the old practices. 110 The prosecutor's 
office criticized the section at the outset111 and lobbied for its repeal. 
The CCRF finally backed off his strong ruling of April 1999 and in 
December 2003 declared the unconstitutionality of§ 237 UPK-RF, on the 
grounds that it violated the aggrieved party's right to access to justice, 
thereby restoring the practice of returning the case to the procurator upon 
motion of one of the prosecuting parties. 112 This decision was a victory for 
the procuracy, which has finally succeeded in giving priority to the rights 
of the victim over those of the defendant.ll 3 The heeling of the CCRF to 
107. I HAMAN, supra note 64, at 181-83 (decision translated by the author). 
108. See BVSRF, supra note 93, No. 1 (2002), http:/ /w"'w.supcourt.ru/bullettin/02/ 
02-050/bl06.htm (Bribery acquittal in Moscow Region overturned); Case of Chistiakov/ 
Dimitrov (Rostov ), No. 41-kp-098-61) Oune 2, 1998) (aggravated murder acquittal 
reversed). 
109. Kommentariy-2002, supra note 70, at 464 (text by LB. Alekseeva). 
llO. In 2003, 32,161 cases, involving 42,719 persons, were returned to the prosecu-
tor under this provision. But 28,430 cases, involving 37,390 persons (3.3% of all per-
sons charged with crimes), were not returned within 5 days. In only 18°/o of cases were 
the errors eliminated within 5 days. ln 54% of cases the statute was violated. In 12% of 
cases it was violated for more than one month and in 4 percent, for more than 3 months. 
The case was never returned in 28% of the cases. Nekotorye voprosy praktiki primeneniia 
sudami ugolovno-protsessua!'nykh norm pri osushchestvlenii pravosudiia, in BVSRF, supra 
note 93, No. 8 (2004). 
ll L S.G. Kekhlerov, Letter to Ye B. Miz.ulina, Vice-Chair Legislative Committee of the 
State Duma, Federal Assembly, Russian Federation, Sept. 3, 2001, at 5-6 (on file with 
author) [hereinafter Procuracy Letter]. 
112. Kor;sTITUTSIOKNYY sun RossrYsKOY FEDERATSH, PosTMOVLENHA, 0PREDELEN!lA 4-5 
(V.G. Strekozov ed., 2004). 
113. A.D. Boykov, long-time director of the Procuracy Institute and head of a 
procuracy working group which produced a Draft UPK in the mid-1990's, called for the 
priority of the rights of the aggrieved party over those of the defendant and for maintain-
ing the practice of returning the case for further investigation. FRANZ, supra note 96, at 
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the procuracy's successful counter-revolution under CCRF President 
Valeriy Zor'kin was made evident when Zor'kin told President Putin that 
the UPK-RF needed amending to protect the rights of victims. 114 As a 
result, the prosecution may now conduct sloppy investigations and still 
evade acquittals by falling back on the rights of those they have failed to 
protect due to bad faith or incompetence. Indeed, the investigative authori-
ties can intentionally violate the rights of the victim during the preliminary 
investigation and then rely on the victim to reassert those rights during 
trial, after it becomes clear that the evidence will be insufficient for a 
conviction.115 
If the aggrieved party is to be a full-fledged participant in the prelimi-
nary investigation and the trial, then she must assert her rights at the out-
set and the criminal procedure law must ensure that she is represented and 
able to defend those rights. If the law enforcement authorities do not 
enforce those rights, it is unfair then to punish the defendant by denying 
her a speedy trial or the presumption of innocence, or to place her again in 
jeopardy. 
In the United States the concept of double jeopardy clearly prevents 
the prosecution from torpedoing a trial after it has begun in order to get a 
fresh chance to gather incriminating evidence, or a second chance to pre-
sent the evidence to a more sympathetic judge or jury. As soon as the jury 
is sworn to hear a case, the case must be concluded in one sitting. Accord-
ing to the U.S. Supreme Court: 
the "underlying idea [of the protection against double jeopardy], one that is 
deeply ingrained in at least the Anglo-American system of jurisprudence, is 
that the State with all its resources and power should not be allowed to make 
repeated attempts to convict an individual for an alleged offense, thereby 
subjecting him to embarrassment, expense and ordeal and compelling him 
to live in a continuing state of anxiety and insecurity as well as enhancing 
the possibility that even though innocent he may be found guilty."116 
141-44. This position was advocated by Valentin Stepankov in 1992, when he was Proc-
urator General. Aleksandr Larin, Ataka na sudebnuiu reformu, lzvESTIIA,]an. 21, 1993, at 
5. 
114. Igor' Kozhevin, Novyy UPK zabyl o poterpevshykh, VESn.Ru, Oct. 12, 2005, http:/ 
/www.rtr-vesti.ru. Evidence of a veritable sea change in the CCRFs jurisprudence and 
concerns about the sanity of the President of the Court, Valeriy Zor'kin, were revealed in 
July 2004, when Zor'kin compared former Vice President of the CCRF, Tamara 
Morshchakova, the author of the April 1999 decision which limited returning the case 
for further investigation, one of the co-authors of the 4 Concept for Judicial Reform," and 
one of the most respected jurists in Russia, to the Bolsheviks, Nazis, and Jesuits, claim-
ing her ideas would lead to "violence" and "firing squads." Valeriy Zor'kin, Ostorozhno: 
pravorazrushitd'stvo! Po povodu interv'iu T. Morshchakovoy v 'Novoy gazete,' NovAIA 
GAZETA july 22-25, 2004, at 8-9. 
115. In a Krasnodar jury case, the prosecutor provoked a discharge of the jury five 
times, until the result was to his liking. Tselms, supra note 66. In 2005, 142,000 cases 
were sent back to the procurator per§ 237 of the UPK-RF, 3.5% less than in 2004. Only 
4.9% of these cases returned within 5 days, and 4.6%, in 2004. 15.8% of the cases 
returned to court only after a month, compared to 16% in 2004. Further, 12.1% never 
returned, about the same amount as in 2004. Court Statistics-2005, supra note 79. 
116. Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 187-88 (1967). 
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In the U.S., whenever the prosecution seeks a mistrial because of difficul-
ties in proving guilt due to evidentiary weaknesses in the case, the principle 
of double jeopardy will prevent a retrial on the same charges. 117 
Unfortunately, the Russian high courts have not interpreted the 
double jeopardy clause of its Constitution118 in the same manner. Even 
though the SCRF has ruled that the returning of a case to the investigator 
after a jury had begun hearing the evidence is improper, it has merely reset 
the case for trial in front of a new jury, thus crowning the prosecution's 
attempted avoidance of a jury verdict with success. 
B. The Use of Coerced Confessions 
The quintessential inquisitorial form of evidence is the confession of 
the accused, gathered in secret by law enforcement officials, and called by 
Vyshinskiy and others the "queen of evidence."119 Russian officials have 
traditionally obtained confessions through the use of threats, psychological 
schemes, or even outright torture, which would render the resulting confes-
sions inadmissible in nearly all civilized countries. 120 The practice contin-
ues today, as up to an estimated 50% of all criminal defendants are subject 
to torture or ill-treatment, and up to 80% of those who refuse to admit guilt 
are subject to such techniques. The practices include asphyxiation, beat-
ings, electroshock, threats, and use of fellow prisoners to mistreat uncoop-
erative suspects. 121 The appalling conditions of pretrial detention in 
Russia (recently condemned as inhumane treatment by the European 
Court of Human Rights)122 is at times sufficiently coercive to induce sus-
pects to confess just to secure transfer to better detention facilities. 123 
The problem of coerced confessions has been addressed by the legisla-
ture in a surprisingly forthright fashion. Const. RF article 51 guarantees 
the right not to testify against oneself, and this right is implemented in 
section 47( 4)( 3) of the UPK-RF. Canst. RF article 50(2) prohibits the "use 
of evidence gathered in violation of federal law and this exclusionary rule 
is also implemented in section 75(1) of the UPK-RF. Since the beginning of 
117. Downum v. United States, 372 U.S. 734, 737-38 (1963) (prosecutor failed to 
subpoena a crucial prosecution witness). 
118. CoNsT. RF, art. 50(1). 
119. Stephen C. Thaman, Miranda in Comparative Law, 45 ST. LoUis U.LJ. 581 
(2001). 
120. For a comparative analysis, see Stephen C. Thaman, Wahrheit oder Rechtsstaat-
lichkeit: die Verwertung von verfassungswidrig erlangten Beweisgegenstanden im 
Strafverfahren, in MENSCHENGERECHTES STRAFRECHT: FESTSCHRIFT FUR ALBIN EsER ZUM 70 
GEBURTSTAG 1041, 1049-50 Oorg Arnold et al. eds., 2005). 
121. Human Rights Watch, supra note 98, at 1, 21, 36; see also L Petrukhin, Rol' 
priznaniia Obviniaemogo v Ugolovnom Protsesse, 2 RossrYSKAJA YUSTITSllA 24 (2003). The 
European Court of Human Rights recently found Russia in violation of article 3 of the 
ECHR, which prohibits cruel and inhumane treatment, in the case of a man who claimed 
he was tortured with electroshock and beaten and who ended up paralyzed after jump-
ing out of a window to escape ilie mistreatment. Mikheyev v. Russia (Application no. 
77617/01) Oan. 26, 2006), www.echr.coe.int. 
!22. Kalashnikov v. Russia, 36 E.H.H.R 34 (2003). 
123. Leonard Orland, A Russian Legal Revolution: The 2002 Criminal Procedure Code, 
18 CoNN.]. lNT'L L 133, 140 (2002). 
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jury trials in 1993, the courts themselves began interpreting Const. RF arti-
cle 51 and excluding admissions and confessions when investigators did 
not advise the defendant of his or her right to remain silent, thus judicially 
enforcing the kind of exclusionary rule set down by the U.S. Supreme 
Court in Miranda v. Arizona. 124 This practice was ratified and made bind-
ing on the courts in a declaratory opinion of the SCRF in 1995.1 25 There-
after the SCRF has on occasion reversed murder convictions of defendants 
because they were based on confessions taken in the absence of the 
required warnings. 126 
The UPK-RF requires the interrogator to advise the defendant of the 
right to remain silent and the right to counsel during the preliminary inves-
tigation but does not mandate counsel's presence during an interroga-
tion.127 The new code also prevents the inquisitor from interrogating a 
defendant after she has invoked her right to remain silent. 128 The most 
radical innovation in the UPK-RF, however, was a provision excluding any 
statement taken by a suspect or defendant in the absence of counsel if the 
defendant retracts the statement during trial, even if the defendant had 
waived the right to counsel before making the statement.129 The legisla-
ture designed this provision to prevent police, investigators, and public 
prosecutors from coercing, threatening, or deceiving the suspect into waiv-
ing her right to counsel. 130 
124. 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 1 discuss the development of this practice in The Resurrec-
tion of Trial by Jury in Russia. Thaman, supra note 1, at 90-94. CJ fRANZ, supra note 96, 
at 133-34. For the early practice in the Saratov courts, see Ye. Druzin, Obviniaemyy 
priglasil zashchitnika, 9 RossiYSKAIA YusnTsnA 43, 43-44 (1997). Nearly all European 
countries now require what Americans call the Miranda warnings before interrogating 
criminal suspects. Thaman, supra note 120. 
125. Decision No. 8, Plenum Verkhovnogo Suda RF, 0 nekotorykh voprosakh 
primeneniia sudami Konstitutsii Rossiyskoy Federatsii pri osushchestvlenii pravosudiia, 1 
BIULL. VERKH. SuoA RF 3, 6 ('I 18) (1996). 
126. Case of Dzamaldaev et a!. (Stavropol'), No. 19 kp-096-3 7 sp Qune 4, 1996 ); Case 
of 1ovin et a!. (Krasnodar), No. 18 kp-096-47 sp Qune 25, 1996); Case of Savinskiy 
(Moscow Region), No. 4-kp-096-40sp (Dec. 19, 1995); Case of Guziev et a!. (Stavropol'), 
No. 19/1-kp-096-18 sp (Apr. ll, 1995). 
127. UPK-RF, supra note 14, §§ 173, 47(3)-(4), (8). Prior to the UPK-RF, underpaid 
court-appointed lawyers would actually encourage suspects and defendants to waive the 
right to counsel. Pomorski, supra note 57, at 467; see also Druzin, supra note 124, at 43-
44. 
128. UPK-RF, supra note 14, § 173(4) ("Repeat questioning of the accused as to the 
same charge in the case of his refusal to give a statement during the first questioning 
may only be conducted upon the request of the accused himself."). 1n the U.S., police 
may again attempt to question a suspect after invocation of the right to remain silent if 
there has been a sufficient break in circumstances. Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 
104-105 (1975). 
129. UPK-RF, supra note 14, § 75(2)(1). The typical Russian trial involves the defen-
dant's confession, followed by his subsequent retraction thereof at trial. fRANZ, supra 
note 96, at 70-71. 
130. The authors of the Russian legislation have emphasized that the rule is needed 
because statements given in the absence of counsel "give rise to completely justified 
doubt as to the voluntariness of these statements, that they were gathered without appli-
cation of physical or psychic coercion by the interrogator." KoMMENTARIY-2002, supra 
note 70, at 206. This protection thus exceeds that accorded by the Miranda decision 
itself, which expressly permits waiver of the right to counsel. 
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Despite the apparently seamless protection against improper coercive 
or deceptive practices provided by§ 75(2)( I) GPK-RF, the resourceful Rus-
sian police and investigators have also circumvented this protection 
through the so-called "pocket lawyer," or karmanyy advokat. The "pocket 
lawyer" works with investigators in encouraging the suspect to confess and 
sometimes even watches while the suspect is tortured.l31 These lawyers 
betray their clients, either because they owe their salary to such appoint-
ments, 132 or because they are former police officers or prosecutors them-
selves and sympathize with the interrogators. 
In the G.S., as in Russia, the jury is not present during the hearing to 
determine whether an allegedly coerced confession has been obtained in 
violation of the constitution. When a Russian defendant alleges torture or 
other form of duress, the judge will often call the interrogators in to testify 
and usually request the prosecutor's office to investigate. The prosecutor's 
office, however, never substantiates the validity of the complaints, and 
judges therefore feel constrained to admit the confession or face rever-
sal.133 Despite the myriad allegations of torture and its documented wide-
spread use, judges seldom suppress statements. 134 
When a judge in the U.S. rules that the defense has not proven the 
coercive acts of the police and allows the jury to hear the confession, the 
defendant may still argue the coercive conduct to prove to the jury that the 
confession is not reliable. Shockingly, this is not the case in Russia. The 
SCRF has ruled that no evidence of allegedly illegal investigative methods, 
such as torture, beatings, or threats, may be adduced in court by the 
defense to demonstrate coercion or to challenge the veracity of the confes-
sion.135 The ruling effectively prevents the defense from arguing that there 
were reasons for his false confession. 
This doctrine puts the defendant in the difficult position of risking 
reversal of a favorable verdict if she raises "otherwise relevant" evidence in 
131. The lawyer, converted into a witness for the prosecution, will then testify that the 
police obtained the confession without torture. Human Rights Watch, supra note 98, at 
66. In December 2004, the Moscow Lawyer's Panel expelled a lawyer who allowed his 
client, whose jaw had just been broken by the police in a beating, to confess, and its 
President Genri Reznik, said the bar must eliminate lawyers who during questioning 
"play into the hands" of their friends, the investigators who invite them to take part in 
questioning. Yekaterina Zapodinskaia, Advokaty Moskvy podveli itogi nezavisimosti, KOM· 
MERSANT, Dec. 12, 2004, available through INDEM, supra note 59 (Dec. 4, 2004-Feb. 5, 
2005). 
132. Many "pocket lawyers" actually share their fees with the investigators who invite 
them. LL Marogulova, Nekotorye voprosy sudebnoy reformy, in SuDEBNAlA REFORMA v Ros. 
SU: PROBLEMY SOVERSHENSTVOVA.NllA PROTSESSUAL'NOGO ZAKONODATEL'STVA 54 (2001). 
133. HuMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 98, at 7, 76. 
134. Human Rights Watch is aware of no case of judicial suppression of coerced state-
ments, even where medical testimony corroborates the complaint. Id. at 68, 76. judges 
have allegedly estimated that at least one-third, and probably more, of all convictions are 
based on coerced confessions, Peter Finn, For Russians, Police Rampage Fuels Fear, WASH. 
PosT, March 27, 2005. 
135. A. Shurygin, Zashchita v Sudoproizvodstve s Uchastiem Kollegii Prisiazhnykh Zase-
dateley, P. n, 9 RoSSIYSKA!A YUST!TSl!A 5, 6 (1997). 
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trying to avoid conviction. 136 The SCRF defended its decision by asserting 
that "[t]he procedural moments of interrogations of suspects and accused 
do not relate to the factual circumstances of the case and, consequently, 
cannot be the object of investigation by the jury."137 This astonishing doc-
trine indirectly amounts to a kind of unassailability of the quality of the 
evidence gathered during the preliminary investigation once the trial judge 
has ruled it admissible. 138 The SCRF rulings in this area have been the 
subject of much criticism. 139 
C. Secret Trial and Secret Evidence 
An increasing number of modern Russian jury and non-jury trials are 
now being conducted in secrecy, thus depriving the defendant of a public 
trial and also denying the community and the press of the ability to assess 
the reliability of convictions and the fairness of court proceedings. A pub-
lic trial is guaranteed by Art. 123(1) Con st. RF but the code provides for 
the possibility of a closed trial to protect state secrets. 140 Despite this limi-
tation, many judges routinely lock their courtrooms and make it difficult 
for the public to gain entry even in routine trials in the district court. 
Sometimes the excuse is that the courtrooms are too small to accommodate 
the public, while at other times no reasons are given.l41 judges in Mos-
cow's Basmanyy District Court repeatedly require visitors to get permis-
sion from the presiding judge before attending court proceedings, and at 
least one judge has claimed that all of her trials are closed to the public. 142 
In higher level political trials in the jury courts the prosecution invari-
ably claims that the public must be excluded to protect "state secrets." 
This argument appears facially plausible, given the increasing number of 
espionage trials now heard by juries in Moscow and elsewhere. 143 But it is 
unclear why (i) the trial of Mikhayl Khodorkovskiy, charged with tax eva-
sion allegedly committed 10 years before the trial; (ii) the trial of Viaches-
lav lvan'kov (a.ka. Yaponchik), a gangster accused of a double murder who 
l36. The large number of acquittals reversed by the SCRF on this ground \Viii be 
discussed infra. 
137. Case of Kniazev (Moscow Region), No. 4-kp-098-Hsp, at 2, 3 (Feb. 24, 1998). 
138. For instance, a jury acquittal of murder was reversed in 2004 because defense 
counsel asked more than 30 questions calling into question the validity of investigative 
acts, including questioning the signatures on witness statements that were read in court. 
Case of Os'mukhin (Lipetsk), Obzor kassatsionnoy praktiki sudcbnoy kollegii po 
ugolovnym delam verkhovnogo suda Rossiyskoy Federatsii za 2004 god, in BVSRF, supra 
note 93, No.8 (2005), available at http:/ /www.supcourt.ru/vscourt_detale.php?id=2759 
!hereinafter SCRF-Criminal Case Review-2004]. 
139. KARNozovA, supra note 10, at 352, n.l9; Nikitinskiy, supra note 66. 
140. UPK-RF, supra note 14, § 241(2)(1). 
141. Pomorski, supra note 60, at 458-60. 
142. BASMANNOE PRAVOSl!DlE, UROKI SA1vi00BORONY. PoSOBlE DUA ADVOKATOV 10, 19, 
73-74 (2004). 
143. In the Sutyagin espionage trial in Moscow City Court before a jury, the contents 
of the question list or verdict form >'.'-ere even kept secret. Sec Leonid Zlotin, Pravosudie 
na vere, GAZFTA.Ru, April6, 2004, http://www.gazeta.ru/comments/2004/04a_100414. 
shtml. 
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had just been released from an eight-year prison sentence in the U.$. 144; 
and finally, (iii) a trial involving a bombing of a market in Astrakhan attrib-
uted to either Chechen terrorists or gangsters seeking control of the mar-
ket145 should have been closed to the public. 
One theory is that since the preliminary investigation in criminal 
cases is itself "secret," all of the results of the investigation are "state 
secrets" and may not be disclosed to the public. This theory has been 
applied to exclude reporters from trials, where there were allegations of the 
use of torture and coercive methods by police and investigators during 
interrogations. 146 
IV. Humanization of the judgment: Control of the Questions of Guilt 
and Punishment 
A. judicial Nullification of the jury's Power to Determine Guilt 
1. Introduction 
The key to judicial co-opting of the guilt question lies in the compli-
cated special verdicts returned by Russian juries and the jurisprudence of 
the SCRF in interpreting them. To fully comprehend the modern system 
and its pathologies, it is helpful to consider the pre-1917 Russian jury sys-
tem, which struggled with whether the jury or the judge should determine 
guilt. 
2. General Structure of the Question Lists 
Both before and after the October Revolution, Russian legislators 
rejected the Anglo-American general verdict, where the jury simply answers 
"guilty" or "not-guilty," in favor of the French model, adopted by most Con-
tinental European countries in the nineteenth century, which involved a 
list of questions or propositions for the jury to answer. Those answers, in 
theory, would form the basis of the judge's decision. The UPK-RF of 2001, 
like its 1993 predecessor, requires that three basic questions be asked with 
respect to each crime charged: (1) has it been proved that the charged 
offense was committed?; (2) has it been proved that the offense was com-
mitted by the defendant?; and (3) is the defendant guilty of having commit-
ted the offense? The court may also pose only "one basic question as to the 
guilt of the defendant representing a consolidation of the three basic 
questions."147 
The current jury law follows the same basic structure of questions lists 
under the jury Law of 1864: 
Questions as to whether the criminal acts were committed, whether they 
were the acts of the defendant and whether guilt therefor should be imputed 
144. Aleksey Sokovnin & Sergey Mashkin, Viacheslav Ivan'hov Opravdal Opaseniia 
Obvineniia, Km!MERSANT 3 Quly 19, 2005). 
145. Vladimir Voronov, juries on Trial, RussiAN LIFE, Nov.-Dec. 2004, at 48-54. 
146. Georgiy Tselms, Izbienie podozrevaemogo- tayna s!edstviia, RussKIY KuR'ER, Mar. 
18, 2004, available through INDEM, supra note 59 (Mar 13-19, 2004). 
147. UPK-RF, supra note 14, § 339; UPK-RSFSR, supra note 12, § 449. 
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to him, are united into one collective question as to the guilt of the defen-
dant, if no doubt has arisen as to whether the criminal acts were committed, 
nor as to whether guilt therefore should be imputed to the defendant if they 
were found to be his acts. In the case of any doubt as to any of the questions 
they should be posed separately. 148 
After the trifurcated or unitary guilt question, both the current law 
and that of 1864 provide for subsidiary questions relating to facts which 
modify guilt. "After the principal question of the defendant's guilt particu-
lar questions are posed as to those circumstances which aggravate or miti-
gate the level of guilt, or modify its character or lead to the exoneration of 
the defendant from responsibility."149 Finally, the current law removes 
certain questions from the purview of the jury that involve: 
juridical qualification of the status of the defendant (as to his prior convic-
tions, as to the fact he has been declared to be an especially dangerous recid-
ivist, as to the duties of his official position) or also other questions requiring 
strict juridical evaluation in the jury's rendering of the verdict, may not be 
posed, neither separately, nor as part of other questions. 150 
The SCRF has interpreted the language italicized above to eliminate from 
the question list "the use of such juridical terms as murder, murder with 
exceptional cruelty, murder ~with hooliganistic motivation or for personal 
gain, murder in a state of sudden heat of passion, murder using excessive 
force in self-defense, rape, robbery, etc." 15 1 
3. What Does the jury's Finding of Guilt Actually Mean? 
The jury in English and American cases has been called a "procedural 
Sphinx,"152 inasmuch as a laconic "guilty" or "not-guilty" verdict reveals 
little of the logic or thought-processes which underlie the jury's decision. 
In Continental European trials "(t)he trial judge is obligated in a written 
148. U!JS..1864, supra note 34, at 168-69 (§ 754). 
149. UPK-RF, supra note 14, § 339(2); UPK-RSFSR, supra note 12, § 449. This Ian· 
guage is virtually identical to that of§ 755 of the UUS..1864. UUS..1864, supra note 34, 
at 169. 
150. UPK-RF, supra note 14, § 339(5); UPK-RSFSR, supra note 12, § 449(9[ 3) (empha-
sis added). 
15 L "Postanavlenie Pienuma Verkhognaga Suda Rassiyskay Federatsii ot 22 naiabria 
2005 g. N. 23 g. Moskva '0 primenenii sudami norm Ugaiovno-protsessuai'nogo kodeksa 
Rossiyskoy Federatsii, reguliruiushchikh sudoproizvodstvo s uchastiem prisiazhnykh zase-
datelei." RossiYSKAlA GAZETA, Dec. 2, 2005, at § 29(2), available at http:/ /www.rg.ru/ 
2005/12/02/sud-dok.html [hereinafter SCRF, Decision No. 23 (2005)]. This decision 
repeats nearly verbatim § 18: "Postanovlenie Plenuma Verkhovnogo Suda Rossiyskoy 
Federatsii: '0 nekotorykh voprosakh primeneniia sudami ugolovno-protsessual'nykh 
norm, reglarnentiruiushchikh proizvodstvo v sude prisiazhnykh."' SBORNIK POSTA-
NOVLENIY PLENcMov VERKHOVNYKH suDov SSSR 1 RSFSR (RossiYSKOY FEDERATsn) Po 
ucoLOVNYM DELAM 569-80 (1995) [hereinafter SCRF, Decision No. 9]. The earlier deci-
sion, however, included the terms "intentional or negligent murder" in those which 
could not be included in questions posed to the jury. See id. 
152. MtRJAN R DAMASKA, EviDENCE LAw ADRIFT 44 (1997); see also A.M. BoBRISHCHEv-
PusHKIN, EMPIRICHESKJE ZAKONY DE!ATEL'NOSTI RusSKOGO SUDA PRISIAZHNYKH 12 (1896) 
(claiming the Russian tsaristjury was the same "sphinx" in 1896 as it was in 1864 when 
the new system was introduced). 
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opinion to articulate which items of evidence support each finding and 
what chains of inference lead from these items to specific factual determi-
nations."153 Russian criminal judgments must be reasoned, 154 and the 
European special jury verdicts were intended to facilitate reasoned judg-
ment. The three-pronged guilt question in Russia allows the sentencing 
judge to know, in the case of an acquittal, whether the jury found that the 
corpus delicti of the charged offense was simply not proved, whether they 
had doubts as to the defendant's authorship of the crime, or whether the 
defendant's action could be excused (such as in duress or insanity), or jus-
tified (such as in self-defense).l55 
Since the nature of the questions as to corpus delicti and authorship 
are rather straightforward, it is important to focus on the nature of the guilt 
question, the third and crucial component of the jury's verdict. This analy-
sis addresses the following issues: (i) how is the guilt prong different than 
the material elements of corpus delicti and authorship?; (ii) how should 
questions about mitigating or exculpatory evidence be phrased in relation 
to the guilt question; (iii) to what extent are aggravating and mitigating 
circumstances and mental state questions of fact for the jury or of law for 
the judge?; (iv) did the Russian legislators intend to give the jury the power 
to nullify the law and vote for guilt, despite the proof of corpus delicti and 
authorship? 
4. Formulation and Resolution of the Guilt Question 
a) One Question or Three? 
In the majority of the cases heard in the first year of modern Russian 
jury trials, the court asked the three basic questions as to each charged 
offense.156 Famous pre-revolutionary judge and theorist A.F. Koni sup-
ported a move to the simple English verdict form in which the jury votes 
guilty or not-guilty without submission of a list of specific questions, 157 
and it is apparent from the language of § 754 UUS that the old Russian 
jury law favored uniting the three elements of the guilt question into one in 
which there was no question as to corpus delicti or authorship. 158 
153. DAMASKA, supra note 152, at 45. 
154. UPK-RF, supra note 14, §§ 305, 307. 
155. The problem of acquittals on non-legal or meta-legal grounds, so-called jury nul-
lification, v.ill be discussed infra Part IV.B. 
156. I analyzed the question lists from 80 cases of murder or attempted murder. In 
fifty-nine of these cases, all three questions were asked. Thaman, supra note I, n.333. 
157. AF. KONI, SOBRANtE sOCHINENII, vol. 4, 273 (1967). Also supporting the idea of 
posing one question to the jury were pre-revolution jurists V.K Sluchevskiy and YD. 
Spasovich. See S.A. NASoNov & S.M. YAROSH, VERDIKT PtUSIAZHNYKH ZASEDATELEY 50 
(2003). 
158. NEMYTINA, RosstYSKIY suo PRtSIAZHNYKH, supra note 84, at 79, gives an example of 
the pre-revolution one-question approach: «Is the petty bourgeois Aleksey Andreev Krasi-
ukov guilty, that on the night of March 7, 1905 in the city of Tsaritsyn, while irritated or 
angered, but with intent, struck the petty bourgeois Semen Belousov with a heavy blunt 
instrument causing him head injuries and contusions, as a result of which injuries 
Belousov died in the same night?" Id. 
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In its early jurispmdence, the SCRF, however, indicated a preference 
for the formulation of all three questions and insisted that if the court for-
mulates just one question it must contain the elements of corpus delicti, 
authorship, and guilt. 159 The SCRF reversed two aggravated murder judg-
ments entered by a Rostov judge because he asked one simple question as 
to guilt after having instructed the jury on the applicable law. 16° 
Despite its alleged preference for three questions, the SCRF has 
affirmed cases in which one fact-laden question, formulated in the precise 
terms of the accusatory pleading, has been asked. For example, the follow-
ing question was affirmed by SCRF: 
"Is the defendant D.N. Obukhov guilty of an attempt on the life of divisional 
police inspector A.A. Borovoy, committed in the following circumstances: 
On july 26, 1994, around 7:20p.m. on the territory of Zernogradskiy Rayon, 
Rostov Region, D.N. Obukhov, while drunk and driving his TMZ-5402 
motorcycle, committed a serious violation of the Vehicle Code (leaving his 
motorcycle at the entrance to the Horse Factory No. 157, near a dangerous 
turn with less than 100 meters visibility, therefore threatening traffic safety). 
When divisional inspector of Zernogradskiy Police A.A. Borovoy, while fulfil-
ling his official duties, tried to remove the motorcycle from the entrance to 
the highway, he, D.N. Obukhov, knowing that A.A. Borovoy was a police-
man, and with intent to kill him, took out a knife, located in the carriage of 
the motorcycle, and tried to stab A.A. Borovoy in vital organs, however, due 
to reasons independent of D.N. Obukhov's will, he did not commit murder, 
but inflicted him a cut on the left hip joint."16 1 
b) Relative Factual Detail of the Questions 
The SCRF has ruled that the court, in writing the judgment, may only 
refer to facts found to be true by the jury162 and has reversed several cases, 
including a death sentence, for failing to do so. 163 The pre-revolutionary 
Cassational Senate also required questions to include all facts in the 
lengthy indictments which could be relevant to guilt and punishment. 164 
159. See SCRF, Decision No.9, supra note 151, § 17. Mel'nik also prefers the three-
question approach because one fact-laden question would be too cumbersome and con-
fusing for the jury. MEL'NIK, supra note 5, at 98. The SCRF seems, however, to have 
retreated from this preference. SCRF, Decision No. 23, supra note 151, § 28. 
160. Case of Butakov/Zimov (Rostov), No. 41-kp-094-106sp (Nov. 28, 1994); cf Case 
of Stoianenko/Shishkov (Rostov), No. 4l-kp-094-l08sp (Nov. 22, 1994). 
161. A.P. Shurygin, Pravoprimenitel'naia praktika rassmotreniia del s uchastiem kollegii 
prisiazhnykh zasedateley, in BVSRF, supra note 93, No.2, at 20 (1997); see also A.I. Gal-
kin et al., Postanovka voprosov, podlezhashchikh razresheniiu kollegiey prisiazhnykh zase-
dateley, in SOSTIAZATEL'NOE PRAVOSUDIE, supra note 103, at 184-85; PETRUKHIN, supra note 
9, at 138 (favoring asking one question, when the circumstances of the case are not 
difficult, the act is connected with a concrete person, the defense did not raise a signifi-
cant number of alternatives, other than an assertion of innocence, and where all defend-
ants completely admit their guilt). 
162. SCRF Decision No. 9, supra note 151, § 24. 
163. Case of Brovkin/Minkin (Stavropol'), No.l9-kp-094-42sk sp (Nov. 13, 1994); 
Case of Gokorian/ Artiunian (Stavropol'), No.l9-kp-094-81sp (Dec. 26, 1994 ); Case of 
Sogokon' (Moscow Region), No. 4-kp-094-143sp (Dec. 13, 1994). 
164. M. SELITRENNIKOV, 0 POSTANOVKE VOPROSOV NA SUDE UGOLOVNOM, PO RESHENllAM 
K>\.SSATSIONNOGO SENATA 14 (1875). This was so "the judgment of the court can be based 
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Some judges have held that each factor which must be addressed in the 
descriptive part of the judgment must be found true in the jury's special 
verdict. 165 This has led to very complicated questions often phrased pre-
cisely in the terms of the indictment, including detail not crucial to the 
jurors' answering of the three fundamental questions which are their 
responsibility. 166 These are formulated either in one fact-laden question 
reproducing the narrative of the accusatory pleading, or in a series of 
shorter questions which chop the facts into smaller bite-size pieces for the 
jury. Either way, A. F. Koni accused the courts of trying to bury jurors in a 
morass of concrete facts in which the essential and the non-essential were 
indistinguishable. 167 Excessive detail relating to historical facts not 
directly related to the elements of the offense complicates the jury's deci-
sion-making process, for a majority may agree as to some of the facts and 
not others. 168 
The approach of some courts in presenting virtually the entire text of 
the indictment to the jury for affirmation or rejection could be condemned 
as leading the jurors to rubberstamp the prosecution's theory. Pre-revolu-
tion theorists felt that questions phrased in terms of the Russian indict-
ment, with its excess of detail, often led to acquittals, because the jurors 
often found collateral details therein had not been proved. This would be 
avoided with simple English-style indictments. 169 Bobrishchev-Pushkin 
criticized the "multi-layered and difficult-to-understand questions" which 
he attributed to the outdated criminal code and the "casuistic jurispru-
dence of the Cassational Senate." 170 An example of a flawed question 
presenting a multitude of facts, some of which could be affirmed and 
in an exact and positive sense on the decision of the jury, with no supplementation, 
expansion or limitation of this decision on the part of the court itself in any respect 
touching on the factual side of the case." Id. Compare this empowerment or the jury to 
decide all factors which could aggravate the sentence with the recent jurisprudence of 
the U.S. Supreme Court, which has rebuffed attempts by state and rederallegislatures to 
categorize factual elements of offenses as "sentencing factors" to be decided by the judge 
by a preponderance of the evidence, instead of by the jury beyond a reasonable doubt. 
See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005); Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 
(2004); Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002); Apprendi v. New jersey, 530 U.S. 466 
(2000). 
165. UPK-RF, supra note 14, §§ 220, 307; UPK-RSFSR, supra note 12, §§ 314 ('J 1), 
462. UPK-RF § 307 requires: a "description of the criminal act, found proved by the 
court, indicating the place, time, means of commission, forms of guilt, motives, intent 
and consequences of the crime;" the evidence upon which the conclusions of the court 
are based, and the reasons why the court rejected other evidence; "indications of circum-
stances mitigating and aggravating the punishment," etc. UPK-RF, supra note 14. For an 
opinion that the jury should not determine aggravating or mitigating circumstances 
relating to the defendant's person, see S.A. Pashin, Postanovka voprosov pered kollegiey 
prisiazhnykh zasedateley, in SosTIAZATEL'NoE PRAvosumE, supra note 103, at 103. 
166. Section 754 did not allow questions as to "circumstances which only influence 
the imposition of punishment for the same level of crime." UUS-1864, supra, note 34, at 
168-69. 
167. KoNl, supra note 157, at 273. 
168. "[I]n the entire dense woods of concrete facts, often supplemented by questions 
posed by the jurors, it is not difficult to get lost." SEUTRENNIKOv, supra note 164, at 72. 
169. BoBRISHCHEv-PuSHKIN, supra note 152, at 348-49. 
170. Id. at 542. 
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others negated, comes from the trial of the accused murderer of Prince 
Arenberg in St. Petersburg: 
"Is the defendant guilty of the fact, that, having conspired with another to 
steal property from Prince Arenberg, he went vvith this other person to his 
apartment, and, not being able to take all that they wanted, waited for Prince 
Arenberg to return home, hid in his bedroom, and when Prince Arenberg fell 
asleep, he was awakened by noise in his room, and according to a precon-
ceived plan under such conditions, tied him and gagged his mouth and 
threw themselves on him, strangling him, broke the bone in his throat and 
held his mouth and nose, causing his death, and, departing from the apart-
ment of Prince Arenberg, took pan of the property which belonged to 
him?"l7l 
In a regrettable example of the failure of modern Russian judges to 
learn from the rich pre-revolutionary discussion of the problem and from 
the ten years of experience since 1993, the judge in the first modern Mos-
cow City Court jury trial virtually transcribed the accusatory pleading into 
both the corpus delicti and the authorship questions. Not surprisingly, the 
jury acquitted. 172 
jurors have at times been asked to determine the exact number, type, 
and seriousness of the wounds inflicted in homicide cases, 173 the exact 
number of items stolen in theft counts, the precise sequence of the defen-
dant's acts, and the presence or absence of statutory aggravating factors, 
such as whether or not the defendant was drunk. 174 The SCRF has gone so 
far as to reverse acquittals for aggravated murder because the judge did not 
phrase the questions verbatim in terms of the accusatory pleading, but 
adapted the questions to conform to the testimony at trial. In one such 
case the jury was asked whether the defendant fired one shot at the victim, 
whereas the accusatory pleading alleged that at least three shots were 
fired. 175 On the other hand, the SCRF has reversed a number of judgments 
because the judge, in fashioning the question list, simply reproduced the 
171. SEJURENNIKOV, supra note 165, at 73 (quoting from Decision 454/1870 of the 
Cassational Senate, and criticizing the question for uniting facts as to two crimes, bur-
glary and murder, and the aggravating circumstance of conspiracy, into one question). 
172. Peter Baker, Russia Tests .Juries by Trial and Error, WASH. PosT, Sept. 2, 2003, at 
AI. The ridiculously fact-laden, run-on second question on authorship ran for sixty-one 
lines and contained 946 words in only three sentences. Case of Bortnikov (Moscow 
City), Question List (Aug. 13, 2003) (on file with the author). 
173. Karnozova has noted that Russian judges are more inclined to ask jurors ques-
tions phrased in forensic-medical terms regarding the wounds which caused death than 
about the mental state of the defendant, which is actually relevant to guilt. KARNOZOVA, 
supra note 10, at 212. 
174. See id. at 172, 198. Drunkenness was an aggravating factor per§ 39(10) of the 
now superseded Ugolovnyy kodeks RSFSR [hereinafter UK-RSFSR]. This factor has been 
eliminated from the UK-RF enacted in 1995. UK-RF, supra note 54. 
175. Case of Shveydel, Obzor kassatsionnoy praktiki Sudebnoy ho!legii po ugolovnym 
delam Verhhovnogo suda Rossiyskoy Federatsii za 2002 god, in BVSRF, supra note 93, No.8 
(2003) [hereinafter SCRF-Criminal Case Review (2002)]. Petrukhin observes that exces-
sively fact-laden questions might lead a jury to refuse to answer a question because they 
"believe, that not three, but two blows were administered and not in the rib cage but in 
the chest, and not by a Finnish, but a table knife, etc." PETRUKHJN, supra note 9, at 137. 
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language of the accusatory pleading. Indeed, the "lack of clarity of ques-
tions and cumbersome formulation" made it "difficult for jurors to return a 
verdict."176 
Questions uniting the facts of multiple charged crimes have also com-
pelled judges to reverse acquittals. For example, in a trial of a man for 
murder and attempted murder, the Presidium reasoned: 
"Uniting in one question circumstances relating to two acts, murder of 
Puzyrev and attempted murder of Gvozdkov, and the cumbersome and diffi-
cult formulation of the question using a large quantity of medical terms not 
understandable to the jury could influence the jurors in reaching a correct 
decision and did not exclude the receiving of an ... unclear answer." 177 
As to the propriety of asking a multitude of shorter questions, Selitren-
nikov cautioned against chopping up questions into myriad chunks, for it 
allowed the jury to find "guilt" as to an act which did not constitute a crimi-
nal offense. 178 Foynitskiy felt that the courts deliberately engaged in this 
"chopping up of questions" in order to reserve the final determination of 
guilt for themselves. 179 In the modern era, the number of questions has 
sometimes been staggering. In one murder case, 19 questions were asked 
relating to one murder count in which the aggravating factor, the defen-
dant's recidivist status, was not even before the jury. In three other 1994 
cases, the court asked 41, 52, and 87 questions respectively. 180 The ques-
tion list in a case heard in Krasnodar in 1998 contained nearly 1100 ques-
tions.181 The SCRF has reversed several aggravated murder acquittals, 
claiming that splitting up questions as to the various acts of the defendants 
confused the jury.182 
The acquittal of two defendants for robbery-murder was reversed 
because the trial judge did not include factual aspects of a robbery-murder 
in the corpus delicti question, choosing instead to put them into the second 
question relating to authorship. 183 Foynitskiy stressed that questions 
176. Case of Mukhanin/Saraliev (Stavropol'), in SCRF-Jury Review (2001), supra note 
89. 
177. Case of Pavlov, No. 919p01pr, Obzor sudebnoy praktiki Verkhovnogo Suda Rossiys-
koy Federatsii za IV Kvartal 2001 goda po ugolovnym delam, in BVSRF, supra note 93, No. 
2 (2002), http:/ /\vww.supcourt.ru/bullettin/02/02-08/b1ll.htm [hereinafter SCRF-
judicial Practice Review (4th Quarter-2001)j. Pashin suggests asking more than one 
question when two aspects of a narrative question could produce contradictory answers. 
Pashin, supra note 103, at 95. 
178. 5EUTRENNIKOV, supra note 164, at 71-72. 
179. l.YA. fOY"llTSK!Y, KuRS UGOLOVNOGO SUDOPROIZVODSTVA - 1910, VOl. 1, 364 
(1996). V.D. Spasovich also shared this opinion. NASoNov & YAROSH, supra note 157, at 
50. 
180. Thaman, supra note 1, 116-17; cf. Case of Raykin (Saratov), No. 32 kp-096-5 sk 
sp. (Sep. 20, 1996) (ninety-nine questions); Case of Almamedov et al. (Rostov), No. 41 
kp-097-22 sp. (Mar. 20, 1997) (ninety-nine questions); Case of Perfil'ev (Ul'ianovsk), 
No.80 kp-097-19 sp (Apr. 10, 1997) (sixty questions). 
181. KARNozovA, supra note 10, at 297. 
182. Case of Kushchenko/Kushchenko (Stavropol'), No.19-kp 002-9 sp, SCRF-jury 
Review (2002), supra note 92. 
183. "Among other things, the formulation of the first question 'Has it been proved 
that on May 11, 1997 in the forest strip FevTalev died of a knife wound and his automo-
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should be restricted to facts relating to the legal elements of the charged 
offenses and should be phrased in understandable language rather than 
technical jargon.184 This has also been suggested by modern Russian 
scholars185 and was followed by a minority of courts in the first year of the 
new Russian jury system.1B6 
5. Formulation of Questions as to Excuse, Justification, and Mitigating 
Circumstances 
The formulation of questions related to affirmative defenses or lesser-
included offenses raised problems in the first trials under the 1993 law. 
The Moscow and lvanovo courts treated lesser homicides committed in the 
heat of passion, or using excessive force in self-defense, 18 7 as full-blown 
crimes with constituent elements that had to be proved to the jury just like 
the charged capital crimes. Question lists first addressed the basic three 
questions relevant to an intentional homicide, and then asked questions 
relating to the elements of lesser homicide offenses, or justifiable homicide 
in self-defense. Questions relating to defenses were formulated requiring 
positive proof that the victim committed an act upon which self-defense or 
heat of passion could be predicated. For example, has it been proved that 
the victim attacked the defendant?188 In the first Saratov cases, questions 
related to affirmative defenses were framed in the following manner: "Is it 
probable that the acts of Artur Martynov were carried out in self-defense?" 
In later cases, this form was also used in relation to defenses of alibi, acci-
dent, and heat of passion. If the jury answered in the affirmative, then the 
judge, following the verdict, qualified the crime as a lesser offense or, in the 
event of justifiable self-defense, an acquittal. 189 
Phrasing the question in terms of probability was initially considered 
to be more in conformity with the presumption of innocence and the prose-
cution's burden of proof,190 but Saratov judges discontinued using this 
form in favor of the following phraseology: "Has it been established that 
[Gavrilenko] committed the violent act described in Question 5 because 
[Chernov] had earlier beaten him?"191 The SCRF has ruled that questions 
bile was stolen' does not contain all substantive circumstances of the act for which the 
convicted persons were charged ... " Thus, in this question it was not mentioned that 
Fevralev was taken by force, while being threatened with a knife to his throat, to the 
forest strip where he was killed, where he was administered four slash and puncture 
wounds to the chest and stomach, and that, after he died from the knife wounds to the 
throat, his body was taken deep into the strip and hidden, and that his car was stolen." 
Case of Daudov/Vatsaev (Rostov), No. 4l-kp-09S..38sp (Apr. 14, 1998). 
184. FoYNITSKIY, supra note 179, at 453-54. 
185. LB. Mikhaylovskaia, in LB. ALEKSEEVA ET AL., Sun PRISIAZHNYKH: PosoBlE DLIA 
Suna 96-97 (1994); KAR~ozovA, supra note 10, at 192, 212. 
186. See Thaman, supra note 1, at 115-20. 
187. UK-RSFSR, supra note 182, §§ l04, 105 (now codified in UK-RF §§ 107,109, 
supra note 54). 
188. Thaman, supra note 1, at 119. 
189. Case of Martynov (Saratov) judgment (Dec. 17, 1993); id. at 119. 
190. S.A. Pashin, in Sun PRISIAZHNYKH: NAt:CH'>~O-PRAk"TTCJlESKIY SBOR'<IK 282 ( 1994 ). 
191. Case of Gavrilenko (Saratov)judgment (Mar. 14 1994); Thaman, supra note 1, at 
119. 
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should not be formulated in terms of probability192, in much the same way 
that the Cassational Senate had done before the revolution. 193 
Both modern and pre-revolution statutes have sown confusion 
because they appear to require the question of "guilt" to be answered before 
the jury evaluates lesser-included offenses or affirmative defenses such as 
excuse or justification. When the jury is asked to find a defendant guilty 
or not guilty of a violation of a certain section of the criminal code, as in 
the United States, then no ambiguity is possible. Problems arise, however, 
if the jury is asked to determine whether a certain set of facts charged in 
the indictment, or adduced in court, has been proved, and whether the 
defendant is guilty thereof. In these instances, the fact situation may fail to 
encompass all the elements of the charged offense, or to negate possible 
affirmative defenses. If the facts are insufficient in either of these respects, 
no criminal guilt may ensue. 194 
Such confusion arose in several Moscow trials, where the jury first had 
to determine that the defendant did not intentionally kill the victim in 
order to even get to the defense questions. In one case, the jury found that 
the defendant was guilty of intentionally killing the victim by a simple 
majority, but found unanimously that the killing followed a quarrel. The 
finding that the intentional killing occurred after a quarrel moved the case 
into the realm of statutory aggravation and foreclosed the jury from 
answering any of the eleven questions pertaining to affirmative defenses or 
non-intentional homicide. This was the case even though the testimony 
was uncontradicted that the victim had started a fight with the defendant 
and then lunged at him before the defendant stabbed him. Despite the 
clear inconsistency of the verdict, the SCRF affirmed the conviction.l95 In 
another case, the SCRF upheld an attempted murder conviction in a case in 
which the judge's instructions precluded the jury from reaching the self-
defense issue if they found intent. 196 The pre-revolutionary Cassational 
Senate ruled that posing self-defense questions in such a manner was 
reversible error. 197 judges in the first modern Saratov cases usually formu-
192. SCRF, Dec. No. 23 (2005), supra note 1521, § 29 (repeating language of SCRF, 
Dec. No.9 (1995), supra note 1521). 
193. SEUTRENN!KOV, supra note 164, at 130-31. 
194. Because jurors were not asked outright about guilt, the judge had to make sure 
that the question of guilt contained all the legal elements of the crime, so an affirmative 
answer from the jury would buttress a judgment of guilt as to the charged crime. V.N. 
PALAlJSOV, PoSTANOVKA VOPROSOV PRISIAZHNYM ZASEDATELlAM PO RUSSKOMU PRAVC 84, 87 
(1885). 
195. Case of Bogatyrev (Moscow Region)Judgment Uan. 25 1994), affd. by No, 4-kp-
094-6lsp (Apr. 26 1994). See Thaman, supra note 1, at ll8, 175-76. 
196. Case of Sokolov (Rostov) Judgment (Aug. 19, 1994), affd. by No. 41-kp-094-
l24sp (Dec. 26, 1994). See S.C. Thaman, The jury as Catalyst for the Reform of Criminal 
Evidentiary Procedure in Continental Europe: The Cases of Russia and Spain, in PROCEED-
INGS OF THE fiRST WORLD CONFERENCE ON NEW TREKDS IN CRIMINAL lNVESTIGAT!ON AND 
EviDENCE 393, 397-98 Q.F. Nijboer & JM. Reijntjes eds., 1997). 
197. See SEUTRENNlKov, supra note 164, at 264-65, for a pre-revolution example of 
proper question phrasing that reveals that it was the defense's burden to prove self-
defense: ( l) "Was the death of the forest warden of the Yerevan transit post Avdey 
Luk'ianov, caused by gunshot wound in the night of the 22nd to the 23rd of August, 
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lated the question of guilt in relation to the homicidal act without preclud-
ing the questions relating to mental state and affirmative defenses. If the 
jury found the defendant guilty of the homicidal act, then, depending on 
the answers to the questions related to affirmative defenses, the judge 
would find the defendant guilty either of murder as charged, or lesser 
charges of murder in the heat of passion or using excessive force in self-
defense. 198 
Problems arose, however, in a case in which the jury wanted to acquit 
the defendant of murder on grounds that he acted in self-defense. The jury 
found the defendant "guilty" of stabbing the victim to death, but in subse-
quent questions found that the victim had previously acted "incorrectly," 
and that the defendant's acts were justified. When confronted with this 
contradictory "guilty" verdict, the judge reformulated the question list, with 
the defense questions preceding and precluding the question of guilt if 
answered in the affirmative. After reformulation of the questions, the jury 
unanimously acquitted the defendant. The SCRF reversed the acquittal, 
holding that it was error to phrase the self-defense questions in relation to 
the conduct of the victim, and that the questions of self-defense and exces-
sive force are legal questions for the judge and not the jury. 199 
From the Yefremov Case it appears that juries should only determine 
facts-and the judge should determine guilt-by accepting or rejecting 
affirmative defenses. The Case of Kuz'kin (Moscow Region) was reversed 
by the SCRF for similar reasons.200 After the reversal in Kuz'kin, judges in 
1869 by Moses Vartanov, 36 years-old? (2) If it was, then has it been proved that the 
jeath of Luk'ianov was caused by the defendant Vartanov as a result of necessary self-
defense to ward off a danger which threatened his life, in which there was no chance to 
turn to the local police for defense? (3) If not proved, is Vartanov guilty of the crime, 
described in the first question, committed by him, though without a preconceived intent, 
while irritated, but not accidentally, and knowing that he threatened the life of 
another?" Id. 
198. Pashin, supra note 103, at 99. Pashin believes defense-theory questions should 
be posed before the guilt question. Otherwise, the jury might leave the self-defense 
question unanswered. He also thinks that the jury, and not the judge, should decide the 
issue of imperfect self-defense, by answering a question such as the following: "Were the 
means used by Sofronov to defend himself from the attack dearly disproportionate with 
the character of the danger of the attack?" 
199. Case ofYefremov (Saratov)judgment (May 20, 1994) reversed by, No. 32-kp-094-
30sp Quly 28, 1994). Thaman, supra note l, at 119-120. 
200. The jury found "K" guilty of homicide in the "heat of passion," Le., voluntary 
manslaughter, but the SCRF reversed, claiming the jury could not decide "legal ques-
tions" such as heat of passion. Upon retrial, the trial judge asked the jury only whether 
D intentionally killed the victim but asked no direct question on heat of passion. The 
"factual" question, question number three, was phrased in the following manner: "Was it 
proved that before K inflicted the indicated wounds on 0, 0 called K a "goat" and "fag," 
which were serious insults for K?" In the instructions the judge explained the law on 
"heat of passion" but intentionally crafted question three to indicate a state of facts 
insufficient in law to constitute heat of passion. The bewildered jury, which wanted to 
find voluntary manslaughter, found "guilt" of an intentional killing which the judge then 
qualified as murder and not manslaughter. According to Karnozova, the judge "actually 
used the position of the defense "for its own goals" as a "trampoline to an affirmative 
answer to the question of guilt of intentional murder," thereby "coercing the jury" to 
return an affirmative answer as to the guilt of K. KARNOZOVA, supra note 10, at 186. 
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the Moscow Region began refusing to pose questions related to lesser-
included offenses or heat of passion for fear of reversal. 201 In other cases, 
however, the SCRF has reversed acquittals (often for aggravated murder) 
because the trial judge failed either to instruct the jury sua sponte or to 
include a question related to a possible lesser-included offense which was 
alleged by the defense, 202 or because the trial judge refused lesser-included 
instructions requested by the public prosecutor. 203 Such flip-flopping, 
which has sowed confusion among judges, seems driven more by the desire 
to overturn acquittals than by doctrinal concerns. 204 
Another strategy used in some cases is for the judge to draft two alter-
native questions, one tracking the indictment, and the other tracking the 
theory of the defense. Pashin has opined that alternative questions should 
only be used if the positions of the prosecution are clear and diametrically 
opposed. 205 He finds that using the alternate method is less effective and 
confuses jurors if there are a number of possible resolutions to the case, 
ranging, for instance, from aggravated murder down to use of excessive 
force in self-defense. 206 The SCRF found such confusion in reversing an 
acquittal for aggravated murder where alternate questions were proposed, 
stating that the trial was of the defendant rather than the victim. 207 
201. For examples of such cases, see id. at 196, 206-210. 
202. A. Shurygin, supra note 135, at 6. Case of Karakaev (Krasnodar), No.18 kp-096-
87 sp (Nov. 13, 1996). Case of Troitskiy (1vanovo ), No. 7 kp 002-26 sp (in which jury 
acquitted, finding no intent to kill and SCRF claimed an instruction on reckless homi-
cide should have been given); SCRF·Jury Review (2002), supra note 92; Case of Kon-
drashin (Riazan'), in BVSRF, supra note 93, No. 9, at 9 (1998), translated in WILLIAM 
BuRNHA!vl ET AL., THE RusSIAN LEGAL SYSTEM 537 (3d ed. 2004). According to Karnozova, 
since the SCRF could not reverse an acquittal due to denial of defendant's rights, it 
found the verdict "contradictory," because the jury found the corpus delicti of negligent 
or reckless homicide, yet voted "not guilty." KARNOZOVA, supra note 10, at 218-21. This 
case illustrates the principle that, in serious cases, there must be some kind of guilty 
verdict. Id. 
203. Two such cases are Case of Tikunov (Rostov), No. 40-kp-096-26sp (Apr. 10, 
1996) and Case of Baykov (Moscow Region), No. 4-kp-097-25sp (Feb. 6, 1997). For a 
discussion of another similar Moscow Region decision and how such decisions conflict 
with other SCRF decisions, see KARNOZOVA, supra note lO, at 218-19. 
204. For a discussion of the zig-zags of the SCRF jurisprudence, see NASONOV &: 
YAROSH, supra note 157, at 53-54. 
205. S.A. Pashin, supra note 103, at 97; cf PETRUKHIN, supra note 9, at 138 (suggesting 
alternative questions when the defense has staked out a different position with respect 
to mens rea). 
206. S.A. Pashin, supra note 103, at 117-18 (distinguishing "algorithmic" question 
lists, which proceed logically, from more serious propositions to lesser-included 
offenses, and "gradational" lists, which pose two or more different alternatives to the fact 
situations). 
207. ln the Case of Kuznetsov (Moscow Region), No.4 kp 002-124 sp, discussed in 
SCRF-]ury Review (2002), supra note 92, the following two questions were proposed: 
(1) "Has it been proved, that on January 12, 2002, around 8:00 p.m., after drinking 
alcoholic beverages together in the apartment at the address: 6 Sadovaia Street, Apart· 
ment 15, Village of Pervomayskiy, City of Korolev, Moscow Region, the aggrieved party 
Pogorelov was administered many blows in the area of the face, neck, neck by a sharp 
piece of glass from a bottle, and no less than 6 blows by a sharp object not identified by 
the investigator in the region of the ribcage and lower back after which the aggrieved 
party Pogorelov, trying to save himself, ran into the street, but he was chased and pulled 
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6. Mental State and Aggravating Circumstances: Questions of Law or Fact? 
a) The Dispute as to Separation of Questions of Law and Fact 
The SCRF's interpretation of "other questions requiring strict juridi-
cal evaluation in the jury's rendering of the verdict"20 8 has signaled a 
return to the early French theory of the separation of powers between the 
jury and the judge, according to which the jurors: 
"provide answers not as to guilt of the defendant of the charged crimes, but 
as to separate factual elements, articulated by the presiding judge in his 
questions, from which not they, but the presiding judge reaches a conclu-
sion as to the presence or absence of criminal guilt in the defendant's 
act."209 
According to the most prominent Russian jurists, the early theory that the 
jury only answers questions of fact and the judge then applies the law was 
decisively rejected in the 1864 Russian Code and the 1871 German Code 
of Criminal Procedure: 
A different theory, that of guilt and punishment was proposed to, and finally 
did take its place, according to which jurors decide the question of guilt in 
its full magnitude, from both the factual and legal perspective, and the 
judges apply the established punishment to the guilty person and decide 
those procedural questions which arise in the case.210 
According to the prevailing pre-revolution view, the jurors' decision on the 
question of guilt must encompass an application of the law to the facts that 
were found to be true. The jury determined guilt and the professional 
judges, as in the United States, decided on the appropriate punishment. 
In the words of Selitrennikov: 
"Statutory terms usually contain general legal norms, general elements of 
the crime, as to which concrete facts must be related, and asking jurors to 
decide such elements, we ask them to make a juridical evaluation of facts, 
back into the apartment and administered one blow with a hammer in the head, as a 
result of which acts bodily injury was inflicted on Pogorelov from which his death 
ensued?" (Answer: Yes, Proved); (2) "If an affirmative answer was given as to the first 
question, then has it been proved that the acts listed in it were committed by Kusnetsov 
under the following circumstances: Pogorelov grabbed a piece of a bottle and lunged at 
Kuznetsov with it. Kuznetsov kicked the piece of bottle from the hand of the aggrieved 
party with his leg, threw him to the ground and administered him many blows in differ-
ent parts of the body of the aggrieved party, the aggrieved party hit Kuznetsov with his 
hands in the chest, Kuznetsov broke the bottle, took a piece and administered no less 
than 6 blows to the aggrieved party."(Answer: Yes, Proved. Unanimously). 
208. UPK-RF, supra note 14, § 339{5); UPK-RSFSR, supra note 12, § 449; see text 
accompanying note 152. 
209. FOYNJTSKIY, supra note 179, at 450; cf. BuRNHAM ET AL, supra note 202, at 538-39. 
NASONov & YAROSH, supra note 157, at 19, 40, note that the French deviated from 
Montesequieu's concept and actually insisted that the jury determine guilt of the charged 
crime. They therefore see the Russian model, which allows the judge to "qualify'' the 
verdict of the jury and actually determine which crime the defendant is guilty of, to be a 
third type of verdict, compared to the Anglo-American general verdict and the French-
German special verdict with explicit guilt-finding. 
210. Id. 
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the decision of a question of law."211 
Although the pre-revolution Cassational Senate was bound by the lan-
guage of the UUS-1864 that required the jury to determine guilt, it inter-
preted §760 UU5-1864, which required questions be formulated in 
language understandable to the jury,212 as prohibiting judges from using 
much of the statutory language of the Criminal Code. Among the words 
and phrases that could not be used in jury questions were: "attempt," 
"theft," "intent," "personal gain," "robbery,'' "false denunciation," "rape," 
"embezzlement," "aiding and abetting," "complicity," "incitement," and 
"main perpetrator."213 The replacement of such "juridical terms" with 
sometimes more abstruse terms was ridiculed by critics.214 The intent of 
the legislator was not, however, to restrict the jurors to answering questions 
of naked fact. To the contrary, it was to popularize the abstruse juridical 
language describing the elements of the offense rather than to replace it.215 
According to the prevailing view of Russian scholars, the approach of the 
Cassational Senate was not based in any solid source of statutory author-
ity216 and served to create a "strained, even sometimes hostile relationship 
between jurors and judges, inasmuch as the attempt at all costs to separate 
questions of fact and questions of law cannot have another result than the 
invasion of the crown element into the region reserved to the jury. "21 7 
While the SCRF insists that the jury must determine guilt, 218 it has 
interpreted the prohibition against the jury determining "other questions 
requiring juridical evaluation" as applying to some basic questions relating 
to guilt, thus effectively removing the guilt determination from the jury and 
211. SEUTRE!'INIKOV, supra note 164, at 22; see also FoYNITSKIY, supra note 179, at 451; 
BoBRISHCHEv-PusHKIN, supra note 152, at 583; PAL>.usov, supra note 194, at 52-59 (pro-
viding a detailed analysis of how the French moved from restricting jurors to naked 
factual questions to entrusting them with the guilt decision, thereby leaving only the 
question of sentence to the professional bench). 
212. Section 7 60 of the UC5-l864 reads: "In cases decided with the participation of 
jurors, the questions posed them shall be formulated in commonly used expressions as 
to the substantive elements of the crimes and the guilt of the defendant, and not in the 
terms used in the statute." UUS-1864, supra note 34, at 169. 
213. See SELlTRENNIKov, supra note 164, at 12, 53. 
214. Id. Selitrennikov points out how the Cassational Senate in its decisions allowed 
the technical word "rastratil"( embezzle) to be replaced with "izraskhodoval" (expend) or 
"used for his needs." It was also held permissible to replace the phrase "openly pur-
loined" with "otnial" (took away). "Krazha" (theft) could be replaced with "taynoe 
pokhisllchenie" (secret taking) and "shayka" (gang) replaced with "according to a precon-
ceived plan with other persons engaging together in theft." "s umyslom" (with intent) 
could be replaced by "zhelaia etogo" (wanting to do it), and "zavedomo" (knowingly) 
could be replaced with "knowing the results of his acts, understanding what he is 
doing." Id. at 53. Another odd example was replacing the word "rape" with "deprived of 
innocence." Marina Nemytina, Sud prisiazllnykh: rossiyskaia traditsiia ili zapadnaia 
model, in VESTN!K 5ARATOVSKOY GORlJDARSTVENNOY AKADEMI! PRAVA, No. 3, 26 (1996). 
215. PALAusov, supra note 194, at 79. 
216, 5EUTRENN!KOV, supra note 164, at 18, 
217. fOYNITSKIY, supra note 179, at 451. 
218. It reversed the first jury death penalty verdict due to the court's failure to include 
the guilt question. Case of Panchishkin/Filippov (Rostov ), No. 41-kp-094-3-sk sp Quly 
12, 1994). 
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arguably violating Articles 20 and 47 of the Russian Constitution.219 The 
SCRF's decision also contradicts the law requiring the presiding judge in 
summation to, inter alia, "read the content of the accusatory pleading [and] 
explain the content of the criminal statute [that] provides for responsibility 
for the commission of the crime of which defendant is charged."220 Pre-
revolution law provided for a similarly detailed explanation of the law to 
the jurors. 221 If the jury is not responsible for applying the law to the facts 
then the provisions are senseless, as was pointed out by legal scholars criti-
cal of the practice of the Cassational Senate before the revolution.222 
The confusion caused by the SCRFs interpretation becomes dear 
when one compares the three basic questions answered by the jury under 
the old code as per § 449 UPK RSFSR and the questions answered by a 
single judge, or a court with lay assessors, under the old system. In reach-
ing its judgment, the non-jury court must determine, in order, the follow-
ing: whether the charged criminal act was committed; whether it contains 
the elements of a particular crime; whether the defendant committed the 
act; and whether the defendant is guilty of committing the crime. 223 
In fact, the trial judge must sometimes review the dossier before trial 
to determine whether the charged act contains the elements of a crime 
before trial may even be set.224 There is a good argument, therefore, that 
the division of labor in jury cases is intended to allocate the guilt question 
to the jury and the rest of the questions, i.e., whether defendant should be 
sentenced, the magnitude of the sentence, resolution of the civil suit, 
etc.,225 to the professional judge. Palausov makes this argument in relation 
to the pre-revolution law, 226 claiming that the meaning of "guilt" cannot be 
different if decided by jurors than if decided by a court without jury. It is 
219. Article 20 of the Const. RF, grants criminal defendants the right to trial by jury 
when threatened with capital punishment; Article 47 grants criminal defendants the 
right to trial by jury to the extent provided by law. 
220. UPK-RF, supra note 14, § 340(3); UPK-RSFSR, supra note 12, § 451. 
221. UU5-1864, supra note 34, at 174 (§ 801) ("in cases heard with a jury, the presid-
ing judge, at the time of handing the fore person the question list, explains to them: ( 1) 
the substantive circumstances of the case and the laws relating to determining the char-
acter of the felony or misdemeanor before the court, and (2) the general juridical basis 
for judgment of the strength of the evidence introduced in favor of and against the 
defendant."). 
222. fOYNlTSKIY, supra note 179, at 451-52; SELITRENNIKOV, supra note 164, at 29-30 
("Why, after all, all this long part of the speech about laws, about their true meaning, 
when the discussion of the facts from the point of view of the law is forbidden fruit for 
the jurors?"). 
223. UPK-RF, supra note 14, § 299(1)(1-4); UPK-RSFSR, supra note 12, § 303 ('I'I 1-
5). BuRNHAM ET AL., supra note 202, at 539 (noting that§ 339(1) and (3) of the UPK-RF 
and§ 449(1)-(3) of the UPK-RSFSR require the jury to find the defendant "guilty of the 
commission of the act" and not the "commission of the crime" as in § 299(1) of the 
UPK-RF and § 303(1}(4) of the UPK-RSFSR). 
224. § 220(1), (3), and (4) of the UPK-RF require the accusatory pleading to contain 
the circumstances surrounding the commission of the charged acts and their juridical 
qualification; the committal order for trial must also point to the charged offense. UPK-
RF, supra note 14, § 231(3); cf. UPK-RSFSR, supra note 12, §§ 433, 5(2), 221-22. 
225. UPK-RSFSR, supra note 12, § 303(5)-(10). 
226. PAlAusov, supra note 194, at 95-97. 
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incumbent upon the trial judge to formulate the three basic questions so 
that they contain all of the required elements of the charged crime(s).227 It 
is also the judge's duty to ensure that the jury knows, either from the sum-
mation or from the text of the questions themselves, that by answering the 
questions as posed in the affirmative they are convicting the defendant of 
the charged crimes or lesser included offenses.228 The judge would only 
be called upon to "qualify" the verdict if the jury crosses out or changes the 
text of the basic questions, or refuses to find aggravating circumstances.229 
As it turns out, the SCRF has reversed both convictions and acquittals 
on the grounds that the jurors were asked "questions of law," which are 
reserved for the judge. In one case, it was considered error that jurors were 
asked to determine whether the defendant "raped" the victim.230 In a simi-
lar case, the SCRF held that it was the province of the judge to determine 
whether the victim had been "robbed''231 by the defendant. Many com-
mentators have criticized the SCRF for assuming that jurors cannot under-
stand terms used in the codified definitions of criminal offenses.232 If the 
jury is to perform its function, it must be able to answer questions that 
correspond to the proof or disproof of the elements of the crime, either the 
actus reus or the mens rea.2 33 
Finally, the recent jury trials of scientists accused of espionage appear 
to be a throwback to the practice of English judges in the late seventeenth 
and eighteenth centuries, who tried to confine the purview of the jury to 
the issue of "publication" in seditious libel cases, while co-opting the deter-
227. FovNITSKlY, supra note 179, at 459. 
228. The facts established by the jury are not just "facts of real life" but "juridical 
questions" corresponding to the "ideal model" of the crime. I<ARNozovA, supra note 10, 
at 251. 
229. SEUTRENNlKov, supra note 164, at 20. In a recent case, when the jury amended 
the questions to eliminate some of the charged acts, the SCRF reversed the ensuing 
acquittal, claiming the jury, in changing the place of the commission of the crime, "went 
beyond the limits of the triar and that their act was tantamount to amending the accusa-
tory pleading. Case of Poliakov (Saratov), No. 32 kp-099-6sp (Feb. 16, 1999). 
230. Case of Garibian/Rubenian (Stavropol'), No. 19-kp-095-94 sp. (Oct. 5, 1995) 
(conviction for rape and murder reversed for using terms "rape" and "murder"). 
231. An acquittal of robbery-murder was reversed in Case of Boytsov et aL, because 
the jury was asked to determine whether defendants "intended to steal" and had intent 
to kill or were reckless as to whether death would ensue. SCRF:fury Review, supra note 
90. 
232. Moscow Region judge Natal'ia Grigor'eva, who presided over many of the first 
jury trials in that court, felt that the word "murder" was understandable to jurors and 
that it was nonsensical to replace the technical word for "intentionally" (umyshlenno) 
with another word that means the same thing (namerenno). N.V. Grigor'eva, Naputstven-
noe slovo predsedalel'stvuiushchego sud'i, in SosT!AZATEL'NoE PRAvosumE, supra note 103, 
at 166-67. In the first modern trials, before the confusing SCRF jurisprudence, judges 
used the terms in the code and clarified them with instructions, and there was no indica-
tion that jurors did not understand their meaning. NEMYTINA, RossiYSKlY SuD PRt-
SJAZHNYKH, supra note 84, at 82-84 (dealing with the concept of "heat of passion. 
KARNozovA, supra note 10, at 175-76. 
233. MEL'NIK, supra note 5, at 97; I<ARNOzovA, supra note 10, at 192, 260 (noting that 
answering questions of intent should be the main issue for the jury. "[F]or in this area 
one needs life experience, common sense, understanding of life, ability to understand a 
person as an equal."). 
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mination of the seditious nature of the writings or speeches. 234 In the trial 
of Igor' Sutiagin in Moscow City Court in April 2004, the court only asked 
the jury whether the defendant passed certain material to representatives 
of a British firm and included no question about whether the material was 
classified. 235 
7. Treatment of Aggravating Circumstances in Modern Russian 
jurisprudence 
The SCRF's dogma limiting the competence of the jury is critically 
important when it comes to the aggravating circumstances that formerly 
converted an intentional killing into a capital murder236 and which pres-
ently trigger a sentence of life imprisonment. 237 This can be illustrated by 
examining the SCRF's treatment of two aggravating circumstances com-
mon in modern Russian capital murder cases: "hooliganistic motivation" 
and "exceptional cruelty."23 8 
In the first year of jury trials, the majority of judges formulated the 
questions relating to these aggravating circumstances to allow the jury 
either directly or indirectly to decide whether the conduct of the defendant 
fell within the statutory definition. In some cases the jury was first asked 
whether it had been proved that the defendant committed the charged 
homicides, listing the precise acts perpetrated and injuries inflicted, and 
then whether the murder was committed out of "hooliganistic motivation" 
or with "exceptional cruelty." The definitions of these crimes, usually 
drawn from opinions of the SCRF or UPK commentaries, were then read to 
the jury during the judge's summation. 239 Other judges, by formulating 
the questions in cases of "hooliganistic motivation" in relation to the 
motive or lack thereof, allowed the jury indirectly to determine the aggra-
vating circumstances. One such question was formulated as follows: "Has 
it been proved, that Kashuba committed the above-described acts (includ-
ing shooting the victim to death) in the absence of any provocation from 
Vorozhbet or his friends?"240 Another was formulated thus: "Has it been 
proved that Brazhin killed the victims using the insignificant reason of 
their just demands that he leave their apartment (after he had broken in in 
order to drink vodka)?"241 
234. GREEN, supra note 22, at 318-55. 
235. Sergey lvashko, Sutiagi.n priznan shpionom, GAZETA.RU, Apr. 5, 2004, available at 
http:/ /www.gazeta.ru/print/2004/04 /05/ oa_116909 .shtmL 
236. See THAMAN, supra note 13, at 215. 
237. LK-RF, supra note 54, § 105(2). 
238. UK-RSFSR, supra note 182, § l02(b), (g) (currently UK RF § 105(2)(d), (i)). 
239. According to an opinion of the Plenum of the LSSR Supreme Court of September 
22, 1989, murder out of hooliganistic motivation is accompanied by a "clear lack of 
respect for society, a gross violation of the rules of collective living and morality." They 
are killings out of mischief, foolhardiness, daring, or in response to insignificant 
affronts. Thaman, supra note 1, at 104. 
240. Case of Kashuba/Bykov (Saratov) Judgment Ouly 8, 1994). 
241. Case of Brazhin (Saratov) Judgment (Aug. 3, 1994); cf. Case of Trofimov et al. 
(Ivanovo ), No. 7 kp-098-23sp, 3-4 (Oct. 10, 1998) (holding that questions of hooliganis-
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In cases of alleged exceptional cruelty, questions were asked in rela-
tion to whether the defendant, in inflicting the bodily injuries that led to 
the victim's death, harbored the intent to "inflict exceptional pain and suf-
fering" on the victim. Other judges formulated factual questions to the 
jury relating to the precise manner in which a murder was committed, and 
arrogated to themselves the determination of whether hooliganistic motiva-
tion or exceptional cruelty existed.242 
The SCRF reversed a conviction for non:-aggravated murder and sent 
the case back for retrial on a charge of aggravated murder with exceptional 
cruelty because the jury negatively answered the question as to whether the 
defendant "knew and desired to inflict pain and special suffering" upon 
the victim when he stabbed him 101 times.243 The SCRF continues to 
reverse convictions for non-aggravated murder when the jury, specifically 
asked to determine whether a murder was committed with "exceptional 
cruelty" or "hooliganistic motivation," responded in the negative. 
8. Treatment of Mens Rea in Russian Question Lists 
An immutable tenet of the criminal law, accepted in all common and 
civil law jurisdictions, is that actus not facit reum nisi mens sit rea (an act 
does not make one guilty unless his mind is guilty). 244 Thus, the defini-
tion of any criminal offense must include the prohibited acts or omissions 
(actus reus), and the mental state that makes the acts criminal (mens rea). 
The Model Penal Code has tried to harmonize the sometimes archaic and 
confused descriptions of mental state in the common law and settled on 
four classic types of mens rea making an act criminal: purposefully (with 
intent); knowingly (knowing the nature of one's acts or the existence of 
attendant circumstances); recklessly (awareness of a substantial risk); and 
negligently (action generating a substantial risk of which one should have 
been, but was not, aware).245 
Under the 1864 law, juries were explicitly instructed to determine the 
defendant's mental state as part of the guilt decision. § 811 UUS, which 
guided judges in instructing juries, provided: 
The decision as to each question should consist in an affirmative "yes" or a 
negative "no," coupled with that word, which contains the substance of the 
answer. Thus, as to the questions: "Was the crime committed? Is the defen-
tic motivation including the term "violated social order" ( narushili obshchestvenn)'Y 
poriadok) were legal questions for the judge). 
242. For instance, "1s Bortsov guilty, that on May 23, 1993 at about midnight near the 
cultural palace 'Peace' in the city of Saratov, following Zakopaylo's refusal to engage in 
sexual intercourse with him, he dealt her a multitude of blows with his hands and feet 
and with an empty bottle on different parts of her body, crushed the organs in her neck, 
hit her with a wooden object in the area of her eyes, with the intent to kill her, causing 
the bodily injuries described in Question l, which led to the death of Zakopaylo?" Upon 
an affirmative answer, the judge decided that the situation constituted exceptional cru-
elty, but not hooliganistic motivation. Case of Bortsov (Saratov) Judgment (Feb. 18, 
1994); see Thaman, supra note 1, at l20-2l. 
243. Case of Cherkashin (Stavropol'), No.19 kp-096-101 sp (Dec. 14, 1996). 
244. WAYNE R. LAFAVE&: AusnN W. ScoTT, JR., CRIMINAL LAw 211 (2d ed. 1986). 
245. Id. at 214. 
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dant guilty thereof? Did he act with premeditation?" The affirmative 
answers should be: "Yes, it was committed; Yes, he was guilty; Yes, he acted 
¥lith premeditation."246 
Furthermore, § 812 UUS provided: 
When the jurors assert that it is impossible to express with exactitude their 
opinion with a mere affirmation or negation, they may give the appropriate 
meaning to their answer by adding some words to the established expres-
sion, for instance: "Yes, guilty, but without premeditation."247 
Despite the apparent clarity of the law, the pre-revolution Cassational 
Senate held that the list of questions only had to include a narrative 
describing the external facts of the crime charged and did not have to 
explain the mental element for the jury to decide. The court could then 
find the charged crime or lesser-included offenses based on the jury's 
answers.248 Critics, such as Palausov, harshly criticized the ambivalence of 
the Cassational Senate, and maintained that the question of guilt had to 
include the question of imputability. If it did not, the questions submitted 
to the jury would "exclude even the concept of a criminal offense in a legal 
sense. "249 Moreover, Selitrennikov provides a formulation of questions in 
a case that involves an insanity defense, which was also approved by the 
Cassational Senate: 
(1) Was the violent killing of Ivan Grigorev committed by a person close to 
him on june 11, 1869 in the city of Rostov in the cottage of the peasant 
Advota Fedorova, and, to wit, by his wife, Matrena Trofimova, who was at 
this time 17 years, 2 months and 24 days old? (2) If it was committed, has it 
been proved that the defendant Matrena Trofimova was, at the time of the 
commission of the aforementioned crime, in the throes of an illness, which 
led her to delirium or to complete unconsciousness? (3) 1f it has not been 
proved, then is the defendant Matrena Trofimova guilty of the crime men-
tioned in the first question? ( 4) Tf she is guilty, was the crime committed by 
her with premeditation?250 
Pre-revolution Russian jurors struggled with questions of mens rea. 
Bobrishchev-Pushkin emphasized the special problems juries encountered 
when they were instructed, for example, that intent to kill could be imputed 
based upon the number of stab wounds in the area of vital organs of the 
victim, even though the victim testified that he or she did not intend to 
kill.251 jurors would often find a lack of intent due to drunkenness, espe-
246. UUS-1864, supra note 34, at 175 (§ 811). 
247. Id. (§ 812). 
248. Id. at 77. 
249. PALAusov, supra note 194, at 112 (arguing that the jury should decide questions 
of insanity, self-defense, and also questions of carelessness or intent); cf. KalYTINA, Ros. 
SlYSKIY suo PRISlAZHNYKH, supra note 84, at 80 (discussing the pre-revolution practice). 
250. SELlTRENNIKov, supra note 164, at 259. The question oi insanity was explicitly 
excluded from the competence of the jury in the modern Russian jury laws. If the ques-
tion of insanity arises, the judge is to discharge the jury and institute psychiatric com-
mitment proceedings. UPK-RSFSR, supra note 12, §§ 461(2), 403-414; UPK-RF, supra 
note 14, §§ 433-446. 
251. BoBRlSHCHEv-PusHKIN, supra note 152, at 543. Jurors in the first modern Spanish 
jury trials struggled with precisely the same issue, especially when the judge did not 
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dally in the context of domestic violence clouded by jealousy or anger. 252 
Early in its jurisprudence, the SCRF began to treat the mental ele-
ments of crimes as "questions of law,"253 and to place them solely within 
the competence of the professional judge to decide as "questions requiring 
strictly juridical evaluation." This jurisprudence has led to the reversal of a 
number of acquittals and judgments of conviction for lesser-included 
crimes of homicide, often when the jury has expressly found that the 
defendant did not harbor the intent to kill254 or killed in the heat of 
passion. 255 
B. The Question of jury Nullification 
The "sphinx-like" general verdict of "guilty" or "not guilty" in Ameri-
can and British jury trials, coupled with the non-appealability of acquittals, 
enable juries sometimes to render verdicts contrary to the facts and the 
law. The trifurcation of the guilt question in Russian special jury verdicts, 
which also allows the jury to acquit even when all the elements of the crime 
have been proven, was criticized by foynitskiy as being French legalistic 
casuistry and had been rejected by Germany.256 
The official position of the pre-revolution Cassational Senate was that 
the third question related to guilt embodied the classic excuses or justifica-
give them the option of basing murder on a theory of recklessness. See Thaman, supra 
note 20. at 394. 
252. In the Case of Filimonov ( 1880), the jury answered that the twenty-one-year-old 
defendant who tried to kill his wife was "guilty" but "without knowing intent" BoBRIS-
CHEv-PusHKIN, supra note 1.52, at 355-56. 
253. See Thaman, supra note 1, at 122. Pre-revolutionary writers also treated ques-
tions of sanity and intent as "serious questions of law" but never doubted that they were 
for the jury to decide. BOBRISHCHEV-PUSHKIN, supra note 152, at 338. 
254. Case of Shchepakin (Rostov), No.41-kp-094-ll2sp (Nov. 24, 1994) (reversing 
negligent homicide judgment); Case of Manukian (Stavropol'), T\o. 19-kp-096-75 sp. 
(Oct. 29, 1996); Case of Solomatov/Kharitonov (Stavropol'), No. 4-kp-096-28sp (Mar. 
20, 1996) (reversing a conviction of a lesser homicide offense); Case of Poliakov 
(Riazan), No. 6-kp-096-10 sp (May 13, 1996) (reversing acquittal of murder on this 
ground); Procuracy Institute, lnformatsionnoe pis'mo o nekotoryl<h voprosakh 
obespecheniia gosudarstvennogo obvineniia v sude s uchastiem kollegii prisiazhnykh zase-
dateley, No. 12/13-96, 7-8 (May 16, 1996); Case of Markelov (UI'ianovsk), No. 80-kp-
097-4 sp. (Feb. 13, 1997) (reversing conviction of lesser-included homicide offense); 
Case of Perril'ev et al. (Ul'ianovsk), supra note 180 (reversing lesser homicide charges). 
2.55. Case of Riazanov (Altay) No. 51-kp-096-6sp (Mar 5, 1996); Case of Khachaturov 
(Sta>Topol'), No. 19-kp-096-23sp (Apr. 11, 1996); Case of Kuz'kin (Moscow Region), No. 
4-kp-095-ll4sp (Oct. 18, 1995); Case of Shayko (Ul'ianovsk), No. 80-kp-096-33sp (Sept. 
24, 1996). All were convicted of §104 of the UK-RSFSR. The jury in the Shayko Case 
held that the defendant had killed her husband "probably in a condition of a sudden 
heat of passion or emotional stress, resulting from the serious insult from the victim." 
I d. 
256. FoYNITSKIY, supra note 179, at 457-58. Foynitskiy was a proponent of amending 
the laws to prevent the influence of "public opinion" in the jury's guilt decisions. Id. at 
360-61. He cites later opinions of the Cassational Senate from 1904-1905, which 
required the presiding judge to instruct the jurors that they had to answer positively as to 
guilt if they had done so in relation to the corpus delicti and authorship questions. I d. at 
452. The new Spanish jury law avoids these problems by declaring that such a verdict is 
legally contradictory and in such a case the judge would require the jury to correct the 
inconsistency. Thaman, supra note 20, at 377-78. 
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tions of the criminal law: insanity, unconsciousness, mistake, deception, 
and self-defense.257 This position has been followed by some voices in the 
modern literature.258 
But juries did indeed nullify before the Revolution, such as in the case 
of Vera Zasulich in 1878, and such acquittals were welcomed by the famous 
judge in that case, A.F. Koni: 
Jurors are asked not whether defendant committed the criminal act, but 
whether h~ is guilty of having committed it; not the fact, but the inner aspect 
thereof and the personality of the defendant expressed therein, is for their 
decision. With its question as to guilt, the court establishes a general gap 
between fact and guilt and requests that the jury, based exclusively on the 
'conviction of its conscience' and mindful of its great moral responsibility, 
bridges this gap with considerations that determine whether the defendant 
is guilty or not-guilty. 259 
This broad approach to the jury's guilt decision is supported by 
Bobrishchev-Pushkin, who saw juries as "self-proclaimed legislators" and 
their verdict, as "social facts" which should be considered by the actual 
legislators in revising outdated and unpopular laws. He wrote that the 
content of the word "guilty" in the verdict of the jury, embraces such a count-
less quantity of aspects of the offense, particularities in the personality of 
the defendant, shades of the manifestations of his will, utilitarian and ethical 
considerations, which can possibly be contained in each separate case, that 
it can never be rendered precise either by the law, by morals or by a complete 
juridical understanding. 260 
Russian juries before the Revolution would typically exercise the 
power of so-called "nullification" in the following situations: (l) to prevent 
the enforcement of unpopular laws; (2) to apply popular social notions of 
the seriousness of conduct, where it differed from those expressed in the 
criminal law; (3) to prevent the imposition of sentences perceived as exces-
sive; ( 4) to correct injustices in the administration of criminal justice that 
were sometimes unrelated to guilt or innocence; and (5) for reasons of 
social custom completely unrelated to the facts of the case. 
257. SEL!TRENN!KOV, supra note 164, at 254; see also KucHERov, supra note 36, at 66-
67 (claiming that the Cassational Senate allowed nullification in a decision of 1870, but 
reversed itself in 1884). 
258. PETRUKHll', supra note 9, at 133 (stating that the third "guilt" question refers to 
the subjective side of the offense, the presence of negligence, self-defense, etc). 
259. KoNI, supra note 157, at 201. 
260. BoBR!SHCHEv-PusHKIN, supra note 152, at 38-39. juries would "determine 
whether the act of the defendant was an evil which must be punished as a dangerous or 
immoral act, or just something prohibited by law. If this question is difficult or too 
controversial, they either acquit or limit themselves to an exact establishment of factual 
details in their answers, leaving the decision on the question of law to the judge." Id. at 
584-85. Also, juries occasionally acquit merely to prevent the judge from unjustly for-
mulating the juridical consequences of the verdict. I d. at 380. 
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1. The Nullification of Unpopular Laws 
Russian juries have a history of nullifying unpopular laws. Just as 
colonial American juries nullified the effect of British tax, customs and 
seditious libel laws, 261 pre-Revolution Russian juries refused to enforce the 
repressive passport laws. 262 Juries often refused to convict defendants in 
minor cases of bribery or public corruption, because they believed that the 
entire system was corrupt and knew it was difficult to be honest in such a 
system. 263 Acquittals were common in cases of passing forged money, 
because the jury viewed the defendant as a victim for having paid good 
money for bad. 264 
Sergey Pashin and his colleagues, who authored the 1993 jury law, 
were aware that the tripartite formulation of the guilt question would per-
mit jury nullification. Pashin interprets a finding of "not-guilty" following 
affirmative answers to the first two parts of the guilt question in the follow-
ing way: "the act contains all the elements of the crime in its totality, but 
the jury, for reasons known to them, deprived the state of the right to 
achieve a conviction and apply the sanctions of the special part of the Penal 
Code."265 
2. Nullification Due to Social Attitudes Contrary to Criminal Law 
Principles 
The following description of the relation of drunkenness to criminality 
in Tsarist Russia could just as well apply to the social situation in today's 
Russia: 
The question of the extraordinary use of alcoholic beverages represents one 
of the most serious social questions. Drunkenness as a vice in many cases 
in its most ruinous manifestation, is among other things reflected in a great 
mass of different kinds of crimes committed primarily by simple people 
exclusively under the influence of their non-sober condition. Whoever has 
watched jury trials cannot but be struck by the huge number of cases in 
which drunkenness, a non-sober condition, reckless holiday drinking sprees 
and different gross instincts arising due to the extravagant consumption of 
vodka, are the main, and sometimes the direct factors in the commission of 
261. Albert W. Alschuler &: Albert W. Deiss, A Brief History of Criminal Jury in the 
United States, 61 U. CHL L REv. 867, 874 (1994). 
262. N.P. T!MOFEEV, Suo PR!SlAZHNYKH v Rossu.SuDEB!'<'YE OcHERKI 278-79 (1881). It 
was almost impossible for simple people to get a passport, and violations of the laws 
resulted in the loss of all civil rights and long mandatory imprisonment. I d.; cf MEL'NlK, 
supra note 5, at 266-67. 
263. BoBRISHCHEV-PusHKlN, supra note 152, at 291 (modern Russian juries likely have 
the same attitude). The defendants in the only two bribery cases tried by jury in the 
first year of the new Russian jury system were both acquitted. See id. at 152-53; Case of 
Shcherbakov (Moscow Region) Judgment (Apr. 22, 1994); Case of Es'kov (Altai) Judg-
ment Ouly 1, 1994); Thaman, supra note 1, at 182-264. 
264. BoBRlSHCHEv-PusHKlN, supra note 152, at 292-94. In the first year of modern 
Russian jury trials, two of the six trials for passing counterfeit money ended in acquit-
tals, one in a conviction for a lesser-offense, and the jury recommended special lenience 
in the remaining three. Thaman, supra note l, at 137-38. 
265. Pashin, supra note 103, 90-91. 
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the crime.266 
Due to its connection with so much crime, Russian law has traditionally 
considered drunkenness to be an aggravating factor in the imposition of 
sentence.267 Tsaristjuries, however, viewed drunkenness at the moment of 
the commission of a crime in an entirely different way than did the Old 
Russian Penal Code. Since Russian juries were aware that excessive con-
sumption of alcohol could affect volition and consciousness, and therefore 
negate the mental states necessary for the commission of certain crimes, 
they often tried to gauge how much the defendant had drunk to determine 
if it was sufficient to diminish the defendant's criminal responsibility.268 
In the first year of modern Russian jury trials, the aggravating factor of 
drunkenness was alleged as to 89 defendants in 76 of the first 109 trials to 
go to verdict. In 4 7 cases the defendants were convicted of lesser-included 
offenses or granted lenience.269 
Also, it has been common for the jury to nullify or soften the law in 
cases in which battered and abused wives have attacked their husbands. 
For example, in the Case of Kraskina (Ivanovo Region) in 1995, the jury 
found that the defendant threw her drunk male companion to the ground 
and intentionally stabbed him in the brain "with a home-made knife, which 
she prepared specially for this purpose, having been dissatisfied with the 
conduct of her companion, who had expressed in a drunken stupor profan-
ity, and extorted money to buy alcohol." Even though the defendant never 
claimed self-defense, the jury nonetheless acquitted. 
The SCRF upheld this acquittal of an allegedly battered woman on 
appeal in an opinion that also upheld the jury's right to nullify the law.27° 
Although Tsarist juries usually did not acquit a woman when she killed her 
husband while sleeping, in the Case of Kuz'mina, the jury found a peasant 
woman guilty of the lesser-offense of infliction of bodily injury resulting in 
death without intent to kill after she poured an entire boiling samovar onto 
his genitals while he was sleeping, locked the door of their hut, and let him 
266. TIMOFEEV, Supra note 262, at 380; BOBRISHCHEV-PUSHKIN, supra note 152, at 577 
(noting the "overwhelming and specific meaning of drunkenness in Russian life."). 
267. In Tsarist Russia it was an aggravating circumstance if it could be shown that the 
defendant drank liquor to summon up courage to commit a crime. TIMOFEEv, supra note 
262, at 381. 
268. Id. at 381-82. Timofeev, a prosecutor, recalled a case in which the jury acquitted 
the defendant of mayhem and answered: "No, not guilty, and not guilty, because he was 
not in a human shape."( ne v chelovecheshom obraze). Id. at 383. Bobrishchev-Pushkin, 
another prosecutor, also noted that drunkenness often led juries to not find criminal 
intent in crimes of passion, but seldom in crimes of theft, unless the victim of the theft 
was also drunk. BoBRISHCHt-v-PusHKJN, supra note 152, at 35, 355-56, 577-79. 
269. Thaman, supra note 196, at 405. 
270. Case of Kraskina (Ivanovo) judgment Quly 20, 1995); THAMAN, supra note 64, at 
197-98. Another alleged battered woman, however, did not fare so well. In the retrial of 
the Case of Shayko, supra note 255, the defendant was convicted of aggravated murder 
after her conviction for homicide in the heat of passion of her abusive husband was 
overturned. In the retrial, the trial judge refused to allow the defendant to admit evi-
dence of the bad character of her husband and his previous acts of violence, thus mak-
ing a nullification or sympathy verdict more difficult. Id. The SCRF refused to set aside 
the conviction. Case of Shayko (Ul'ianovsk) No. 80-kp-097-28sp Oune 3, 1997). 
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suffer for 5 days until he died. 271 
Tsarist juries also tended to be exceedingly lenient and even acquit 
defendants in cases in which the defendant gave a full judicial confession 
and expressed remorse before the jury.272 Timofeev noted that before 
1864 criminal investigators engaged in questionable techniques to procure 
confessions, including the use of priests.273 In contrast, after the introduc-
tion of trial by jury, defendants were quick to confess during trials and 
frequently threw themselves at the mercy of the jury. 274 The Russian tradi-
tion of leniency by juries was particularly apparent during an early jury 
trial in lvanovo, witnessed by the author, in which the defendant fully 
admitted guilt to all the charges, including attempted rape and aggravated 
murder, but claimed he did not remember committing any of the alleged 
acts because of his drunkenness. 275 The jury acquitted as to all of the 
most serious charges, most likely because the young man had no prior 
criminal record, was a model village dweller, and appeared sincere in his 
remorse.276 
3. Sanction Nullification 
Tsarist juries often acquitted because they felt that the sentencing pro-
visions of the criminal code were too severe. 277 Theft by force, for 
instance, was punished much more severely than secret theft, yet many 
jurors saw the sneak thief as a more dangerous social menace. They would 
therefore often acquit the strong-arm robber. The same was true of bur-
glary and theft when only something of insignificant value was stolen. 278 
27L BoBRISHCHEv-PusHKIN, supra note 152, at 389. 
272. Id. at 32, 207. 
273. T1~10FEEV, supra note 262, at 23-24. In one judicial district, twenty-two of thirty-
three defendants pleaded guilty in front of the jury. Id. at 24. One attorney claimed that 
twenty-six of eighty-four clients pleaded guilty in the first year of jury trials, forty-two of 
one hundred twelve in the second, and fifty-nine of one hundred six in the third. Id. at 
23. 
274. Id. Timofeev also tells the story of a sympathetic peasant women who was on 
trial for trying to poison her tyrant husband. Jail-house lawyers told her to admit her 
guilt and the jury would surely acquit. She stubbornly asserted innocence and was 
found guilty. When asked about her unwise decision, she told her fellow cellmates that 
she preferred exile and hard labor to her "unwanted forced labor" with her husband. Id. 
at 24-25. 
275. Thaman, supra note l, at 104. 
276. Case of Kulakov (Ivanovo), Judgment (Feb. ll, 1994), affd. by SCRF, No. 7-kp-
094-7sp (Apr. 20, 1994); see also Thaman, supra note 1, at l04-l05, 159-60. 
277. Minister of Justice N.V. Murav'ev attributed the high percentage of acquittals to 
"the cruel provisions of the Criminal Code which no longer meet the requirements of 
life." KucHEROV, supra note 36, at 70-71. Pre-revolution theorists Butkovskiy and Viktor-
skiy also acknowledge that many acquittals were to avoid the "antiquated punishments" 
or lack of proportionality thereof. KARNoz.ovA, supra note 10, at 225-26. 
278. TtMOFEEV, supra note 262, at 267-71. 
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4. Nullification to Correct for Injustices in the Administration of Criminal 
justice 
Juries in Tsarist Russia often acquitted defendants in cases in which 
the defendant had already spent a significant amount of time in pre-trial 
detention, due to the slow pace of criminal investigations.279 The "prema-
ture doing of time" was considered, in the eyes of the jury, to be an ade-
quate basis for acquitting defendants whom they would have otherwise 
found guilty.280 
5. Reasons for Nullification Unrelated to the Facts of the Case 
Russian juries also acquitted defendants for reasons entirely unrelated 
to the presentation of a defendant's case. Perhaps most notably, juries 
would invariably acquit defendants in the first and fourth weeks, and in 
the Passion Week of the Great Fast, because their religious beliefs required 
them to ask for forgiveness for their sins and prohibited them from convict-
ing others.281 Similarly, they would also acquit on days when the dead 
were remembered or in August, when the winter grain was planted. At the 
latter time, they believed that God would not deliver a good harvest if they 
exhibited any form of anger. Defendants responded to these patterns by 
attempting to get their cases heard in August.282 Juries would also acquit 
during extremely hot weather, when the unventilated courtrooms would 
sometimes reach a temperature of 40 degrees Celsius. On one hot day, 
four trials ended in acquittals before the prosecutor challenged the sitting 
jurors. After the challenge, however, eleven of the sixteen subsequent cases 
still ended in acquittal.283 
C. The Jury's Role in Sentencing 
Proponents of the mixed court often claim that the "common sense" of 
lay judges may be most appropriate in criminal cases at the time of sen-
tencing.284 Many think that the beginning of the end of the French jury 
system came with the reforms of 1932, when the jury joined with the pro-
fessional judges to take part in the sentencing decision.285 The express 
reason for this change was to prevent "scandalous acquittals" by allowing 
the juries to convict but mitigate the sentence, especially by avoiding capi-
tal punishment.286 
279. BonmsHcHEv-PusHKIN, supra note 152, at 207. Juries would also acquit if the 
defendant's co-partner in crime had escaped punishment. Id. at 254. 
280. TIMOFEEv, supra note 262, at 387. 
281. Id. at 135. 
282. Id. at 136-38. 
283. Id. at 147. 
284. A study of the German mixed court revealed that lay assessors disagree with 
professional judges more over issues of punishment than guilt and innocence. Gerhard 
Casper & Hans Zeisel, Lay judges in the German Criminal Courts, I]. LEGAL STUD. 135, 
152-55 (1972). 
285. LoMBARD, supra note 24, at 273-75. 
286. Id. at 273-74. A law of April28, 1832 gave the jury the power to find mitigating 
circumstances to avoid acquittals (id. at 226), which was arguably the source of the 
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In Russia, under the 1993 jury law, jurors, when returning a guilty 
verdict, could recommend "lenience" or "special lenience," which limited 
the sentencing alternatives available to the professional judge. 287 With a 
finding of "lenience," the sentence could not exceed the mid-level between 
minimum and maximum punishments, and the death penalty, applicable 
in the early years of the modern jury system, could not be imposed. With a 
finding of "special lenience" the judge was required to sentence below the 
minimum punishment or impose a lesser form of punishment 288 
From 1993 to 1994, during the first year of jury trials, my investiga-
tions indicated that juries worked to mitigate the severity of the statutory 
punishments. All but 12 of the first 114 cases were potentially capital 
cases. Of these 102 cases, the jury found the capital charge to be proved 
but recommended lenience in 28 cases and special lenience in six more. 
An additional 23 defendants were convicted of lesser offenses, with ten of 
these receiving lenience and six special lenience. Lenience or special leni-
ence was recommended in nine of the ten cases involving rape of a minor. 
1n the twelve non-capital cases, six defendants were acquitted, two were 
convicted of lesser offenses, and the jury recommended lenience in all 
cases where they convicted the defendants as charged. 289 
Since 2001, the category of "special lenience" has been dropped.290 A 
finding of "lenience" now permits sentencing below the statutory mini-
mum in "extraordinary circumstances,"291 eliminates the death penalty or 
life imprisonment where applicable, or limits the punishment to two-thirds 
of the statutory maximum.292 
These provisions have been criticized because the jury is being asked 
to determine lenience based only on the evidence relating to the commis-
sion of the charged offenses and is prevented from knowing of the defen-
dant's prior criminal record293 or character evidence in general.294 Some 
provision in the pre-Revolution Russian jury law. Section 804 of the UUS-1864 allowed 
for a jury finding of lenience, which permitted the judge to reduce the sentence no less 
than one nor more than two levels. UUS-1864, supra note 34. Pre-revolution juries often 
found lenience to avoid the severity of the Russian criminal code. TIMOFEEV, supra note 
262, at 340-41; see also BOBRlSHCHEV-Pt:SHKIN, supra note 152, at 215-17; BURNHAM ET AL., 
supra note 202, at 544 (suggesting that the lenience power facilitates compromise 
verdicts). 
287. Thaman, supra note 1, at 126-27. 
288. UPK-RSFSR, supra note 12, § 460. 
289. Id. at 135-38; see also Yu. A. Liakhov, Sokrashchennoe sudebnoe sledstvie v sude 
prisiazhnykh Rossiyskoy Federatsii, VEST:>IIK SARATOVSKOY GOSUDARSTBENNOY AKADEMII 
PRAVA No. 3, 200, 207 (1996) (claiming that juries recommended lenience in 56 percent 
of all cases in the first year of the new system). Overall figures of 50.5% lenience find-
ings and 20% of special lenience (MEL'NIK, supra note 5, at 48) and 40% of lenience in 
general (Sergey Pashin, Sudite Sami, VERSTY, Mar. 5, 2003, available through lNDEM, 
supra note 59 (Mar. 1-7, 2003)) have been reported. 
290. UPK-RF, supra note 14, § 339(4). 
291. ld. § 349(2) (referring to § 64 of the UK-RF). 
292. Id. (referring to § 65(1) of the UK-RF). 
293. UPK-RSFSR, supra note l2, § 446('1 6); UPK-RF, supra note 14, § 335(8). 
294. In <J 16 of SCRF Dec. No.9 (1995), supra note 151, the SCRF decided that char-
acter evidence could not be put before the jury to influence their decision as to guilt or 
lenience. This decision has been heavily criticized. Liakhov, Sudcbnoe, supra note 103, 
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critics have suggested that the jury determine guilt first and then hear evi-
dence of the defendant's criminal record or bad character evidence before 
deciding the issue of lenience. 295 
V. Nullification of Nullification: The Rampant Reversal of Acquittals 
"Our obtuse, our blinkered, our hulking brute of a judicial system can live 
only if it is infallible." "<\lexander Solzhenitsyn, The Gulag Archipelago.296 
A The Problem: a System Without Acquittals 
Before the passage of the UPK-RF in 2001, cases were handled by 
either the jury court, the mixed court with lay assessors, panels of three 
judges, or a single judge.297 Pomorski noted in his study of some Krasno-
yarsk courts in the late 1990's that a "no acquittal" policy was de facto in 
place. Although judges acknowledged the miserable quality of the prelimi-
nary investigation, they knew that all acquittals would be overturned if the 
prosecutor appealed. This converted the trial court into a mere sentencing 
court, imposing the judgment sanctioned in advance by the prosecutor. As 
a result of their lack of power, many judges were actually eager for the 
introduction of jury trials, which began in january, 2003.298 The statistics 
for the three-judge panels are remarkable. From 1994 through 1998, 1,564 
persons were tried before the rarely used three-judge panels, and not one 
person was acquitted. Only 22 were not convicted because their cases were 
returned for further investigation. 299 In the first three years follmving pas-
sage of the UPK-RF in 2001, the overall acquittal rate, including jury trials, 
rose from 0.3% to 0.9%.3oo 
at 65-66; Liakhov, supra note 289, at 206-207; see also PETRUKHIN, supra note 9, at 143; 
S.A. Pashin, Dokaz:atel'stva v rossiyskom ugolovnom protsesse, in SosTIAZATEL'NoE 
PRAVOSUDIE Vol. ll, supra note 103, at 385. 
295. MEL'NIK, supra note 5, at 49. 
296. ALEXANDER SotZHENITSYN, THE GuLAG ARCHIPELAGO 520 (1979). 
297. Juries and three-judge panels heard cases punishable by more than fifteen years 
in prison or the death penalty (until a moratorium was declared in 1996). UPK-RSFSR, 
supra note I 2, § 15. A mixed court of one judge and two lay assessors handled cases 
punishable by between five and fifteen years, and a single judge would hear cases where 
punishment did not exceed five years. UPK-RSFSR, supra note 12, § 35. 
298. Pomorski, supra note 60, at 456-58. Human Rights Watch noted that the 
procuracy and the appellate courts go over acquittals meticulously to find any reason to 
reverse, whereas guilty judgments are accepted with little scrutiny. To enforce this "no-
acquittals" policy, the SCRF routinely reverses a much higher percentage of acquittals 
(which constitute less than l/2 of one percent of all judgments) convictions. For 
instance, in 1996 it reversed 29.4% of acquittals and only 2.2% of convictions, and in 
1997, 33.1% of acquittals and only 2.5% of convictions. Human Rights \Vatch, supra 
note 98, at 118-19. 
299. MEL'NIK, supra note 5, at 42. The Ministry of Justice confirmed the lack of 
acquittals for the years 1994-1996. Miniust podvodit itogi raboty sudov, RossiYSKAIA YUS-
TITSIIA No. 8, 4 (1996). 
300. PETRUKHIN, supra note 9, at 101. Sergey Pashin noted that district court judges 
acquitted only 0.72 percent of all defendants in 2002. Sergey Pashin, Mertvye dushi?, 
NovYE IzvESTI!A, Sept. 11, 2003. 
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B. The Lack of Adversary Procedure in the Appellate Courts 
Soviet trial courts avoided acquittals not only to avoid the wrath of the 
all-powerful procuracy, but also due to fear of being reversed by the higher 
courts. In Russia there is no "raise or waive" rule,301 and the SCRF is not 
limited to consideration of the issues raised by the contesting parties. This 
enables it to comb the file and to reverse jury verdicts, often acquittals, sua 
sponte for any reason whatsoever. This seems to be a complete violation of 
the principle of adversary procedure. 302 The ability of appellate judges to 
override the jury's determination of guilt was easier under the UPK-RSFSR 
because reversals could be based on "one-sidedness or incompleteness of 
the inquest, preliminary investigation or trial."303 This gave the SCRF in 
jury cases the power to determine that new evidence of guilt could have 
been introduced at trial.3°4 I found several such cases in my study of the 
practice of the Cassational Panel and the Presidium of the SCRF and its 
handling of Russian jury cases from 1993 to 1999.305 The SCRF also does 
not recognize a "harmless error" rule, for it has often reversed acquittals, 
and even convictions, based on errors that could not have had an impact 
on the jury's decision as to guilt or innocence.106 
The defendant, the procurator, and the victim may appeal judgments 
30L In the United States, errors of constitutional magnitude may not be raised on 
appeal if they were not objected to by the parties during the trial, where they could have 
been corrected. On the so-called "raise or waive" doctrine, see WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., 
CRl'v!INAL PROCEDURE 1293-94 (5th ed. 2004). 
302. For others who agree with my view, see P.A. Lupinskaia, Poriadok obzhalovaniia, 
oprotestovaniia i proverki, ne vstupivshikh v zakonnuiu silu prigovorov i postanovleniy, 
vynesennykh v usloviiakh al'ternativnoy farmy sudoproizvodstva, in VESTN!K SARATOVSKOY 
GOSUDARSTVENNOY AKADEMll PRAVA vol. 3, 239,240-41 (1996); Nemytina, SUpra note 214, 
at 29; see also SoLOMON & FoGLESONG, supra note 60, at 50. 
303. UPK-RSFSR, supra note 12, § 343. 
304. Mel'nik felt that the combination of UPK-RSFSR section 343, the appeal ground 
that the "reasons in the court's judgment do not correspond to the factual circumstances 
of the case," and sections 344 and 379(1)(1) of the UPK-RF, "open a very wide field for 
arbitrary reversals of [acquittals]." MEL'~>:!K, supra note 5, at 58. He continued: "In such 
cases, the most important arbiters of questions of guilt are again professional judges, 
who in the cassational instance can determine the legality of the conclusions of the jury, 
not on the basis of immediately heard evidence, but on the basis of paper, while study-
ing the dossier." I d. 
305. The author visited the SCRF and reviewed the files of all reversed cases in these 
years. My special thanks to Judges AP. Shurygin and V.P. Stepalin for allowing me 
access to the files. In Case of Paziev et aL (Altay), No. 5 Ikp-097-21 sp. (Apr. 24, 1997), 
the SCRF unilaterally reversed the acquittals of Beziakin and Pashkov based on jury 
misconduct, an issue not raised in the appellate briefs. One judge told Karnozova that 
the SCRF reversed an acquittal in his court using a "thought-up" argument, precisely 
because it was an acquittaL KARNozovA, supra note 10, at 158. 
306. On the U.S. harmless error doctrine, see LAFAvE ET AL., supra, note 301, at 1298-
1310. Saltykov-Shchedrin quotes a Tsarist judicial official, shedding light on the old 
mentality which still seems to exist at the SCRF: «I don't look into my conscience, I don't 
consult with my own convictions; I look only as to whether all formalities were 
observed, and in this respect, strictly to the point of pedantry. If I have in my hands two 
witness statements, formulated in the appropriate manner, I am satisfied and write "they 
exist." If they do not exist, I am also satisfied and write "they don't exist." What does it 
concern me whether the crime was committed or not in reality? I want to know whether 
it was proved or not, and nothing else." MEL'NtK, supra note 5, at 7. 
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of conviction or acquittal at each level of the court structure.307 The appel-
late courts, composed of panels of three professional judges, are empow-
ered to review questions of both fact and law. If the accused appeals, the 
appellate court may not find the defendant guilty of a more serious offense 
or impose a more severe punishment. The procurator or the victim, how-
ever, may appeal and seek to have the judgment overturned, and a more 
severe punishment may be imposed upon retriaL 
Since errors need not be raised in the trial court in order to preserve 
them for appeal, and since the appellate courts may also cull the record for 
errors not raised in the appellate briefs, prosecutors and judges can inten-
tionally commit errors at the pretrial and trial stage and, in the event of an 
acquittal, later raise them on appeaL judges have acknowledged their suc-
cessful use of this tactic.308 For example, the prosecutor might fail to 
object to seating a juror who has not revealed that his family members have 
been convicted of crimes. The prosecutor is not barred from bringing up 
this fact on appeal if the case ends in acquittaL 309 
307. UPK-RF, supra note 14, §§ 19(2), 42(2), 42(19), 354(1), 370(1), 385. 
308. I<ARNOZOVA, supra, note 10, at 152, interviewed a judge who said he intentionally 
does not refer to all the evidence in his summation at the end of the trial to give the 
prosecutor grounds for objection. She says there is clearly collusion between judges and 
prosecutors to create reversible error. The revival of the court's power to remand a case 
for further investigation in the decision of the CCRF of Dec. 12, 2003 has also been 
criticized as giving prosecutors and judges leeway to plant errors in cases to avoid 
acquittals. See KS razreshil sudam ispravliat' oshibki prokurorov, KoLOKoLRu., Dec. 9, 
2003, available through INDEM, supra note 59 (Dec. 1-15, 2003). 
309. This recently happened following the acquittal of «Yaponchik" in Moscow 
Region, where the prosecutor on the day after the verdict claimed that seven of the twelve 
jurors were thus "prejudiced." Sokovnin &: Mashkin, supra note 144. This has become a 
common ground for reversal of acquittals, even though being related to a felon would 
not statutorily disqualify a juror. Kollegiia nebespristrastnykh, KoMMERSANT, july 20, 
2005, at 3. For other cases reversing acquittals due to belated revelation of juror bias, 
see BVSRF, supra note 93, No. 2, at 5 (2002), http:/ /v.ww.supcourt.ru/bullettin/02/02-
050/bl07.htm (acquittal of double murder in Ul'ianovsk, where juror had once worked 
as an investigative official for the Ministry of Interior); Case of Raykin et al. (Saratov), 
supra note 180 (death sentence of Raykin and acquittals of two others for quadruple 
murder reversed because juror had prior unexpunged conviction); Case ofVolkov (Mos-
cow Region), No. 4-kp-095-ll1sp Quly 6, 1996) (acquittal of double murder reversed 
because juror knew circumstances of case, though prosecutor agreed in court to let her 
sit); Case of Paziev et al. (Altay), supra note 306; Case of P. (Krasnodar), SCRFjury 
Review (2001), supra note 89 (acquittal of murder reversed because a juror did not 
reveal he had been sentenced to six months probation and had a brother who had been 
charged but not convicted of a crime); Case of P'ianzin (Mordovia), No. 15-003-25spr 
(Aug. 14, 2003) (acquittal of double murder reversed because foreperson did not reveal 
he had been charged with crime); BVSRF, supra note 93, No. 8 (2004), http:// 
v.ww.supcourt.ru/vscourt_detale.php?id~l688; Case of Tsereev, :-lo. 42-003-05, in 
Obzor sudebnoy praktiki Verkhovnogo Suda Rossiyskoy Federatsii za 4 Kvartal 200.3 Goda, 
http:/ /www.supcourt.ru/vscourt_detale.php?id~ 153 [hereinafter SCRF·Criminal Case 
Review (4th Quarter 2003)) (acquittal reversed because juror did not reveal son had a 
prior conviction); Case of Slabochkov (Cheliabinsk), No. 48-004-512p (6.30.04), in 
BVSRF, supra note 93, :-lo. 3 (2005), http://www.supcourt.ru/vscourt_detale.php? 
id=2529 (acquittal of two not reversed where prosecutor withheld information that ten or 
twelve jurors had relatives who had been administratively fined by the police, claiming 
the jurors could not have known of this fact!). 
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C. Zeal in Reversing Acquittals 
Despite the serious nature of the crimes tried in the jury courts, the 
acquittal rate in those courts has been much higher (around 15%) than in 
the regular courts with lay assessors or single judges (less than l% ). 310 It 
is generally recognized that juries acquit accused murderers because of the 
poor quality of the preliminary investigation and because jurors in many 
cases believe the defendants' allegations that confessions had been extorted 
by the use of coercion, threats, or even torture. 311 
The SCRF has shown great zeal in reversing such jury acquittals. The 
statistics relating to acquittals in the first nine years of jury trial, when it 
was restricted to just nine regions of the RF, are revealing. In 1994, 18.2% 
of jury cases ended in acquittal, in comparison to only I% in non-jury 
trials. Yet, according to the author's investigation, of the 19 judgments 
reversed by the SCRF, nine were acquittals, and only one acquittal was 
upheld on appeaP12 In 1995 the acquittal rate fell to 14.3%. 17.3% of 
these acquittals were reversed. In 1996 the acquittal rate rose to 19.1 %, 
but the SCRF reversed 34.2% of those challenged on appeaL In 1997 the 
acquittal rate rose to 22.9% but the SCRF reversed 48.6% of those 
appealed.313 Finally, in 1998, the acquittal rate fell slightly to 20.6%, but 
66% of those were overturned on appeaP14 In 2000 the acquittal rate fell 
to 15.2%, and was 15.6% in 2001.315 In 2001, the SCRF reversed 43% of 
acquittals as opposed to only 6. 7% of convictions. 32.4% of all acquittals 
were reversed in 2002 as opposed to 5.9% of all convictions.316 By 2003, 
the first year that the jury trial began expanding throughout Russia, only 
15% of cases ended in acquittal, yet the SCRF reversed 24% of those as 
310. Thaman, supra note 29, at 348. If one includes partial acquittals, Le., of some 
counts or of the charged offense in favor of a lesser offense, Sergey Nasonov, an attor-
ney, estimates that from 20-40% of defendants before juries are acquitted. Georgiy 
Tselms, Gospoda prisiaznhye, supra note 66. ln 2005, juries heard only 600 of the 1.1 
million criminal cases. They acquitted in 18% of those cases, whereas professional 
judges acquitted in only 3% of cases. This was, however, a rise from earlier years. Kim 
Murphy, In Russia, Juries Must Try, Try Again, LA TIMES, Sept. 30, 2006. 
311. For a description of some methods of torture, see HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra 
note 98, at 21; MEL'NlK, supra note 5, at 46. 
312. Stephen C. Thaman, Geschworenengerichte in Ost und West: Die hlassische Jury 
und das adversarische Verfahren im Strafverfahren Russiands und Spaniens, in 41 RECHT IN 
OsT UND WEST 73, 80 (1997). 
313. Spravka o praktike rassmotrenii ugolovnykh del sudami prisiazhnykh v 1997 godu 
(Mar. 21, 1998) (on file with author) [hereinafter SCRF:Jury-Spravka (1997)]. The 
figures for 1994-1996 were from another Spravka given the author by President of the 
Cassational Panel of the SCRF, A.P. Shurygin (on file with the author). 
314. Spravka po rezui'tatam izucheniia prichin otmeny i izmeneniia prigovorov suda pri-
siazhnykh, rassmotrennykh Verkhovnym Sudom Rossiyskoy Federatsii v 1998 godu (1999), 
at 3, 6-7 (on file with author) [hereinafter, SCRF-Jury-Spravka (1998)]. 42.9 percent of 
all acquittals were reversed whereas only 1.85 percent of convictions were reversed in 
the same year. A. Gagarskiy. Rabota sudov Rossiyskoy Federatsii v 1998 godu, RosslYSKAIA 
YUSTITSUA Vol. 8, 52, 54 (1999). 
315. SCRF-Jury Review (2001), supra note 89. 
316. SCRF:Jury Review (2002), supra note 92. 
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opposed to only 5% of convictions.317 The trend continued in 2004 when 
53.5% of all acquittals were reversed.318 
The author believes that one factor pushing the SCRF to reverse so 
many acquittals, despite the acknowledged incompetence of investigative 
organs and their inability to present credible inculpatory evidence, is the 
ugly fact that the murder rate in Russia has risen progressively since jury 
trials began in 1993, and that the SCRF is unwilling to release alleged mur-
derers who are charged with brutally killing more than one person. Of the 
jury acquittals reversed by the SCRF, the author has discovered at least 20 
cases involving two murder victims, at least two involving three victims, 
and four involving four victims, and at least one case involving more than 
four victims.319 
D. Converting Adversarial Procedure into a Weapon Against the 
Defense: Reversal of Acquittals Based on the Complexity of 
the Rules of Adversary and jury Procedure 
1. "Errors" in the Formulation of the Question List 
The most common reason for reversals of jury judgments, especially 
acquittals, has been purported errors in the formulation of the question 
list by trial judges.320 43% of all reversals were related to these problems 
in the first three years of jury triaP21 The same was true in 1997.322 
Question list "errors" played a comparable role in reversals in 2002 and 
317. BVSRF, supra note 93, No.8, at 14 (2003); cf Burnham, in THE RussiAN FEDE&'-
TIO'-l CoDE OF CRIMINAL PRoCEDURE 67 (William Burnham ed., 2004). Burnham cites Ye. 
B. Mizulina for the proposition that from 1997 to 2001 the SCRF reversed over 50% of 
acquittals and only 15-16% of guilty verdicts. ln Krasnoyarsk Territorial Court, ten jury 
trials were held from January l, 2003 through July 23, 2004. Of the five acquittals 
granted, four were reversed and the fifth was sti.ll pending appeal before the SCRF. Dis-
cussion with judges of Krasnoyarsk Territorial Court on july 23, 2004, Krasnoyarsk Territo-
rial Court, Krasnoyarsk, Russia. 
318. Among all cases heard by the SCRF on appeal, 3.9% of convictions and 45.8% of 
acquittals were reversed. SCRF-Criminal Case Review (2004), supra note 138. In the 
first quarter of 2004, there were 21% acquittals in jury trials but only 0.5% in non-jury 
trials. Andrei Sharov, '12 stu!'ev', RossiYSKAJA GAZETA, Nov. 11, 2004, available through 
INDEM, supra note 59 (Nov. 4-Dec. 4, 2004). In 2005, the acquittal rates for all cases in 
regional-level courts subject to jury trial was 3.6 percent, whereas juries acquitted in 
17.6% of cases. Court Statistics-2005, supra note 79. In the first nine months of 2006, 
the acquittal rate in the regional-level courts remained steady at 3.8% and juries acquit-
ted at a rate of 18.1 %. Statisticheskie svedeniia o rabote sudov obshchey yurisdikzii za 9 
mesiatsev 2006 g, http:/ /www.cdep.ru/ statistics.asp ?search_frm_auto= 1&dept_id=8. In 
that same time period, the SCRF reversed 40% of the acquittals it reviewed. Steven Lee 
Myers, Russia Overturns Acquittalln Killing of Forbes Editor, N.Y. TIMES, t'.;ov. 10, 2006, at 
A6. 
319. See Case of Ulman (Stavropol') (six Chechen civilian victims); Vladimir Voronov, 
supra note 145, at 53-54. These statistics are very rough and greatly understate the 
number of reversed acquittals in each category. These are merely the cases that have 
come to the author's attention. 
320. For a discussion of the mass confusion created by the question lists and the 
SCRF's interpretation thereof, see infra IV.A. 
321. A. Shurygin, Zashchita v sudoproizvodstve s uchastiem kollegii prisiazhnykh zase-
dateley, P. I, RossiYSKAIA YusnrsnA, No. 8, 6 (1997). 
322. SCRF:Jury-Spravka (1997), supra note 313. 
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2003.323 In 1998, however, the SCRF reversed more cases due to improper 
attempts by the defense to influence the jurors (by complaining of coercive 
tactics by investigators), improper exclusion of incriminating evidence, and 
violations of the rights of victims, all of which tended to result in reversals 
of acquittals. 324 
Frequently, the SCRF has seized on the failure of the trial court to 
return the verdict to the jury to correct errors in the question list, in order 
to reverse acquittals.325 Judges have intentionally violated this norm to 
build in reversible error when juries are determined to acquit 326 Many of 
the other question list errors noted above have led, both intentionally and 
unintentionally to reversals of acquittals.327 
2. Erroneous Exclusion of Evidence 
Russia's new and seemingly categorical rule excluding all evidence 
obtained in violation of the law was aimed at protecting defendants from 
the rampant human rights violations that characterized Soviet procedure. 
But this rule has been turned on its head, for when a defendant today suc-
cessfully suppresses illegally gathered evidence and is acquitted, the prose-
cutor or the aggrieved party will invariably complain that their procedural 
rights have been violated and will frequently obtain a reversal. 328 Simi-
323. This matter accounted for 44.8% of all reversals in 2002. SCRF-jury Review 
(2002), supra note 92. For information on the impact of question list errors in 2003, see 
SCRF-Jury-Review (2003), supra note 90. 
324. Spravka po rezul'tatam izucheniia prichin otmeny i izmeneniia prigovorov suda pri-
siazhnykh, rassmotrennykh Verkhovnym Sudom Rossiyskoy Federatsii v 1998 godu (1999), 
at 9 (on file with author) [hereinafter SCRF-jury-Spravka (1998)]. 
325. Case of Drygin (Saratov), No.41-kp..099-l35sp Oan. 20, 1999) (acquittal of 
aggravated murder and rape); Case of Kovalev (Saratov ), No. 32-kp..Q96-28sp Oune 10. 
1996) (reversal of attempted aggravated murder). In the first modern Moscow City 
Court jury trial, the judge sent the jury back five times, trying in vain to coax a guilty 
verdict. The jury foreman, obviously thinking the jury was at fault, sighed: "It's the first 
time. The first pancake is always messed up." Baker, supra note 172, at AL 
326. KARNOZOVA, supra note 10, at 231-34. 
327. See infra lV.A.2-8, which include many examples of reversed acquittals. 
328. Case of Nikitin et al. (Moscow Region), No. 4 ktr097-l3 sp. Uan. 26, 1997) 
(exclusion of report of search of the scene and seized knife leading to reversal of acquit-
tal for attempted murder); Case of Kurnosikov (Moscow Region), No. 4 kp-097-44sp, 
(May 15, 1997) (reversal of murder acquittal due to exclusion of autopsy report); Case of 
Kozyrialin (Stavropol'), No. 19-kp-096-115 sp. Oan. 28, 1997) (conviction of lesser 
homicide reversed due to admission of defendant's alleged report of the crime); Case of 
Samoylov (Saratov), No. 32 kp-099-16sp (Mar. 23, 1999) (murder acquittal reversed due 
to suppression of report of search of a house); Case of Kurochkin et al. (Moscow 
Region), No. 4 ktr098-l30sp (Aug. 6, 1998) (murder acquittals reversed due to exclu-
sion of report of photographic identification and "dean-hearted" confession due to lack 
of reasons); Case of Aliev (Moscow Region), No. 4 kp-098-141sp (Aug. 27, 1998) (mur-
der acquittals reversed due to exclusion of report of forensic-ballistic expert and of a 
confrontation between the defendant and a witness); Case of Bulochnikov (Altay), 
No.51-ktr094-68sp (Sep. 1, 1994) (acquittal of double murder reversed due to exclusion 
of defendant's statements); Case ofViazovets (Rostov), No. 41-ktr094-l09sp (Nov. 24, 
1994) (acquittal of double murder due to exclusion of testimony of aggrieved party and 
a witness who did not appear for court reversed); Case of Uvarov/Sosiurko (Moscow 
Region), No. 4kp-003-188 sp Qan. 8, 2004), in BVSRF, supra note 93, No. 10 (2004), 
http://www.supcourt.ru/bulletin/2004/2004-ll/4.htm (acquittal of bribery reversed 
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larly, the reform of confession law in Russia, the implementation of 
Miranda rights, and exclusionary rules relating to confessions obtained 
through illegal means have been bizarrely turned against defendants by the 
SCRF's doctrine excluding evidence to impeach the credibility of such con-
fessions. As noted above, this has led to the frequent reversal of 
acquittals. 329 
Fear of reversal of any acquittal has inspired some lawyers to refuse to 
make suppression motions in order to deprive the prosecution of grounds 
to appeal or to return the case to the investigator for supplementary investi-
gation to fill gaps left by the suppressed evidence.330 
3. Ignoring the Adversarial Rights of the Aggrieved Party and the 
Prosecutor 
We have already discussed how the CCRF has allowed the aggrieved 
party to claim that his or her rights were violated at the pretrial stage in 
order to torpedo an ongoing jury trial and return the case for further inves-
tigation. As one might expect, the SCRF has not hesitated to reverse jury 
acquittals when the aggrieved party has complained of an alleged violation 
of his or her rights. Typically, the SCRF will reverse acquittals when law 
enforcement organs or the courts have not notified the aggrieved party of 
due to exclusion of confessions); Case of Darchuk (Saratov) (reversal of murder acquit-
tal due to exclusion of defendant's report of crime) and Case of Mediantsev (Altay), 
Procuracy Institute, Informatsionnoe pis'mo, supra note 254, at 3-4, http:// 
www.supcourt.ru/vscourt_detale.php?id~2759 (reverse of murder acquittal due to 
exclusion of forensic medical examination of weapon based on chain of custody 
problems); Case ofl\ovikov (Yaroslavl), SCRF-Criminal Case Review (2004), supra note 
138, http:/ /www.supcourt.ru/vscourt_detale.php?id=2759 (acquittal of murder solicita-
tion reversed due to suppression of taped solicitation of bribe because it had too many 
swear words in it). 
329. Case of Kornilov et al. (Rostov), No. 41-kp-096-39sp (May 14, 1996); Case of 
Zhevak (Rostov), No. 41-kp-096-24sp (Apr. 10, 1996); Case of Popov (Saratov), No.32 
kp-097·21 sp. (May 29, 1997); Case of Antipov (Rostov), No. 4l-kp-097-27sp (Apr. 9, 
1997); Case of Grigor'ev (Altay), No.5 I kp-097-26sp (May 7, 1997); Case of Aleshin et 
at. (Moscow), No. 4-kp-098-94sp Oune 3, 1998); Case of Grafov (Moscow Region), No. 
4-kp-098-179sp (Nov. 25, 1998); Case of Kurochkin et al. (Krasnodar), No. 18-kp-098-
81sp (Sep. 22. 1998); Case of Topchiy (Krasnodar), l\o.18-kp-098-103sp (1\ov. 28, 
1998); Case of Lipkin et al. (Moscow Region), No. 4-kp-099-9sp (Feb. 24, 1999); Case of 
Agafonov et al. (Stavropol'), No. 19-kp-099-48sp (May 5, 1999); Case of Yermolaev/ 
Drachenko (Rostov), No. 41-kp-099-lSsp (Mar. 10, 1999); Case of Arustamov (Stavro-
pol'), SCRF-Criminal Case Review (2002), supra note 175; Case of Morozov (Ivanovo) 
and K (Krasnodar), SCRF-jury Review (2001), supra note 89; Case of Isakov (Altay), 
SCRF:Jury Review (2003), supra note 90; Case of Pomazan (Volgograd), No. l6-004-36sp 
Quly 14, 2004), in BVSRF, supra note 93, No. 2 (2005), http:/ /www.supcourt.ru/bullet-
tin/2005/2005-02/l8.htm; Case of Turischev et al. (Volgograd), SCRF-Criminal Case 
Review (2004), supra note 139. 
330. See Thaman, supra note 1, at 94 (noting the potential for "dramatic" effects from 
exclusion of all illegally obtained evidence). Lupinskaia suggests that requiring the 
judge to give reasons for excluding or failing to exclude evidence would serve to prevent 
some of the abuses of the new exclusion jurisprudence, such as the motions for supple-
mental investigation. P.A. Lupinskaia, Nekotorye voprosy, voznikaiushchie v praktike 
primeneniia ugolovno-protsessual'nogo zakonodatel'stva pri rassmotrenii ugolovnykh del 
sudom prisiazhnykh, 3 VESTNlK 5ARATOVSKOY GOSUDARSTVENNOY AKADEMI! PRAVA 70-76 
(1996). 
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the day of the trial or have prevented it from participating in procedural 
acts.331 Although violations of the rights of the aggrieved party are used as 
a reason to reverse acquittals, the courts and law enforcement organs make 
virtually no effort to ensure that aggrieved parties are represented or know 
what their roles are at trial. 332 Indeed, identifying the aggrieved party as a 
victim before the jury has proven guilt beyond a reasonable doubt violates 
the presumption of innocence and makes the defendant's rights subject to 
those of a person who is particularly biased and often motivated by 
revenge.333 Similarly, the SCRF has reversed acquittals because the trial 
court denied the prosecutor and the aggrieved party's motions to read the 
prior testimony of witnesses who had failed to appear in court, or because 
the trial court refused to grant a continuance to enable them to appear. 334 
4. Defense Mentioning of Facts Not in Evidence 
The SCRF theory for reversing acquittals involving suppressed confes-
sions is based on the fact that the defense is mentioning facts not in evi-
dence. The SCRF has also overturned acquittals or judgments favorable to 
the accused due to other alleged comments that the defense lawyer made 
during closing argument,335 or that the defendant made during his or her 
33L Case of Karakaev (Krasnodar) (reversing murder acquittal because aggrieved 
party was sick, did not come to court, and the judge made no effort to get her into 
court); Case of Bulychev (Saratov), No. 32 kp-096-55 sp. (Oct. 8, 1996) (reversing 
acquittal of double murder because conducted without aggrieved party and court made 
no attempt to find out his whereabouts); Case of Likhonin et al. (Saratov), No. 32 kp-
095-76sp Qan. 23, 1996) (denying aggrieved party chance to express opinion about par-
tial refusal of prosecutor to dismiss murder charges against two of defendants); Case of 
Kulemin (Moscow Region), No.4-kp-098-155sp (Oct. 7, 1998) (reversing acquittal of 
aggravated murder because aggrieved party was not notified of the day of the prelimi-
nary hearing or the trial, could not participate in jury selection, and when she did 
appear, was not allowed to participate in examining evidence); Case of Bogatov (Moscow 
Region), No.4 kp-098-l96sp (Dec. 30, 1998) (reversing aggravated murder acquittal of 
victim not advised of the day of his trial); Case of Pomazan (Volgograd), supra note 329 
(reversing murder acquittal due to failure to advise victim of date of trial, and the defen-
dant's inability to participate in jury selection and questioning of some witnesses). 
332. According to one study, the aggrieved party did not participate at all in 66 per-
cent of jury cases and played a passive role in 60 percent of the remaining cases. In 78 
percent of cases the aggrieved party did not suggest any changes in the question list and, 
in 94 percent of acquittals, no lawyer represented the aggrieved party. MEt'NlK, supra 
note 5, at 56-57. 
333. MORSHCHAKOVA, supra note 59, at 219. 
334. Case of Khachaturov (Stavropol'), supra note 255 (reversing conviction of lesser 
offense of murder in the heat of passion); Cases of Shut'ko and Paron'ko/ Antonenko, 
SCRF-Jury Review (2003), supra note 93. The 2006 acquittal of the alleged murders in 
2004 of the Moscow editor of Forbes magazine, Paul Klebnikov, was based on appeals by 
the defendant's widow and sibling alleging "blatant procedural irregularities.~ Myers, 
supra note 318. 
335. Case of Gusiev/Poliakov (Stavropol'), No.19 kp-097-15 sp (Apr. 30, 1997) 
(reversing acquittal of robbery-murder because defense lawyer mentioned history of 
defendant's illnesses and his earlier conviction had been reversed); Case of B( Rostov) 
(reversing aggravated murder acquittal because defense lawyer mentioned expert testi-
mony which had been excluded), SCRF-Jury Review (2001), supra note 89; Case of 
Zaletov (Altay), No. Sl-kp-002-113 sp, SCRF-Jury Review (2002), supra note 95 (revers-
ing acquittal because defense counsel mentioned illegal investigation methods, other 
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testimony or last word, 336 especially when the trial judge did not interrupt 
the offender or advise the jury to disregard the comments. The SCRF has 
also reversed acquittals merely because the defense has called into ques-
tion the credibility of the prosecution's evidence.337 
5. Errors in the Presiding judge's Summation 
Unlike in the United States, the Russian trial judge is required not 
only to instruct the jury on the law but also to summarize the evidence 
presented by the parties,338 and in doing so, the judge must not reveal his 
or her opinion as to which facts were proved or the proper verdict. 339 
Alleged errors in the judge's summation have often led to the SCRF revers-
ing acquittals.34° Courts have even reversed acquittals when the trial 
judge was compelled to mention to the jury that there was no evidence to 
support a conviction, because all the evidence had been suppressed in 
defense motions.341 Several Moscow Region convictions were also 
reversed because the judge did not give the parties a chance to object to the 
evidence, and a witness's prior arrests); Case of Tipikin (Stavropol'), No. 19-004-6sp 
(Feb. 4, 2004), in BVSRF, supra note 93, No. 5 (2005) (reversing aggravated murder 
acquittal because lawyer mentioned testimony of witnesses not subpoenaed, reports not 
read into evidence, etc.); Case of Os'mukhin (Lipetsk), SCRF-Criminal Case Review-
2004, supra note 145 (reversing double murder acquittal because counsel called into 
question character of witness by mentioning his prior convictions). 
336. Case of Denisov (Moscow Region), No.4 kp-098-20lsp) Qan. 20, 1999) (revers-
ing acquittal of triple murder because defendant mentioned illegal methods of law 
enforcement during the investigation and many other pieces of inadmissible evidence). 
337. Case of Surin (Moscow Region) (May 25, 2004), in BVSRF, supra note 93, No.5 
(2005), available at http:/ /www.supcourt.ru/vscourt_detale.php?id=2628 (reversing 
acquittal of juvenile for killing another juvenile because the defense lawyer called into 
question whether the defendant's slingshot had a hole in it). 
338. UPK-RF, supra note 14, § 340(3)(2-5); UPK-RSFSR, supra note 12, § 451(3, 5). A 
summation of the facts and the law relevant to the case by the judge was also required in 
the pre-revolution Russian jury system, whereas in nineteenth century Germany the 
judge only had to explain the legal elements, and in nineteenth century Italy, only the 
factual evidence. KucHERov, supra note 36, at 60. 
339. UPK-RF, supra note 14, § 340(3)(2); UPK-RSFSR, supra note 12, § 451(5). 
340. Case ofMinakhmedov (Stavropol'), No. 19 kp-097-81 sp (Oct. 31, 1996) (revers-
ing conviction of lesser-included offense to murder because it was not dear in the record 
whether the judge summarized the prosecutor's position); Case of Kustov/Sobolevskiy 
(Moscow Region), No.4 kp-096-10 sp (Mar. 7, 1996) (reversing acquittals of aggravated 
murder, inter alia, because it was not clear that the judge summarized prosecutor's posi-
tion); Case of Shevshenko/Shevshenko (Rostov), :..Io. 41-kp-095-103 sp Qan. 29, 1996) 
(finding that position of one defendant, who was found guilty of lesser offense to mur-
der was not properly summarized by judge, but reversing both the conviction for a lesser 
offense and the aggravated murder acquittal of the other defendant.); Case of 
Nemchikov (\.'loscow Region), No. 4-kp-095-94 sp (Sep. 7, 1995) (reversing acquittal of 
attempted murder because judge called prosecution evidence into question); see also 
Obzor zakonodatel'stva i sudebnoy praktiki verkhovnogo Suda Rossiyskoy Federatsii za lV 
Kvartall995 Goda (4th Qtr. 1995) [hereinafter SCRF-Review of legislation andjudicial 
Practice] (for the judge's critique of the SCRF decision, see Grigor'eva, supra note 232, at 
171-72); Cases of P (Moscow Region) and K (Krasnodar), SCRF-Jury Review (2001 ), 
supra note 89 (reversing murder acquittals). 
341. KARNOZOVA, supra note 10, at 293-94 (mentioning cases tried by Natal'ya 
Grigor'eva in Moscow Region and V. V. Zolotyhh in Rostov). 
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summation in front of the jury. 342 
judges have, on occasion, intentionally built error into their summa-
tions to plant the seeds for reversal in the event of an acquittal, by recount-
ing the prosecution's evidence or position in an incomplete or skewed 
manner. Observers have also witnessed cases in which the trial judge 
made comments clearly prejudicial to the defense, but then excluded those 
remarks from the copy of the summation which becomes part of the offi-
cial record, making it difficult to allege error.343 
6. Errors in jury Selection, juror Misconduct, and Errors During 
Deliberation 
Errors in compiling jury lists or assessing juror eligibility have led to 
reversals and are clear examples of how the state's own negligence or mis-
conduct can lead to the reversal of verdicts in favor of the defendant.344 
Indeed, the widespread violation by administrative officials of the rules for 
compiling jury lists could build reversible error into any case the SCRF 
desires to reverse.345 Allegedly, certain courts have encouraged citizens to 
volunteer for jury duty in clear violation of the law.346 In some recent high 
profile political cases, parties have alleged that the courts have permitted 
342. Case of Gushchin/Zhirnov (Moscow Region), No. 4-kp-095-42 vt sp (Nov. 15, 
1995); Case ofKuz'kin (Moscow Region), No. 4-kp-095-ll4sp (Oct. 18, 1995); Case of 
Obusov (Moscow Region), No. 4-kp-95- 106 sp. (Oct. 11, 1995). Natal'ya Grigor'eva, 
the judge who presided over the first Moscow Region jury trial, niticized such rulings 
and also noted that this ground was not even mentioned in the appellate briefs. 
Grigor'eva, supra note 232, at 177-78. The Chair of the Cassational Panel of the SCRF, 
A.P. Shurygin, defends the court's position. See Shurygin, supra note 135, at 7-8 (citing 
Professors LL. Petrukhin and P.A. Lupinskaia). 
343. One judge told the jury that the guilt question "usually raises no doubts" and 
that the main issue was that of leniency. 1n another case the judge said the jury could 
find defendant not guilty due to self-defense "in the case of extreme necessity" but then 
indicated that this was not present in the instant case. KAILNOZOVA, supra note 10, at 
147-58. 
344. Case of Anufriev (Ul'ianovsk), No. 80-kp-096-7sp (Mar. 7, 1996) (reversing 
acquittal of rape-murder because 1995 list of jurors from City of Dimitrovgrad unlaw-
fully included 269 persons from the 1994 list. Six thereof sat on the jury); Case of 
Kaplunov et al. (Rostov), No. 41-kp-099-7sp (Feb. 12, 1999) (reversing judgments of 
acquittal and conviction for four murders attributed to gangs because one juror unlaw-
fully served twice in one year); Case of Smirnov/Medvedev (Stavropol'), No. 19 kp-099-
25sp (Mar. 18, 1999) (reversing acquittal of two police officers for extortion because 
two jurors were sitting on their second case in the same year and one, the foreperson, on 
his third. In one of the previous cases he was also foreperson and the jury acquitted). 
345. Ombudsman for Human Rights Vladimir Lukin has alleged that the procedure 
for selecting juries is not transparent and is subject to manipulation. Sharov, supra note 
317. Persons are twice included on the same lists, lists contain the dead or people who 
no longer live in the district, and 30 percent of persons on lists do not meet eligibility 
requirements. Id. The European Court of Human Rights has already condemned such 
practices in relation to the selection of lay assessors in the old mixed court trials, where 
lay assessors had been sitting for eighty-eight days rather than the fourteen day maxi-
mum that the law imposed. Posokhov v. Russia, E.C.H.R. 21, 'I'I 28, 40-41, 43 (Mar. 4, 
2004). 
346. When Governor Aman Tuleev allegedly determined that the jury list in Kuzbass 
contained criminals and village idiots, he ordered that officials seek om only orderly, 
intelligent, and good people to become jurors. Due to the errors in the list, the first 
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the "stacking" of conviction-prone juries. This was evident in the espio-
nage trial in Moscow City Court of Igor' Sutyagin, who was convicted in 
April of 2004. ln that case, a former KGB agent was allowed secretly to sit 
on the jury.347 This was also alleged in the case of Alexey Pichugin, ex-
associate of Mikhail Khodorkovskiy, whom the jury convicted of 
murder.348 
The SCRF has also reversed a number of acquittals due to seemingly 
technical errors during jury selection.349 A common trivial error leading 
to reversal has been the jury's violation of its duty to deliberate for three 
hours before returning with a majority (as opposed to unanimous) ver-
dict.350 This first happened in the first jury trial in Riazan' in 1994, when 
the jury returned with a majority acquittal verdict of aggravated murder 
before three hours had elapsed. The prosecutor did not object, and the trial 
judge neither called the jury's attention to the error nor returned them to 
deliberate for the additional time.351 This easily avoidable error has led to 
the reversal of convictions352 as well as acquittals. The SCRF has also 
Kuzbass jury trial had to be postponed. Anatoliy Yarmoliuk, Segodnia ty, a zavtra-ya, 
VERSTY, Feb. 6, 2003, available through INDEM, supra note 59 Ouly, 2003). 
347. The Moscow Military District Court allegedly added the former agent, Grigorii 
Yakimishen, to the jury pool. Despite these allegations, the SCRF upheld the conviction. 
Sutyagin Lawyers Charge That juror Was Secret-Service Agent, RFE/RL NEWSLINE, Oct. 26, 
2004 at 9[ 15, http:/ /www.rferl.org/newsline/2004/l0/1-RUS/rus-26l004.asp. See also 
Law on Jurors, supra note 38. 
348. The judge dismissed the jury after it indicated that it was going to acquit and 
replaced it with a new jury. Yuhas Official Appeals Murder Conviction to Supreme Court, 
RFE/RL NEwsUNE, Apr. 5, 2005, at 9[ 10, available at http:/ /www.rferl.org/newsline/ 
2005/04/1-RUS/rus-050405.asp. 
349. In Case of Shpeko et al. (Krasnodar), No. 18 kp-096-8 sp (Sep. 3, 1996), the 
court reversed an acquittal for quadruple murder because, inter alia, the parties were 
given a list of the jurors with full information as to their residence and place of work, for 
which the law did not provide. The court deemed that this could have influenced their 
decision to acquit. In Case of Puchkov /Savchenko (Stavropol'), No. 19/I kp-095-131 sp 
(Dec. 14, 1995), the jury selection began with nineteen instead of the twenty jurors 
required by the jury law. In a 1998 case, the Presidium of the SCRF reversed an acquit-
tal that had been affirmed by the Cassational Panel because the Presidium found that an 
alternate juror, "Medvedeva," who replaced one of the original jurors, had never been 
sworn, though the actual reason was that the secretary of the court had written 
"Ledvedev" in the file in error. See Interview with A P. Shurygin, in SCRF (Moscow, Aug. 
19, 1998). 
350. UPK-RF, supra note 14, § 343(1); UPK-RSFSR, supra note 12, § 453(2). 
351. Case of Artiukhov (Riazan'), No. 6-kp-094-13sp (Apr. 19, 1994). For discussion 
of this case, see Thaman, supra note 1, at 125. 
352. Case of Dzalmadaev et al. (Stavropol'), No. 19 kp-096-37 sp Oune 4, 1996); Case 
of Uzhakov (Moscow Region), No. 4-kp-095-90sp (Aug. 10, 1995) (reversing because the 
jury did not deliberate for three hours on issue of lenience); cf Case of Kukhtenkov, 
SCRF-Review of Legislation and Judicial Practice (4th Quarter 1995), supra note 340; 
Case of Puchkov/Savchenko (Stavropol'), No. 19/l kp-095-131 sp (Dec. 14, 1995) 
(reversing conviction because deliberations started at noon and jury returned with 
majority verdict at 3:20p.m., but jury had asked for some explanations at 1:30 p.m. and 
record did not reflect how long these explanations took); Case of Alekseenko (Rostov), 
No. 41 kp-097-38 sp. (Apr. 30, 1997) (reversing conviction because some questions were 
not answered unanimously); Case of Kudriashov (Riazan'), No. 6-kp-094-17sp, Obzor 
zakonodatel'stva i sudebnoy praktiki Verkhovnogo Suda Rossiyskoy Federatsii za IV. kvartal 
1994 gada, at 23 (Moscow, 1995) (reversing conviction because no unanimity on the 
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reversed acquittals when the jury did not deliberate for three additional 
hours after the jury's deliberation had been interrupted to adduce a piece 
of new evidence.353 
The SCRF has not infrequently reversed judgments because of viola-
tions of the confidentiality of jury deliberations or other instances of 
alleged jury misconduct. It has reversed acquittals because the two alter-
nate jurors sat in during deliberations354 and also because the alternates 
allegedly left the jury room during deliberations or communicated with 
non-jurors during deliberations. 355 Other acquittals were reversed because 
jurors allegedly spoke with counsel or family members of the defendant 
during the trial,356 independently investigated the case,357 or in one case, 
questioned a defendant directly rather than i.n written form mediated by 
the trial judge, as required by law.35S 
7. judicial Errors in Giving Reasons for the judgment 
Most continental European criminal justice systems permit reversal of 
a judgment if the reasoning was inadequate,359 but only two classic jury 
systems, Spain and Austria, require the jury to provide reasons for the ver-
dict. In Spain, inadequate reasoning by the jury can lead to the reversal of 
an acquittaP60 
question of lenience) [hereinafter SCRF-Review of Legislation and Judicial Practice (4th 
Qtr. 1994 )]. 
353. After the jury had deliberated for two hours and ten minutes, the trial was 
reopened to read a report of a view of the scene of the crime. The jury then deliberated 
another hour and ten minutes. BVSRF, supra note 93, No. 6 (2002), http:/ I 
www.supcourt.ru/bullettin/02/02-06/bll2.htm. 
354. Case of Denisov (Altay), No.51-kp-094-6lsp Qune 28, 1994) (alll4 jurors voted 
for acquittal). See also Thaman, supra note 1, at 129. At least two other acquittals were 
reversed for the same reason. Case of Sherstnev (Krasnodar), 1\o. 18-kp-095-55sp (Feb. 
14, 1995). For another acquittal reversed for the same reason, see Shurygin, supra note 
161, at 20. 
355. Case of Zhevak (Rostov), supra note 329 (reversing acquittal because, inter alia, 
male jurors left jury room to smoke). 
356. In Case of Shpeko (Krasnodar), supra note 349, the prosecutor alleged that the 
jurors talked with the defendant's relatives and that seven of the jurors spoke with the 
defendant's girlfriend in the bathroom; see also Case of Metskhvarishvili (Moscow 
Region), No.4-kp-098-l05sp Qune 25, 1998) (reversing acquittal for forcible sodomy 
because foreperson chatted with defendant's lawyer); Obzor zakonodate!'stva i sudebnoy 
praktiki Verkhovnogo Suda Rossiyskoy Federatsii za pervoe polugodie 1995 goda 45 ( 1995 ); 
Case of B (Krasnodar), No. 18 kp 002-71 sp vt, SCRF-]ury Review (2002), supra note 92 
(judge dissolved jury after it had reached acquittal due to alleged violation of the confi-
dentiality of deliberations). 
357. Case of P (Saratov), SCRF-jury Review (2001), supra note 89 (foreperson became 
convinced of innocence after visiting the scene, and convinced other jurors). 
358. Case ofTitov (Moscow Region), No.4kp-003-l3sp (Mar. 5, 2003) (defendant also 
answered some of the questions by volunteering allegedly inadmissible evidence); 
BVSRF, supra note 93, No. 7 (2004 ), http:/ /www.supcourt.ru/vscourt_detale.php?id= 
1670. 
359. For examples, see THAMA"~, supra note 64, at 187-213. 
360. Id. at 193-95. The Spanish Constitutional Court has upheld the requirement 
that juries give reasons for verdicts of acquittal. STC 2004 of Dec. 20, 2004, http:/ I 
www.tribunalconstitucional.es/JC.htm. 
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In Russia, the professional judge, while bound by the jury's answers to 
the questions in the question list, must give a reasoned judgment subject to 
appellate review.361 In both the German mixed court and the Russian jury 
court, it is possible for the professional judge to create error in the judg-
ment reasons and thereby lay the groundwork for the reversal of a judg-
ment with which he disagrees. 362 The Russian appellate court often bends 
over backwards to find error in the trial judge's reasoning so that it may set 
aside a jury verdict that itself may have been error-free. 363 The SCRF has 
recently ruled that in giving reasons for an acquittal, the trial judge need 
only state which of the three special verdict questions the jury answered in 
the negative. Thus, the reviewing court now will only correct the judgment 
to reflect whether it was due to of the absence of any criminal conduct, 
inadequate proof of the identity of the perpetrator, or the jury's failure to 
find guilt. 364 
E. Are There Cases Where No Result Other Than a Conviction is 
Acceptable? 
Several cases suggest that sometimes the SCRF will not permit acquit-
tal, no matter how many times the case is tried. One of the most well-
known multiple-acquittal cases is the Case of Lipkin, et al., which involved 
the assassination of State Duma deputy S.G. Skorochkin on February 2, 
1995. The first trial in the Moscow Regional Court resulted in acquittal of 
Lipkin and his five co-defendants after Lipkin had spent 3.5 years in pre-
trial custody. The SCRF reversed the acquittal, citing the exclusion of sev-
eral pieces of evidence favorable to the prosecution's case, and the fact that 
the defendant and defense witnesses called the jury's attention to the use of 
unlawful methods by investigators during pretrial interrogations. 365 
361. UPK-RF, supra note 14, §§ 351,305, 307; UPK-RSFSR, supra note 12, § 462. 
362. In the celebrated German case of Monika Weimar it was speculated that the pro-
fessional judge who wrote the reasons for the acquittal in a case of double murder inten-
tionally left them inadequate, allowing the judgment to be reversed upon appeal in 
cassation. THAMAI', supra note 64, at 202-08. 
363. The SCRF has reversed acquittals or convictions of substantially lesser, included 
offenses based on this reason. Case of Kondzhariia et al. (Saratov), No. 32 kp-096-22 sp 
Oune 4, 1996), SCRF-Review of Legislation and Judicial Practice (4th Qtr. 1994 ), supra 
note 340 (setting aside verdict of negligent homicide because the killing was described 
as if it were an intentional murder); Case of Fliagin (Saratov), No. 32-004-5sp (Mar. 16, 
2004), in BVSRF, supra note 93, No. 10 (2004), http:/ /www.supcourt.ru/ 
vscourt_detale.php?id=l731 (acquittal of attempted murder reversed based on judge's 
inadequate reasons for finding no intent to kill). 
364. Case of Liuyma/Romanov (Ul'ianovsk), No. 80-kp003-42-sp-l (Dec. 29, 2003), 
in BVSRF, supra note 93, No.8 (2004), http:/ /www.supcourt.ru/vscourt_detale.php?id= 
1685. Critics have noted that requiring reasons for an acquittal other than lack of proof 
tends to violate the defendant's presumption of innocence. In Russia, the provision of 
reasoning is required because an acquitted person is subject to full rehabilitation and 
compensation as an innocent person. ,\1artin Fincke, Die Reform des Strafprozesses in 
Russland, in DIE NEUEN KODIFIKATIONEN IN Ru£LAND 207 Schroeder ed., 1997). 
365. Case of Lipkin et al. (Moscow Region), supra note 329 (the long pre-trial incar-
ceration was circumstantial evidence of problems encountered while investigating the 
case). 
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The case was tried again, and on December 5, 2000, it again ended 
with an acquittal. In the second trial one of the defendants, Lopukhov, 
claimed that he had satisfied all debts to the victim, Skorochkin, and intro-
duced a note substantiating this fact. On the second appeal, the prosecutor 
claimed that the trial judge had violated the prosecutor's adversarial rights 
by (a) refusing to grant a continuance to conduct a handwriting analysis of 
the note, and (b) refusing to admit the report that a machine gun and pistol 
were found during a search of Lopukhov's home.366 On May 7, 2003, the 
defendants were again acquitted, but the SCRF again reversed, citing a long 
list of erroneously excluded evidence by the trial judge and repeated men-
tion of the illegality of police interrogation techniques.367 
Acquittals in Russia sometimes suggest a troublesome type of ethnic 
prejudice. In several recent cases, courts acquitted Russians of the murder 
of Chechens. These acquittals have been compared to jury verdicts in the 
American South, where whites were routinely acquitted after murdering 
blacks. The most high-profile case of this type was that of Eduard Ul'man 
and four co-defendants. The five Russian were tried before a jury in the 
North Caucasus Military Court for murdering six Chechen civilians during 
the Chechen War. After their first trial, they were acquitted by a jury, but 
the SCRF reversed the acquittal four months later. Ul'man and his code-
fendants were again tried and acquitted, 368 but the Military Panel of the 
SCRF reversed the second acquittal, too.369 In a similar case, two Russian 
servicemen accused of murdering three Chechen construction workers 
were also twice acquitted by juries in the North Caucasus Military Court 
only to have the Military Panel of the SCRF overturn each acquittaP70 
Multiple reversals of acquittals have also occurred frequently in less 
overtly political cases. In the Case of Nikitin, et al., four men killed a 
woman to acquire her apartment, a common crime in the 1990's directly 
following the privatization of most Russian apartments. The men were 
366. Case of Lipkin eta!. (Moscow Region), No. 4-kp-001-3lsp (May 30, 2001) (two 
of the same SCRF judges who reversed the first acquittal, Judges Kozin and Kudriavt· 
seva, sat on the second appeal as well). 
367. Case of Lipkin eta!. (Moscow Region), No. No. 4-kp-003-84sp Ouly 10, 2003). 
Again, Judge Kozin made up part of the panel which overturned the third acquittal, 
along with Judge Ivanov who participated in the second decision. 
368. Sokovnin & Mashkin, supra note 144. 
369. Million Russians Back Officer Charged With Killing Chechen Civilians, RFE/RL 
NEWSUNE, Nov. 14, 2006; see also Russian Court Quashes Servicemen's Acquittal in 
Chechen Killings, RFE/RL NEWSLJNE, Aug. 31, 2005. Despite a petition with one million 
signatories demanding Ul'man's release, the third trial began on November 2, 2006 in 
Rostov-on-the-Don. 
370. Chechen Official Deplores Acquittal of Russian Servicemen, RFE/RL NrwsuNE, 
Oct. 7, 2005. The first acquiual took place in June 2004 and the second on October 6, 
2005. More recently, St. Petersburg juries acquitted two defendants in separate cases, 
each charged with a murder based on racial or ethnic hatred. ln March 2006, a jury 
acquitted a teenage boy of murder of a nine year-old Tajik girl, Khursheda Sultanova, 
and in July 2006, a jury acquitted four young men of the murder of a twenty-nine-year· 
old Congolese student, Roland Eposak, to the cheers of some fifty supporters of the 
alleged killers. Yelena Gorlanova, Negry v Peterburge umiraiut sami, GAZETA.RU, July 26, 
2006 http:/ /v.ww.gazeta.ru/2006/07 /25/ oa_209453.shtml. 
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acquitted, but the SCRF reversed the acquittal soon after, claiming that the 
trial judge erroneously excluded evidence.371 Upon retrial they were 
acquitted again, but the case was again reversed, apparently due to errone-
ous exclusion of the same evidence.372 
Although not all second or third acquittals are reversed by the 
SCRF,373 one may comfortably surmise that the reversals may be the result 
of a "no-acquittals" policy rather than substantive errors during the tri-
als.374 In another multiple acquittal case, the defendant was accused of 
bombing a market in Astrakhan, killing eight people. After two separate 
juries had acquitted the defendant, and two additional trials ended in mis-
trials, the defendant, Magomed lsakov, now believes that he will be repeat-
edly tried until he is convicted. lsakov's second acquittal, while affirmed 
by the Cassational Panel of the SCRF, was reversed by the SCRF's 
Presidium.375 
F. The Appellate Policy of the SCRF in Comparative Perspective 
Tsarist juries also had a high acquittal rate. Of the 918 verdicts over a 
fourteen year period studied by Bobrishchev-Pushkin, 590 ended in acquit-
tals, 96 of which were cases in which the defendant completely admitted 
371. Case of Nikitin et al. (Moscow Region), supra note 328. 
372. Case of Nikitin et al. (Moscow Region), No.4 kp-098-159sp (Oct. 2, 1998). 
373. 1n Case of Sushko (Stavropol'), No. 19-kp-094-72sp (Dec. 13, 1994) (a first 
acquittal for aggravated murder of two persons was reversed due to allegedly erroneous 
exclusion of evidence); see also Thaman, supra note 1, at 261-62. The second acquittal 
was affirmed. Case of Sushko (Stavropol'), No. 19-kp-096-87sp (Oct. 31, 1996). In Case 
of Yes'kov (Altay), the defendant was first acquitted of accepting bribes as a police 
officer and the acquittal was reversed by the SCRF. Tharnan, supra note 1, at 152-53. 
Upon being acquitted for a second time, however, the SCRF upheld the judgment. Case 
ofYes'kov (Altay), No. 51 kp-096-61sp (Nov. 14, 1996). For another case involving mul-
tiple acquittals of a defendant in Krasnodar who threw a grenade at a police station, see 
Irina Dline & Olga Schwartz, The jury Is Still Out on the Future of jury Trials in Russia, 
11 EAST EUROPEAN CONST. REV. 104, 108 (2002). 
374. For instance, in Case of Denisov (Altay), supra note 354, defendant was acquit-
ted of attempted murder of four persons. The acquittal was reversed because the two 
alternate jurors deliberated and ·1oted for acquittal. The defendant was again acquitted, 
but the judgment was again reversed because of a contradictory verdict. The jury found 
that the defendant acted in self-defense, but erroneously also found that he had not 
committed the charged act. Case ofDenisov (Altay), No.51-kp-094-61sp Qan. 18, 1995). 
1n Case of Luk'ianov (Moscow Region), No. 4-kp-094-145 Qune 12, 1994 ), the defendant 
was acquitted of rape of a minor, and convicted of a lesser offense but the case was 
reversed because the judge posed a "question of law," i.e., whether the defendant was 
guilty of "rape." Thaman, supra note 1, at 198. The jury reached the same verdict in the 
second trial, but the SCRF again reversed because the judge disqualified the acts found 
true by the jury and excluded a transcript of the defendant's prior testimony. Case of 
Luk'ianov (Moscow Region), No. 4-kp-095-126 sp Qan. 10, 1996). In Case ofKurochkin 
(Krasnodar), supra note 329, the defendants were acquitted of rape. The SCRF reversed 
the acquittal and a second jury acquitted the defendants again. The SCRF found a new 
reason to reverse: an error in the question list. Case of Kurochkin et al. (Krasnodar), No. 
18-k-099-3sp Qan. 28, 1999). Finally, in Case of Afanas'ev (Buriatiia), supra note 336, 
defendant's acquittal of a double murder was reversed because his lawyer called into 
question the character of a witness and mentioned to the jury his prior acquittal! 
375. Murphy, supra note 310. 
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his or her guilt.376 Timofeev found that in one regional court there were 
103 acquittals (28% of cases) over a six month period, eighteen due to long 
pretrial detentions, fourteen due to insufficient evidence of guilt, eight due 
to sympathy for a defendant in bad economic straits, twelve for other rea-
sons (e.g., youth, relationship of the defendant to the victim, restitution 
having been made, mental retardation, etc.).377 
Harmless error analysis may limit the need to reverse acquittals. Crit-
ics of the Tsarist Cassational Senate often lamented the fact that, due to the 
inconsistency and lack of precedential value of appellate rulings, jurors had 
to deal with the facts of the case "through a difficult, sometimes impenetra-
ble cassational forest."378 Nonetheless, the Cassational Senate employed a 
type of harmless error analysis, which meant that not every error in the 
question lists led to reversal of an acquittal. Though the Cassational Sen-
ate prohibited the use of "juridical terms," it would not reverse a verdict: 
(l) where the jurors were instructed clearly and in a detailed fashion as to 
the meaning of the terms used in the question and in the accusatory plead-
ing; (2) where the Cassational Senate was convinced of the correctness of 
the answers given; (3) where the parties did not object to the questions and 
the jury verdict was understandable and reached without problem; ( 4) 
where the juridical terms had the same meaning in everyday conversation; 
(5) where questions containing juridical terms were left unanswered; (6) 
where, along with juridical terms, factual elements were included "from 
which the meaning of the used terms can be divined''; or (7) where the 
question was susceptible to being understood by everyone.379 
The SCRF, in going out of its way to reverse acquittals, has neither 
cited any authority for its rulings nor attempted to explore the wealth of 
pre-revolution jurisprudence and scholarly writing on the subject of acquit-
tals. The ineluctable conclusion of this analysis is that the SCRF is acting 
to deprive the jury of its historically and statutorily rooted competence to 
determine guilt. The SCRF is acting as a political rather than a judicial 
institution. Its goal appears to be to fight crime by annulling "scandalous" 
jury acquittals. 380 The practices of the old Soviet professional judges are 
being carried on in the "robes of the new procedure,"381 and the SCRF is 
spearheading the sabotage of the "most important and liberal" provisions 
of the UPK-RF.382 
376. BoBRIS!ICHEv-PusrJKIN, supra note 152, at 204-205. In 494 of the acquittals the 
defendant admitted to some of the charged conduct. Id. 
377. T!MOFEEV, supra note 262, at 391-92. 
378. BoBRISHCHEv-PusHKIN, supra note 152, at 383. 
379. SELITRENNIKOV, SUpra note 164, at 12-13. 
380. This, indeed, was a recognized task of the Soviet and Republican Supreme 
Courts in Soviet times. l.L. Petrukhin, Sudebnye Garantii Prav Lichnosti (v ugolovnom 
pmtsesse), in AKTUAL'i'.rE VoPROSY BoR'BY s PREsTUPHOsT'ru v Rossn1 ZA RuBEZHOM, No.8, 
13-14 ( 1992). The U .5. Supreme Court has also been accused of being a "loyal foot 
soldier in the Executive's fight against crime." California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565 
(1991) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
381. K"RNOZOVA, supra note 10, at 14-15. 
382. Tamara Morshchakova, quoted in Leonid Nikitinskiy, ... I suda net. Diagnoz 
doktora Morshchakovoy, NovAIA GAZETA,july 19-21, 2004, at 7. 
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G. Double jeopardy and Limitations on the Reversibility of Acquittals 
The reluctance of the SCRF to accept jury acquittals may make many 
criminal defendants think twice before exercising their constitutional right 
to a jury trial. The idea that retrial of acquittals could violate the principle 
of double jeopardy was first brought before the CCRF in a case where the 
Cassational Panel of the SCRF affirmed an acquittal and it became final, 
only to be overturned by the Presidium of the SCRF in a procedure to 
review final judgments (so-called nadzor).383 The CCRF refused to hear, 
and then remanded, the case, declaring that the trial court should decide 
the case in accordance with the United Nations International Pact for Civil 
and Political Rights (IPCPR). Moscow regional court then dismissed the 
case, only to have the Presidium of the SCRF again reverse the dismissal 
and send the case back to trial.384 The evil in the nadzor procedure is that 
presidents of the courts could themselves trigger review of final judgments, 
and then be the judges on their own motions. In this capacity they often 
worked hand in hand with prosecutors to overturn acquittals that had 
become final. 385 
. The UPK-RF of 2001 took steps to prevent the reversal of acquittals on 
review, thus follov.ing the recommendation of the Concept of judicial 
Reform denying the judiciary any role in appealing acquittals386 or in any 
appeals in cassation which could worsen the position of the defendant.387 
§ 405 UPK-RF, in the original 2001 version, clearly prohibited use of the 
review procedure to appeal acquittals or to alter the posture of the case in 
any manner detrimental to the defendant. 388 
A CCRF decision of May 11, 2005 entitling the victim to move to re-
open a final judgment of acquittal using the review procedure sabotaged 
this step forward. Thus, the CCRF has effectively adopted the position of 
the prosecution, which criticized the limited review prescribed in the origi-
nal draft of the 2001 code. 389 A group of sixty victims supported by the 
human rights ombudsman successfully petitioned the CCRF to declare the 
unconstitutionality of§ 405 UPK RF, claiming it violated victims' rights to 
justice.390 Again, the victim was the Trojan horse for the prosecution in the 
383. Case of Belichenko et aL (Moscow Region), No.l268p96pr (acquittal affirmed 
by Cassational Panel, reversed by Presidium of SCRF Oan. 29, 1997). 
384. For a discussion, see KARNozovA, supra note 10, n.46. 
385. J.L PETRUKHIN, TEORETICHESKIE OSNOVY REFORMY UGOLOVNOGO PROTSESSA V ROSS!l 
Part I, 128 (2004). 
386. Concept of judicial Reform, supra note 2, at 85. 
387. ld. at 98. 
388. UPK-RF, supra note 14, § 405; Kommentariy-2002, supra note 70, at 651. The 
1864 code also prohibited review of final judgments of acquittaL UUS-1864, supra note 
34, § 21. 
389. Procuracy Letter, supra note 111, at 2-4, in which S.G. Kekhlerov explicitly calls 
for allowing the victim to petition for review of acquittals within one year and notes that 
this would not violate Protocol 7( 4) of ECHR. 
390. Postanovlenie Konstitutsionnogo suda Rossiyskoy federatsii po delu o proverke 
konstitutsionnosti stat'i 405 Ugolovno-protsessual'nogo kodeksa Rossiyskoy Federatsii v 
sviazi s zaprosom Kurganskogo oblastnogo suda, zhalobami Cpolnomochennogo po 
pravam cheloveka v Rossiyskoy Federatsii, proizvostvenno-technicheskogo kooperativa 
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quest to undermine and ultimately repeal the aspects of the 2001 UPK-RF 
that sought to protect defendants from the depredations of Soviet era pro-
cedure. Ye B. Mizulina, former State Duma Deputy and chair of the work-
ing group that drafted the UPK-RF, labeled the decision "primitive" and a 
"step back, approximately fifty years."391 
VI. Has the Elimination of the Mixed Court and the Expansion of the 
Jury in Russia Provided an Opportunity for Citizens to 
Participate in a "School for Democracy" and the Rule 
of Law? 
A Reduction in Lay Participation with the 2001 Code? 
Today one is faced with a seeming contradiction. The UPK-RF of 2001 
led to the consolidation of jury trial throughout the republic,392 but the 
simultaneous elimination of the mixed court has resulted in a substantial 
expansion of the cases subject to trial by a single judge.393 This has largely 
prevented the jury from performing the functions the reformers envisioned 
for it, including acting as a catalyst for the implementation of adversary 
procedure and allowing independent popular notions of justice and truth 
to correct the prosecutorial-inclinations of the Russian "no-acquittal" jus-
tice system. 
Voices in the Russian literature cognizant of this trend, however, have 
called for expansion of the jurisdiction of the jury courts, which the "Con-
cept of judicial Reform" recommended for cases punishable by more than 
one year imprisonment,394 and even the reintroduction of a reformed 
mixed court to expand lay participation.395 Some have called for the 
expansion of the number of lay assessors so that they may more easily 
assert their independence from the professional judge396 and conduct 
"Sodeystvie", obshchestva s ogranichennoy otvetstvennost'iu "Kareliia" i riada grazhdan 
(May 11, 2005). 
391. Anna Zakatnova, Ugolovnye problemy, RossJYSKAIA GAZETA, May 12, 2005, availa-
ble at http://www.rg.ru/2005/05/12/ks.html. 
392. It was never assured that the jury trial would spread beyond the nine partici-
pants in the "experiment" begun in 1993. The Russian government refused to fund an 
extension to twelve further regions in 1995-1996, and some of the regions, notably 
Riazan' and Altay, even threatened to stop hearing jury cases due to lack of funds. Dline 
& Schwarz, supra note 373, at 105-06. 
393. The turn to a capitalist, privatized economy led to a reluctance among employers 
to allow employees to sit on the mixed court. SoLOMON & FoGLESONG, supra note 60, at 
120-21, 131-32. For this reason, single-judge courts were introduced in 1992. FRo\NZ, 
supra note 96, at 44. Pashin opined that, following the implementation of the UPK-RF, 
there would be lay participation in only eighty-nine of Russia's 2,500 courts and in 0.8 
percent of criminal cases. Sergei Pashin, Who Needs a Dependent judge?, Moscow TIMES, 
july 2, 2001, at 10. 
394. Concept of judicial Reform, supra note 2, at 41. Only in America are jury trials 
available for an even broader range of offenses, those punishable by more than six 
months imprisonment. See Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 60 (1970). 
395. Yuriy Kolesov, Vmesto reformy sudebnoy sistemy my zakrepili yee poroki, VREV!IA 
NOVOSTEY. No. 29, available through 1NDEM, supra note 59 (Feb. 10-29, 2004). 
396. AA Demichev suggests a court with one professional judge and five lay asses-
sors. Perspektivy rossiyskogo suda prisiazhnykh, GosUDARSTvo 1 PRAVO, vol. ll, 101-1004 
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more transparent deliberations,397 such as by including their reasoning in 
their responses to question lists. 398 
B. Has jury Trial Been a "School for Democracy" in the Eyes of the 
jurors Themselves? 
It has been difficult to assess the extent to which jurors are satisfied 
with their participation in the new Russian system. An early study in Sara-
tov showed a high level of juror satisfaction, though this was conducted in 
the heady early years of the system in a region that was especially enthusi-
astic about its introduction.399 More recently, 200 jurors were surveyed 
who served in jury trials in 2004-2005. Before participating as a juror, 
most of those surveyed (72%) were confident that the jury was a more 
humane judicial institution. After their experience, however, the figure 
dropped to 61% while the number of those who disagreed rose signifi-
cantly from 29% to 48%.400 
To commence jury selection the trial court must summon at least 20 
prospective jurors.401 In the first year or two of Russian jury trials, courts 
seldom had to postpone trial due to the failure of jurors to respond to their 
summons. 402 Unfortunately, the difficulty of summoning jurors to partici-
pate seems to belie the research indicating that jury duty is popular. Since 
(2002). 1 suggested to the Japanese a mixed court of one professional judge and at least 
six lay assessors. Thaman, supra note 32, at 98-99. The future japanese court with lay 
assessors ( saiban-in) will consist of three professional judges and six lay assessors, and 
will begin its work in 2009. Hiroshi Matsubara, Quasi-jury System Earns Diet Approval, 
jAPAN TIMES, May 22, 2004, available at www.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/getarticle.pl5?nn 
20050522a2.htm. 
397. In a late Soviet writing, Petrukhin suggested having the mixed court deliberate in 
the courtroom to prevent professional judges from browbeating the people's assessors. 
l.l. Petrukhin, Die Oeffentlichkeit (glasnost') im sowjetischen Strafprozess, in 4 DEcTscH-
SowJETlSCHES KmwQuruM 129, 134 (1989). 
398. Yu. V. Korenevskiy believes that the question list would "de-automatize" the mak-
ing of judicial decisions. Aktual'nye problemy dokazyvaniia v ugolovnom protsesse, 
GoscoARSTVO 1 PRAVO No. 2, 62 (1999), cited in KARNozovA, supra note 10, at 260. I 
suggested that the Japanese introduce a question list as well as a public instruction of 
the lay assessors on the principles of law applicable to the questions at issue to provide 
transparency and avoid the utter secrecy inherent in the German mixed court model. 
Thaman, supra note 32, at llO. 
399. M.V. Sadomtseva reports of a study in which all jurors who participated in Sara-
tov from February 1994 until October 1995 were given questionnaires. Problemy 
otnosheniia grazhdan k obiazannostiam prisiazhnogo zasedatelia I vospriatiia imi prot-
sedury sudebnogo razbirate/'stva, VESTNIK SARATOVSKOY GOSCDARSTVEI\NOY AKADEM!l PRAVA, 
Vol. 3 120, 123-25 (1996). 354 of 434 jurors filled them out and 91.8 percent approved 
of their experience. 66.7 percent indicated their desire to participate again. 
400. U.S. Embassy, Law Enforcement Section, Sociological Survey Report: Survey of 
jurors' Opinions of the Russian System of Criminal justice, 9 (2005) (unpublished, on file 
with author). 
401. UPK-RF, supra note 14, § 327(3); UPK-RSFSR, supra note 12, § 434. 
402. ln this period, Saratov had nearly 100 percent attendance of jurors. Sadomtseva, 
supra note 399, at 125. ~o trial in Saratov had to be postponed for this reason. Nemy-
tina, Sud prisiazhnykh, supra note 214, at 29. Throughout the nine regions in 1994, 92 
percent of those called to jury duty appeared. The number began to fall when financing 
for the jury courts was cut and jurors were less secure in getting their stipend. Interview 
with Sergey Pashin by Lev Roytman, Peredacha 'Fakty i mneniia.' Prisiazhnye v Rossii sud'i 
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the early days it has become increasingly difficult for courts to summon 
the 20 jurors required to begin jury selection in Russian cases.403 In 2003, 
for example, when the Moscow Regional Court was faced with the task of 
assembling sufficient prospective jurors for four jury trials that were to 
begin around the same time, only 60 of the 1200 candidates agreed to 
come to court.404 
VII. Conclusion: Can an Independent Russian jury be Resurrected 
and Serve as a Model for Eurasia and Elsewhere? 
"Our social life is like swampy, shaky ground. No matter how wonderful a 
building is erected on this ground, it vanishes in an unseen manner into this 
ground, little by little it is sucked up by this soiL"405 
V.D. Spasovich 
"We have a strange symbiosis of a democratic model of institutions and a 
Stalinist model of their functioning."406 
Sergey Stepashin 
A Mandatory jurisdiction of the Lay Participation Courts 
In Russia, a jury trial should be mandatory for the most serious 
offenses, such as murder, as is the case in Spain, in order to prevent law-
yers, investigators, prosecutors, and judges from pressuring defendants to 
waive this right. Arguably, jury trials are inappropriate in certain sensitive 
cases involving state secrets, terrorism, or violent organized crime. Spain 
took this approach in leaving these cases to the jurisdiction of a special 
National Court composed exclusively of professional judges.407 The 
procuracy and the successor of the KGB, the Federal Security Service 
(FSB), sought to eliminate jury trials in espionage cases408 after the acquit-
ili zalozhniki?," RAD1o SvoBODA (wEB-SAYT), jan. 17, 2003, available through INDEM, 
supra note 59 (Feb.1-7, 2003). 
403. Only 5-10 percent of those summoned show up in some regions. K'\RNozovA, 
supra note 10, at 297-98. 
404. Vladimir Perekrest, Narodnaia Femida, 1zvEsTnA, july 2, 2003; see also Kira 
Remneva, Sud iz ulitsy, EzHENEDEL'NYY ZHt:RNAL, May 8, 2003, available through INDEM, 
supra note 59 (Apr. 27-May ll, 2003) (claiming that only one in sixteen prospective 
jurors in Riazan' Region actually responds). A 90 percent failure-to-appear rate has been 
noted in Moscow Region and 84 percent in Altay Territory, while lvanovo Region has 
reported only a lO percent rate of failure to appear. Paul]. DeMuniz, judicial Reform in 
Russia: Russia Looks to the Past to Create a New Adversarial System of Criminal justice, 11 
W!LLAMETTEj. lNT'L L. &: DISPVTE REs. 81, 115 (2004); cf. Sharov, supra note 318 (5-10 
percent appearance rate in some regions). 
405. BoBFJSHCHEv-PusHK!N, supra note 152, at 13. 
406. S. Stepashin, Protiv kriminalizatsii Rossii, Ross!YSKA!A YUSTITSJIA vol. 1, 2 (2000). 
407. Ley Organica 6/1985 dell de julio del Poder judicial,§§ 63, 65, (Spain) availa-
ble at http://www.juridicas.com/base_datos/ Admin/lo6- I 985.11 t4.html 
408. Pavel Aptekar', Yuristy otnosiatsia k prisiazhnym !uchshe, chem FSB, STOLICHNAIA 
VERCHERNWA GAZETA, Feb. 20, 2004, available through INDEM, supra note 59 (Feb.l9-29, 
2004). 
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tal of Valentin Danilov in Krasnoyarsk on December 30, 2003,409 but these 
efforts stopped after the conviction of Igor Sutiagin in Moscow City Court 
for espionage. 
In Russia's case, I do not believe espionage cases should be taken from 
the jurisdiction of the jury court. First, the defendants in the Russian cases 
are typically scientists, who probably could not intimidate jurors. Second, 
these cases, like the seditious libel cases in eighteenth century England, are 
quintessentially political cases where a jury should intervene. 
In the case of trials of terrorists or members of violent gangs, jury 
trials have sometimes become excessively cumbersome in Russia due to the 
number of defendants and the ensuing number of questions that the jury 
must decide. Here, too, jurors could be justifiably afraid of reprisals from 
Russian gang members, who are among the most ruthless and violent in 
the world. Again, however, the slipshod nature of criminal investigations 
in Russia and the inability to trust the professional judiciary to evaluate 
fairly the evidence produced in such investigations militate against entrust-
ing such cases to a purely professional court. 
Once an exception is made for cases involving "national security" or 
"terrorism," officials will try to squeeze controversial cases under such 
rubrics and a dual system of justice may result, in which outsiders, enemy 
combatants, etc., would be deprived of due process.410 
B. The Use of More Independent Mixed Courts in Instances of Less-
Serious Offenses 
I believe that Russia would benefit by maintaining the mixed court 
system in district court trials where the defendant faces imprisonment for 
more than 5 years.411 Lesser crimes could be tried by a single judge. The 
German Code of Criminal Procedure of 1871 provided for a jury trial in 
instances of serious capital crimes and for a mixed court for lesser crimes 
(until the jury was eliminated in 1924).412 Austria413 and Norway414 con-
409. Seth Mydans, Rare Russian jury Acquits Scientist in Spy Case, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 30, 
2003. Of course, Danilov's acquittal was reversed due to "pressures being placed on the 
jury" by defense counsel, and he was convicted in a secret trial in September 2004. 
Voronov, supra note 145, at 52. 
410. The 1864 Russian laws were amended in 1881 and 1907 to remove all political 
and capital cases from the jurisdiction of the jury court and try them in military or other 
secret courts. KucHEROV, supra note 36, at 204-06. The parallels with the military com-
missions of President George W. Bush for "enemy combatants" also come to mind. See 
generally Stephen C. Thaman, L'impatto dell'll Settembre sulla procedura penale ameri-
cana, CASSAZJONE PENALE No. 1, 251, 263-54 (2006). 
411. The main author ofrhe 1993 jury law, Sergey Pashin has also criticized the elimi-
nation of the mixed courts and maintained his work with lay assessors in Moscow City 
Court for five years was a "good experience." Natarov, supra note 57. 
412. Markus Dirk Dubber, The German jury and the Metaphysical Volk: From Romantic 
Idealism to Nazi Ideology, 43 A-,1. J. CoMP. L. 227, 235-37 (1995). 
413. A mixed court of two professional judges and two lay assessors hears cases pun-
ishable by more than five years, and a jury of three professional judges and ten jurors 
hears cases punishable by more than five years when the maximum exceeds ten years. 
Strafprozessordnung, in 5TRAFPROZESSORDNUNG KURZKOMMENTAR, §§ 13, 14 (Manz. 8th 
ed. 2000). 
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tinue to provide jury trials for the most serious crimes, mixed courts for 
the mid-range offenses, and single judge courts for the least serious 
offenses. 
Ironically, the Soviet form of mixed court had much more actual 
resonance throughout the world than its much touted German proto-
type. 415 It became a fixture nearly everywhere in the Socialist Bloc, and 
still exists in remaining socialist or communist countries, such as China, 
Vietnam, and Cuba, as well as in post-socialist countries such as Poland, 
Hungary, the Czech Republic, Croatia, Ukraine, Belarus, Estonia, and 
Latvia (where it has functioned more like the German mixed court since 
the end of Communist party domination). 
The important question is whether the Soviet mixed court system can 
be transformed into a court that can guarantee real judicial independence, 
given that many of the Communist-era judges still sit on the bench.416 
Modern systems of mixed courts should require random selection of 
lay assessors from the general public to ensure a fair cross-section of the 
community and independence from political parties and the establish-
ment. Such independence did not exist in the old "key man" system of 
picking juries in the United States,417 nor in the Communist Party-con-
trolled selection of lay assessors in the old Soviet Bloc.418 Such indepen-
dence is also absent in the party-dominated system of "vetting" candidates, 
which exists in Germany419 and other European countries.420 In contrast, 
lay assessors are drawn randomly from voter lists in the new Venezuelan 
system,421 in France,422 and will be so chosen in the mixed courts to be 
414. In reality, trials in the first instance are all heard by mixed court of either one 
professional judge and two lay assessors, or in cases of more serious crimes, by two 
professional judges and three lay assessors. Serious crimes punishable by an excess of 
six years are then subject to trial by jury but only on appeal. Asbjorn Strandbakken, Lay 
Participation in Norway, 72 REv. lNT'L DE DROIT PENAL 230-36 (2001). 
415. That is, real resonance. Among theoretical proponents of mixed courts, it is the 
German SchOffengericht that serves as the model, not the more prevalent variations of 
the Soviet "court with people's assessors." See john H. Langbein, Mixed Court and jury 
Court: Could the Continental Alternative Fill the American Need? 1981 AM. BAR. FouNDA~ 
TlON RESEARCH j. 195. 
416. For a recent sociological study of the Russian mixed court in the Rostov Region 
shortly before its abolition, a time when the lay assessors were chosen at random and 
were given access to case files, see Stefan Machura, Fairness, justice and Legitimacy: 
Experiences of People's judges in South Russia, 2 LAw &: PouCY 123-47 (2003). Machura 
notes that the lay assessors decided cases rapidly, with little time to understand their 
intricacies. For a more negative assessment, calling the lay assessors "snoring grandnan-
nies,n see SoLOMON &: FoGLESONG, supra note 60, at 120-21. On the persistent lack of 
influence of the pensioner-lay assessors, see Pomorski, supra note 60, at 469-71. 
417. LAfAVE ET AL., supra note 301, at 1044. 
418. Thaman, supra note 1, at 67. 
419. STRAFPRozl£oRDNUNG 1381-1533 (Kleinknecht&: Meyer-Gogner eds., 43rd ed. 
1997) [hereinafter GVG-Germany]. 
420. For instance, Denmark and Norway. Hiroshi Sato, Designing the Lay judge Sys-
tem in japan, in THE RoLE OF THE jUDICIARY IN CHANGING SoCIETY (symposium of the 
Japanese Association of Sociology of Law, Tokyo, japan) Qune 9-10, 2001) (on file with 
the author). 
421. COPP-Venezuela-2001, § 155; cf Stephen C. Thaman, Latin America's First Mod-
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introduced in Kazakhstan on january l, 2007.423 The Russian system was 
modified in 2002 to introduce the same selection process.424 
It is also recommended that lay assessors only sit on a single case 
every year,425 as will be the case in the new Japanese mixed court, which 
will take effect in 2009.426 This restriction prevents "case-hardening," but, 
more importantly, prevents the formation of close relationships between 
assessors and the judges, which undermine the independence of assessors. 
Lay assessors sit for four years in Germany427 and may re-volunteer or be 
re-elected to indefinite successive terms, thus becoming more like English 
lay magistrates.428 Such a system also existed in the Soviet Union and still 
exists in Sweden, where lay judges are elected by local councils for a six 
year period. 429 Lay assessors, if limited to one case, will offer a fresh and 
independent perspective, and will act less like the "nodders" of the former 
Soviet Union or the "ornaments" in Germany430, Hungary,431 and other 
SCHENRECHTE: FESTSCHRIFT FUR STEFAN TRECHSEL 768-69 (Andreas Donatsch et a!. eds., 
2002). 
422. LoMBARD, supra note 24, at 292. 
423. Zakon Respubiiki Kazakhstan of jan. 16, 2006, No. 121, § 6(1)(1), available at 
http:/ /wvt\V, minjust.kz/ site/index_rus.php ?mod=arefphp&DataTextid= I O&Table_ 
Name=laws ("0 prisiazhnykh zasedateley"). 
424. 0 narodnykh zasedateliakh federal'nykh sudov obshchey yurisdiktsii v Rossiyskoy 
Federatsii, Federal'nyy Zakon ofjan. 2, 2000, No. 37-F3, SoB. ZAK. RF, §§ 2(1), 5(2), 9(1) 
(2000), reprinted in UGOLOVNG-PROTSESSUAL'NYY KODEKS RSFSR s PRILOZHENIAMI 256-60 
(N.P. Kipnis ed., 2d. ed. 2001) [hereinafter, Law on People's Assessors-RF]. 
425. The 2000 Russian reforms also provided that lay assessors only sit for a total of 
fourteen days, or not more than one case, whichever was longer. Law on People's Asses-
sors-RF, supra note 424, § 9( I). Unfortunately, some courts routinely violated this law. 
Georgiy Tselms, Nashe mesto !ish' na skam'e podsudimykh, RusSKIY KUR'ER, Mar. 15, 2004, 
available through INDEM, supra note 59 (Mar. 13-19, 2004). Such a violation led to 
Russia being condemned in the European Court of Human Rights in Posokhov, supra 
note 345. For support of the maintenance of the new Russian mixed court, and noting 
that famous pre-revolution judge A. F. Koni held that professional judges should never be 
in a position to deprive anyone of liberty, see V.P. Bozh'ev, 0 sovershenstvovanii 
ugolovnogo-protsessual'nogo zakonodatel'stva, in SuDEBNAIA REFORMA v Rossn, supra note 
132, at 225. This was also the position of the Concept of judicial Reform, supra note 2, 
at 51 (no imprisonmem or, at most, up to one year). 
4 26. See Recommendations of the justice System Reform Council- For a justice System to 
Support japan in the 21st Century, reprinted in 2000-2001 ST. Lours-WARSAw TMNSAT· 
LAKTIC LJ 215 [hereinafter japan Recommendations]. 
427. German Schoffen are elected for four terms and sit for no more than twelve regu-
lar court sessions each year. It should be noted the committees should strive to include 
"all groups of the population" in the lists.§§ 42, 43 GVG-Germany, supra note 419. 
428. ERIC LoRENZO PEREz SARMIENTO, CoMENTARios AL C()DJGO 0RGANrco PRocESAL 
PENAL 215 (3rd ed. 2000) (commenting on the Venezuelan method of selecting lay asses-
sors for just one case, noted that "a lay judge elected for two years, with the unlimited 
possibility of being re-elected, as occurred in the now disappeared USSR, ends by being 
professionalized, and converting himself into a political figure."). 
429. THE SwEDISH CoDE OF juDICIAL PROCEDURE, ch. II, §§ 7-8; The National Council 
for Crime Prevention, Report No. 16 ( 1985). In Sweden it is not uncommon for a lay 
assessor to have served for as many as twenty years. Sato, supra note 420, at 12. 
430. In Germany, some have used the word SchOffenattrappe (lay assessor as stage 
prop). RENNIG, supra note 27. at 273. 
431. Attila Bad6, Reforming the Hungarian Lay justice System, at 10 (Paper presented 
at Law and Society Meeting, Budapest, july 4-7, 2001) (on file with author). 
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countries.432 This limitation also gives a greater part of the population the 
chance to participate in the administration of justice, which should be one 
of the key aims of the system. The goal of greater inclusion is also pro-
moted by mixed courts containing more than just two lay assessors, such 
as in the classic German and Soviet models. Kazakhstan has opted for a 
mixed court composed of two professional judges and nine lay 
assessors. 4 33 
C. Limiting the Adversarial Rights of the Victim 
The role of aggrieved party or victim in Russian criminal trials should 
be limited to that of a civil complainant seeking damages and not to that of 
a party with process rights equal to the defendant (as is now the case). But 
if the Russian legislature continues to allow the aggrieved party to be a 
collateral prosecutor, then she should be required to hire counsel or have 
court-appointed counsel, as is done in Spain. The aggrieved party should 
be responsible for raising at the pre-trial or trial stages all issues it later 
relies on in the appeals process. Recent decisions of the CCRF, which treat 
the aggrieved party as a completely helpless and blameless party, use the 
often intentional violation of their rights as a pretext to overturn acquittals 
or return shoddy cases to the prosecutor for further investigation. Such 
decisions are inappropriate and undermine the adversary procedure man-
dated by the Russian Constitution. 
D. Simplification of the Verdict Form 
The Russian jury should either adopt the Anglo-American general ver-
dict,434 or should explicitly instruct jurors as to the juridical meaning of 
each of the questions asked in the special verdict or question list. The jury 
must understand precisely what crime or crimes the defendant .vill be con-
victed or acquitted of if they answer in a given way. Juries should apply the 
law that is explained to them in the judge's summation to the facts that 
they find proved, and they alone should determine guilt. Guilty verdicts 
should be by qualified majority-at least nine or ten of the twelve jurors.435 
432. For an argument that the American jury trial system has been reduced to an 
"ornament" due to its displacement by plea-bargaining, see DA'viASKA, supra note 152, at 
128-29. 
433. Ugolovno-protsessual'nyy kodeks Respubliki Kazakhstan § 544, added Jan. 16, 
2006, goes into effect, Jan. l, 2007. 
434. The Republic of Georgia appears to be headed towards adopting the classic 
American jury court, composed of twelve jurors and one professional judge and using a 
general verdict form. Draft Code of Criminal Procedure of the Republic of Georgia 
§§ 241, 243 (on file with author) [hereinafter 2006 Draft CCP-Georgia]. I would like to 
thank Professor William Burnham, who is working with the Georgians on their new 
code, for providing me with a 2006 draft. The Azerbaijan jury law also provides for 
submitting just two simple questions, as to guilt and lenience, to their twelve person 
jury, which will then decide based on a simple majority of votes. Ugolovno-protses-
sual'nyy kodeks Azerbaydzhanskoy Respubliki, No. 907-IG, §§ 79(2), 369, 370, 
375(4)(1) (confirmed by a law of July 14, 2000, but not yet in effect). 
435. Mel'nik suggests raising the votes necessary for a guilty judgment to eight from 
seven. MEL'NIK, supra note 5, at 121. Petrukhin supports unanimous, or at least quali· 
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E. Limitation of the Appellate Jurisdiction of the Second Instance 
Courts 
Vol. 40 
Russia should also introduce a "raise or waive" rule for bringing 
appeals and a harmless error rule. The SCRF should be limited in its 
review to the issues that were properly preserved (through timely objec-
tion) at the trial court level and raised by appellate counsel. Acquittals 
should be final and not subject to appeal436 except, perhaps, where the 
verdict was procured through corrupt means.437 Without these changes, 
the SCRF \vill continue to overturn any acquittals that displease it for any 
reasons it sees fit, and the jury will continue to function as an irrelevant, 
decorative institution. 
fied majority, verdicts. Petrukhin, Sudebnye Garantii, supra note 380, at 11. Draft CCP-
Georgia, § 245, supra note 434, would require nine of twelve votes for a conviction. 
436. See SoLOMON & FOGLESONG, supra note 60, at 189 (suggesting that Russia should 
not allow appeals of jury acquittals). Draft CCP-Georgia, supra note 434, § 251 would 
make jury acquittals final and not subject to appeaL 
437. There is little precedent in Anglo-American jurisprudence to allow an appeal of a 
fraudulently acquired acquittal. DavidS. Rudstein, Double jeopardy and the Fraudulently 
Obtained Acquittal, 60 Mo. L. REv. 607, 620-35 (1995). However, an lllinois court 
recently reversed an acquittal in a court trial procured through bribery, and the 7th 
Circuit let the decision stand. People v. Aleman, 667 N.E.2d 615, 623-27 (Ill. App. 
1996); Aleman v. Honorable Judges of Cook County Circuit Court, 138 F.3d 302, 307-
08 (7th Cir. 1998). 
